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A b s t r a c t
This thesis uses Australian unit-record data to examine two important aspects of 
labour supply behaviour. The first part of this thesis examines the participation 
decisions of Australian teenagers. Traditionally, the decision of whether to 
complete school or enter the labour force has been explained using personal 
characteristics, such as age and gender, and family background characteristics, 
such as parents' education. Chapter 2 extends this framework to consider whether 
neighbourhood characteristics provide information about these participation 
decisions over and above personal and family background characteristics. The 
results suggest that neighbourhood effects are present. Also within this 
framework, Chapter 3 considers whether government policy initiatives, designed 
to increase the proportion of Australian teenagers completing high school, 
achieved this aim. Again, the results suggest that this extension increases our 
understanding of teenage participation decisions.
The second part of this thesis investigates two aspects of job-search behaviour. 
Chapter 4 examines the factors that affect how teenagers look for work. An 
equilibrium search model is developed to explain why local labour market 
conditions may be important. The empirical analysis supports the model’s 
implication that teenagers in high unemployment areas are more likely to use 
general search methods, such as a newspapers or employment agencies, which 
appear to be less successful on average. Chapter 5 considers whether reservation 
wage information helps to explain the unemployment duration of the individuals 
in a sample that covers a wider cross-section of the Australian labour market. 
Despite the importance of this variable in job-search models, it does not appear 
to explain unemployment duration experiences once background characteristics 
and previous labour market experience has been controlled for.
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C h a p t e r  1 
S o m e  F a c t s  a n d  a  Su m m a r y
1 Introduction
The unemployment rate in Australia has risen substantially over the past three 
decades: it has increased from an average of less than 2 per cent in the late 1960s 
to an average of around 8 per cent in the 1980s and 1990s (Figure 1). Not 
surprisingly, estimates o f the NAIRU for Australia have also increased 
substantially since the 1970s, with recent estimates o f the NAIRU lying between 
5Vi and 7 per cent (Gruen, Pagan and Thompson, 1999).
Figure 1: Aggregate Unemployment Rate
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Source: ABS Cat. No. 6203.0 and ABS Cat. No. 6204.0
The rise in the aggregate unemployment rate has been associated with an increase 
in the average duration of unemployment (Figure 2). This increase in the 
proportion o f long-term unemployment has been concentrated on some groups
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more than others, in particular, teenagers, less-skilled workers, and people who 
previously worked in declining industries (Miller and Volker, 1987; Fahrer and 
Heath, 1992; Debelle and Swann, 1998; Strombach, Dockery and Ying, 1998).
Figure 2: Average Duration Of Unemployment
Weeks Weeks
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Source: ABS Cat. No. 6202.0 and ABS Cat. No. 6203.0
Recent research on neighbourhood-level data has indicated that unemployment 
has also become increasingly concentrated in low-socioeconomic areas (Hunter, 
1995; Gregory and Hunter, 1995). The unemployment rate for the 10 per cent o f 
neighbourhoods with the lowest socioeconomic ranking increased from just 
below 10 per cent in 1976 to around 40 per cent in 1991. The unemployment rate 
for the 10 per cent o f neighbourhoods with the highest socioeconomic ranking 
increased marginally over this time, but remained below 10 per cent in 1991.
This thesis uses information about the participation and job-search decisions o f 
individuals to understand the extent to which the level o f the unemployment rate
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in Australia can be explained by labour supply factors, rather than labour 
demand. The analysis concentrates on the extent to which the local environment 
affects the labour supply decisions and search effectiveness of Australian 
teenagers, the ability of government policy to influence teenagers’ education 
decisions, and the role of the reservation wage in explaining the unemployment 
duration of a wider cross section of the Australian labour market.
Three of the four pieces of analysis that follow focus on the participation 
decisions and job-search behaviour of teenagers. Therefore, it is useful to provide 
some further information about the characteristics of the Australian teenage 
labour market before summarising the analysis and results in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis.
2 The Australian Youth Labour Market
The unemployment rate for teenagers in Australia has always been higher than 
the unemployment rate for adults (Figure 3). Traditionally, the high youth 
unemployment rate has been explained by a large number of teenagers 
experiencing relatively short spells of unemployment. Foster and 
Gregory (1982) find that in 1979-80 the rate of flow into the teenage 
unemployment pool was four to five times larger than the rate of flow into the 25 
to 54 year-old unemployment pool. They also show that flows into the teenage 
unemployment pool are almost entirely accounted for by separations from full­
time employment rather than entry from the outside the labour force.
However, high inflow rates only account for around half of the total teenage 
unemployment rate. It is also unlikely that changes in inflow rates over time can 
explain the rise in the teenage unemployment rate since the beginning of the 
1970s. A more likely explanation of this rise is the increase in the average
12
duration of unemployment for teenagers, which followed a similar path to 
aggregate average duration over this period (Figure 4). The duration of 
unemployment for teenagers will be capped by the length of time a teenager can 
be in unemployment before being reclassified into an older age group. This is 
likely to explain some of the levelling out o f the average duration o f teenage 
unemployment since the 1980s.
Figure 3: Unemployment Rates By Age
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Source: ABS Cat. No. 6203.0 and ABS Cat. No. 6204.0
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Figure 4: Average Duration Of Unemployment By Age
Weeks Weeks
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Source: ABS Cat. No. 6202.0 and ABS Cat. No. 6203.0
Although the teenage participation rate has fallen substantially, due to increased 
participation in full-time education (Figure 5), this has not offset falls in the full­
time teenage employment-to-population ratio (Figure 6). In 1998, almost half o f 
teenage unemployment could be attributed to teenagers who were not enrolled in 
full-time education and were looking for full-time employment.1 This figure does 
not include a significant degree o f underemployment, as roughly two-thirds o f 
teenagers who work part time, and are not enrolled in full-time education, would 
prefer to work more hours.
1 See ABS Cat. No. 6203.0, The Labour Force, Australia, September 1998.
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Figure 5: Total Year 12 Apparent Retention Rates2
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The decline in the full-time employment-to-population ratio for teenagers has 
been offset to some extent by an increase in the part-time employment-to- 
population ratio. The part-time labour market is dominated by teenagers whose 
main activity is full-time education: by 1998, around 80 per cent o f teenage part- 
time jobs were held by teenagers whose main activity was education. Teenagers 
in full-time education have been well placed to meet the increased demand for 
part-time labour, especially in relatively low-skilled service sectors such as retail 
trade. Around 90 per cent o f unemployed teenagers looking for part-time work 
were in full-time education. Foster and Gregory (1982) show that even in 1979- 
80, flows between employment and outside-the-labour-force were dominated by 
part-time employment flows.
2 Apparent retention rates are calculated as the number of students completing Year 12 
(the final year of secondary school in Australia) in the given year divided by the size 
of the cohort that entered secondary school six years earlier, adjusted for factors such 
as interstate and overseas migration and grade repetition.
15
Figure 6: Employment To Population Ratios For 15-19 Year-Olds
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The decline in the likelihood o f finding full-time employment after leaving full­
time education has probably been an important factor behind the marked increase 
in the number o f teenagers attending full-time education, especially the number 
completing Year 12, the final year of high school. Estimates o f what factors 
affect the teenage participation decision using time series data find evidence o f a 
strong negative correlation between the proportion o f teenagers staying in full­
time education and the full-time employment to population ratio (Larum and 
Beggs, 1989; Lewis and Koshy, 1998). Although the proportion o f Australian 
teenagers completing high school has trended upwards, it has plateaued in the 
1990s at a level below the average of other industrialised countries, suggesting 
that there is room for improvement (Table l) .3
3 Note that these data will be affected by legal minimum leaving ages and differences in 
the way education systems are organised.
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Table 1: Full-Time Retention Rates In Secondary Education By Age, 1992
At age 16 At age 17 At age 18
Greater than 90 per cent Greater than 80 per cent Greater than 50 per cent
Netherlands 97.3 Belgium 93.6 Germany 82.3
Belgium 97.2 Germany 92.8 Finland 79.7
Canada 96.3 Netherlands 90.8 Norway 77.2
Germany 95.3 Japan 90.2 Switzerland 74.2
Japan 95.1 France 87.2 Denmark 68.9
Norway 92.8 Sweden 87.0 Netherlands 67.9
Denmark 92.4 Norway 86.6 Sweden 59.6
France 92.1 Finland 85.8 France 58.6
United States 91.4 Switzerland 82.0
Denmark 80.1
80 to 90 per cent 60 to 80 per cent 20 to 50 per cent
Sweden 89.2 Canada 72.0 Belgium 49.8
Greece 88.4 United States 72.0 Canada 36.9
New Zealand 87.8 Ireland 70.2 Spain 35.5
Ireland 87.5 Spain 66.9 Ireland 33.1
Switzerland 85.2 New Zealand 65.7 New Zealand 20.8
Greece 62.1 United States 20.6
Less than 80 per cent Less than 60 per cent Less than 20 per cent
Australia 78.7 Australia 58.8 Turkey 19.8
Spain 75.6 UK 55.3 Greece 19.4
UK 75.3 Turkey 33.9 UK 18.7
Turkey 39.3 Australia 14.2
Japan 1.8
Source: Centre for Education Research and Innovation, and OECD (1995).
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3 Thesis Summary
3.1 Part 1: Aspects o f School Leaving Decisions
The natural question that arises when looking at data for the youth labour market 
is why teenagers decide not to complete high school when their labour market 
prospects are so poor? The role of personal characteristics, such as age and 
gender, and family background characteristics, such as parents' education, have 
been examined previously in the Australian and international literature and have 
been found to be important. This thesis extends the basic framework previously 
applied, to ask whether local environment or government financial assistance 
have also had an impact on the education decisions of teenagers in Australia.
Chapter 2 examines whether characteristics of the local environment, or 
neighbourhood effects, can help explain school-leaving behaviour over and 
above personal and family background characteristics. An effort is also made to 
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous neighbourhood effects. 
Exogenous neighbourhood effects arise when neighbourhood characteristics 
affect individual behaviour directly, for example, role model effects. Endogenous 
neighbourhood effects arise when the behaviour of an individual is influenced by 
the behaviour of other individuals in the neighbourhood making the same 
decision, for example, peer group effects. Endogenous neighbourhood effects can 
also be thought of as examples of strategic complementarities, which introduces 
the possibility of multiple equilibria and a potentially important role for policy.
The results presented in Chapter 2 suggest that both types of neighbourhood 
effects are present in a teenager’s schooling decision. While it is not possible to 
identify the channels through which they operate, several possible explanations
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are discussed, including the role of job information provided by a local network 
of friends and relatives and role model effects.
Chapter 3 examines whether government policy initiatives, designed to increase 
the proportion of teenagers completing high school, have had the desired effect. 
In 1987, the Australian government introduced a new means-tested income 
support scheme which increased the level and coverage of financial assistance 
available to teenagers in their final two years of high school. Previous work has 
found that the introduction of this scheme, known as AUSTUDY, increased the 
number of eligible teenagers staying on at school by between 3 and 4 percentage 
points (Dearden and Heath, 1996). This analysis, however, neglected to consider 
the effect of changes made to unemployment benefit arrangements which 
occurred simultaneously, and which were also designed to encourage teenagers 
to stay at school.
In Chapter 3, the effects of these simultaneous policy changes are examined in a 
model in which teenagers can be observed in one of three outcomes: school, 
employment or unemployment. The most tractable method of estimating 
multinomial outcome models is the multinomial logit model. The results of 
estimating this model suggest that introducing AUSTUDY and reducing the 
availability of unemployment benefits increased the probability of teenagers 
completing high school and decreased the probability of being unemployed, 
although the probability of being employed fell by more. For individuals who 
completed high school after 1987, eligibility for AUSTUDY is estimated to have 
increased the probability of completing high school by between 8 and 10 
percentage points.
The multinomial logit model, however, does not allow free estimation of any 
variance-covariance parameters. To do this, it is necessary to estimate a less
restricted model such as the multinomial probit model. Without information 
about characteristics of the outcomes which were not chosen, for example, the 
wage an individual would have received had they been employed, identification 
of a multinomial probit model will be fragile, that is, vastly different estimates of 
the variance-covariance parameters are consistent with the same likelihood value 
(Keane, 1992). In the current context, outcome-specific data are not available. 
This results in difficulty identifying variance-covariance parameters, although the 
marginal effects of different variables on behaviour do not change significantly. 
Consequently, there is very little to be gained by freely estimating variance- 
covariance parameters in this case.
3.2 Part 2: Aspects o f Job-Search Behaviour
Descriptive evidence from Australian and international data strongly suggest that 
some methods of job-search, notably using friends and relatives and directly 
approaching employers, are more successful than others at generating acceptable 
job offers. Despite this, roughly two-thirds of unemployed Australian teenagers 
report that their main method of job-search is one of the less successful methods 
such as newspapers or employment agencies. Chapter 4 examines the factors 
which affect the job-search method choice of unemployed Australian teenagers.
First, an economic model of job-search method choice is developed by extending 
the equilibrium search framework of Pissarides (1990). The model assumes that 
individuals have two methods of finding work. The effectiveness of the first 
method, labelled the general search method, in generating job offers depends on 
aggregate labour market conditions and the amount of effort put into search by 
the individual. The general search method captures job-search methods such as 
looking at newspapers and registering with employment agencies. The 
effectiveness of the second job method, labelled the local search method, is
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assumed to depend on local labour market conditions alone and cannot be 
affected by increasing search effort. This captures the idea that networks of 
friends and relatives are local in nature and that the ability of these networks to 
generate job offers only depends on the proportion of the network who are 
employed.
This model demonstrates that individuals will search harder using the general 
search method as the local unemployment rate rises. General equilibrium results 
are also derived and are demonstrated by considering the effects of an increase in 
the efficiency of the local search method and of an increase in the flow of 
benefits to being unemployed in a single neighbourhood.
The second task of Chapter 4 is to estimate which factors affect the main job- 
search method choices reported by Australian teenagers. The results suggest that 
receiving unemployment benefits is the most important determinant of job-search 
behaviour, but that local labour market conditions, background characteristics 
and unemployment duration also have an effect. The results are also interesting 
because they provide a possible explanation for the observed increase in the 
concentration of unemployment in some Australian neighbourhoods noted 
earlier.
In Chapter 5, a model of unemployment duration is estimated in which the role of 
the reservation wage is explicitly considered. Although job-search theory places 
emphasis on the role of reservation wages in determining the duration of 
unemployment, most empirical work investigating the factors which affect 
unemployment duration has not explicitly included the reservation wage. Based 
on a structural job-search model developed by Lancaster (1985), the relationship 
between unemployment and reservation wages is estimated, taking into account
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possible biases introduced if there are omitted variables and/or the reservation 
wage varies with the duration of unemployment.
The results suggest that reservation wages do not help to explain unemployment 
duration once other personal and background characteristics are controlled for. 
One possible explanation is that the minimum wage rather than the reservation 
wage is the binding constraint on individuals finding work. While a significant 
proportion of job-seekers report reservation wages below the minimum, this does 
not appear to explain the insignificance of the reservation wage in the estimated 
relationship. A more plausible explanation is that the number of job offers 
received (and rejected) by the unemployed in Australia is small, indicating that 
more unemployed people are concerned with receiving a job offer in the first 
place rather than whether a given wage-offer is acceptable.
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C h a pt e r  2
T h e  In fl u e n c e  o f  N e ig h bo u r h o o d  E ffe ct s  o n  E d u c a t io n
D ec isio n s
1 Introduction
Traditionally, an individual’s education decisions have been treated as a function 
of personal characteristics, the family environment and macroeconomic 
conditions. Recently, however, there has been an increase in the number of 
empirical studies analysing how the immediate environment affects behaviour 
above and beyond the effects of family background and macroeconomic 
conditions. The recent expansion in the empirical literature that looks at whether 
such neighbourhood effects exist has, in part, been driven by the availability of 
data allowing individuals to be located in relatively small geographic areas which 
can be thought of as neighbourhoods. Most of these data sources provide 
information about the experience of individuals living in inner city areas and the 
suburbs of major US cities. Comparable data from outside the US are not readily 
available.4
We use Australian data to examine the earliest education decision available to 
Australian teenagers: whether or not to complete high school. We combine unit 
record data from the Australian Youth Survey (AYS) with data on average 
neighbourhood characteristics from the 1991 Australian Census to create a data 
set of individuals, with information on their personal characteristics, family 
background and their immediate environment. Although the results are
4 One notable exception is Robertson and Symons (1996) who concentrate on peer 
group effects, using UK data.
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interesting in their own right, they also have interesting implications for the 
existence of neighbourhood effects in a much wider context. One of the main 
problems facing the examination of neighbourhood effects using US data is that 
the locally funded nature of the US education system makes it difficult to 
distinguish between true neighbourhood effects and differential inputs into the 
schooling system. The distribution of funding across Australian secondary 
schools is relatively equitable, making it a useful comparison.
Why should policy makers be interested in neighbourhood effects? If 
neighbourhood effects exist, the ability of families to move to different 
neighbourhoods, combined with barriers to such migration, eg housing prices, 
may benefit high income families, but not as much as they hurt low income 
families. Policy makers may need to intervene to ensure that positive 
externalities arising from the presence of neighbourhood effects are internalised. 
The subsequent increase in efficiency could increase welfare for all. In addition, 
equity considerations suggest that, "A system that allows the accidents of 
geography and birth to determine the quality of education received by an 
individual is inimical to the idea of equal opportunity in the market place".5 The 
policy response will depend on the mechanisms through which neighbourhood 
characteristics influence education outcomes, as well as the strength of these 
neighbourhood effects.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 discusses the existing 
empirical evidence about the factors that affect whether Australian teenagers 
decide to complete high school or not. Section 3 surveys the theoretical and 
empirical literature regarding the existence of neighbourhood effects, and the
5 Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) p. 136.
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mechanisms through which they may operate. Section 4 provides information 
about the data in the Australian Youth Survey and its links to the 1991 Australian 
Census data, which are used in the subsequent analysis. Other practical 
considerations such as what defines a neighbourhood and which data are most 
appropriate for analysing the question at hand are also highlighted. Section 5 
explores the existence and form of neighbourhood effects on the decision of 
Australian teenagers to leave school early. The results suggest that there are both 
significant exogenous and endogenous social effects influencing Australian 
teenagers’ education decisions. Policy considerations and conclusions are drawn 
in Section 6.
2 Education Decisions of Australian Teenagers
The proportion of Australian teenagers completing high school has been steadily 
increasing through the 1970s and 1980s and has levelled off at a little over 70 
per cent in the 1990s (Figure 5). Two approaches have been taken to understand 
the factors that influence the decision to complete high school or not. The first 
explains the aggregate retention rate as a function of other macroeconomic time 
series such as teenage unemployment rates. Larum and Beggs (1989) and Lewis 
and Koshy (1998) find that the aggregate Australian retention rate and the 
teenage full-time employment to population ratio are significantly negatively 
correlated, which is no surprise given that these two series are dominated by 
strong trends. Larum and Beggs (1989) also find a significantly positive 
relationship between the retention rate and the average government assistance 
paid to full-time high school students, although they suggest that this is driven by 
the increase in coverage, rather than increases in the level of payment to each 
individual.
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In general, aggregate studies of this nature are unsatisfactory, as they cannot 
account for changes in sociological factors that have been shown to be important 
by analyses using individual level data. However, studies which include detailed 
information about family background and personal characteristics, are less able 
to capture the effects of changes in macro-economic conditions on participation 
decisions.
One of the most comprehensive examinations of teenage education decisions 
with Australian data is the analysis of Miller and Volker(1987, 1989) who use 
information about teenagers interviewed in the first wave of the Australian 
Longitudinal Survey (ALS) in 1985. They estimate a set of sequential binary 
logit equations for successive school continuation decisions, starting with the 
decision of whether or not to complete Year 10, usually the first year of school 
when a teenager could achieve the minimum school leaving age of 15 years. The 
final education decision in the sequence is the decision of whether or not to 
undertake tertiary education, given that the individual has already chosen to 
complete Year 12, the final year of high school. The unconditional probability of 
being observed at a given stage of education can be calculated as the product of 
the probabilities of choosing to continue at each of the earlier stages.
Miller and Volker consider an extensive array of explanatory variables. They 
control for macro-economic effects such as the state of residence and the teenage 
unemployment rates prevailing at the time the education decisions were made; 
socioeconomic background variables, which mainly includes parents’ 
characteristics; and personal characteristics such as gender, the ability to speak 
English and the type of school attended. On balance they find that personal and 
family background characteristics are more important than macro-economic 
variables such as the teenage unemployment rate.
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The results regarding the importance of family background obtained by Miller 
and Volker are consistent with earlier work, for example Rosier (1978). 
Teenagers with parents who have a university degree and/or higher occupational 
status are significantly more likely to complete high school than other teenagers. 
Both the educational attainment and occupational status of parents are likely to 
be a proxy for parents’ income, which is not reliably available in the ALS. They 
may also reflect parental attitudes to education (Williams et al., 1981).
Miller and Volker's results suggest that teenagers whose father was bom in an 
English speaking country are less likely to complete high school than Australians 
who are at least second generation. Teenagers whose father was bom either in a 
Mediterranean or South East Asian country are significantly more likely to 
complete high school. Teenagers from larger families are less likely to complete 
high school. The most probable explanation for this result is that larger families 
are less financially capable of supporting a working-age teenager in full-time 
education.
Miller and Volker also find that the personal characteristics of teenagers affect 
their education decisions, although these characteristics are also likely to reflect 
choices made by a teenager’s parents on their behalf to some extent. Teenagers 
attending Catholic schools are 20 percentage points more likely to complete Year 
12 than teenagers at government schools. The difference for teenagers attending 
other non-government schools is 38 percentage points. Teenagers whose first 
language is not English and report that their ability to speak English is poor are 
less likely to complete Year 10, but if they do choose to continue, this factor does 
not appear to affect future decisions.
Teenage education decisions are also found to be affected by factors outside the 
immediate family. It is especially important to control for the state and the
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section of state of residence.6 Variation across states can arise because education 
policy, for example school curriculae, are set at the state level, even though 
funding is allocated at the Federal level. There are also important differences in 
the patterns of labour demand across states and in different sections of states 
depending on whether they are urban or rural.
Miller and Volker’s results show that state effects are important, and that they are 
consistent with aggregate differences in high school retention rates across states. 
The probability of completing high school in Queensland and the ACT is 
significantly higher, whilst the probability in Tasmania and the Northern 
Territory is significantly lower. Year 10 appears to be a more important decision 
point in NSW than other states as the conditional probability of completing 
Year 12, given that the decision to go on to Year 11 has been made, is much 
higher than for other states, although the unconditional probability of completing 
Year 12 is similar. Teenagers who spent most of their childhood in rural areas 
are around 10 percentage points less likely to complete high school than their city 
dwelling counterparts.
Finally, Miller and Volker consider the incentive effects of high teenage 
unemployment rates, measured at the time each decision was made. Aggregate 
teenage unemployment rates appear to have some effect on early education 
decisions but do not seem to be important at later stages.
6 Section of state is categorised as either capital city, other city, country town or rural 
area.
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3 The Role of Neighbourhood Effects
Neighbourhood effects will exist when there are localised externalities present, 
that is the payoff to different decisions is affected by the behaviour and 
characteristics of the other people in the neighbourhood. The effects of such 
externalities on income distribution and other outcomes experienced by 
individuals has been examined extensively and this literature is analogous to the 
macroeconomic spillover literature (Durlauf; 1994, 1996a, 1996b).
A number of papers have gone beyond explaining what effect externalities have 
on outcomes and attempt to explain how these externalities arise. Struefert 
(1991) presents a theory of role models to explain why teenage education- 
decision making may be affected by neighbourhood composition. He assumes 
that children infer the returns to effort at school by examining the outcomes of 
adults in their neighbourhood, and base their education decisions on this 
information. Thus, the distribution of education across neighbourhoods can 
influence the education decisions of future generations.
Another model which may provide an insight into why there are externalities at 
the neighbourhood level is the social networks model of Montgomery (1991). 
This model assumes that the unemployed have different productivity levels, but 
that, without further information, they are observationally equivalent to potential 
employers. By introducing a social structure in which workers with similar 
productivity levels are more likely to associate with each other, it becomes 
possible for employers to increase the probability of hiring a high productivity 
worker by employing people recommended by current high productivity workers. 
By increasing information flows, social networks relieve adverse selection 
problems and increase efficiency. To the extent that social networks are 
localised, it is possible that some neighbourhoods will provide their job-seeking
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residents with better job-information networks than others. For example, high 
unemployment areas are likely to have less active job-information networks 
which will decrease the probability of receiving job-offers and may decrease the 
incentives to leave school early.
These two models help explain how the composition of the neighbourhood may 
affect an individual’s decisions. These spillovers can be described as exogenous 
neighbourhood effects. We are also interested in considering endogenous 
neighbourhood effects, where the propensity to leave school early is an 
increasing function of other teenagers’ propensities to leave school early. One 
example of an economic model which uses this idea is Banerjee and Besley 
(1991) who model the importance of peer effects on education achievement. 
These endogenous effects are also implicit in the ethnographic evidence 
described in Akerlof (1997), which suggests that an individual’s payoff to 
completing school can be severely diminished if peers do not also complete 
school. In the terminology of Cooper and John (1988) we are interested in the 
existence of strategic complementarities. The presence of endogenous 
neighbourhood effects raises the possibility of multiple equilibria across 
otherwise identical neighbourhoods and has interesting policy implications.
A rapidly growing literature has found empirical support for the existence of 
neighbourhood effects. Jencks and Mayer (1990) provide a detailed survey of 
the early literature. One of the best sources of data for looking at the influence of 
the neighbourhoods on education outcomes is the 1968 sample of the University 
of Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) combined with the 1970 
Census Fifth Count for Zip Codes. This provides a sample of young male heads 
of household who were 23 to 32 years-old in 1978 and who were living with at 
least one of their parents in one of 188 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas in
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1968. The neighbourhood data consist of a number of socioeconomic indicators 
recorded by five digit zip code.
Two representative papers exploiting these data are Datcher (1982) and 
Corcoran, Gordon, Laren and Solon (1991). Both find strong intergenerational 
links between father’s 1968 income and son’s subsequent economic status. 
However, neither report a strong impact of neighbourhood variables on son’s 
income over and above family background effects. Corcoran et al. (1991) 
conclude that a likely reason for these problems is the presence of measurement 
error and omitted variable bias.
Another interesting empirical paper, which finds evidence of neighbourhood 
effects, is Crane (1991). He proposes that the extremely bad outcomes observed 
in inner city areas of major US cities can be explained by epidemic or contagion 
effects which are triggered after some critical level of social problems is reached. 
After this point, outcomes in these neighbourhoods deteriorate rapidly as 
susceptibility to these problems increases. He tests this hypothesis by estimating 
a piecewise linear logit model using the Census Bureau’s 1970 Public Use 
Microdata Samples where the observations are ranked by the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with professional or managerial jobs. His hypothesis is supported, 
as he finds significant differences in the estimated coefficients on the proportion 
of the neighbourhood with professional or managerial jobs, and the probability of 
dropping out of school is much higher than background characteristics suggest 
for teenagers in the lowest 5 per cent of the neighbourhood distribution defined 
in this way.
Case and Katz (1991) explicitly allow for the possibility of strategic interaction 
between agents in their analysis of the influence of neighbourhoods on the 
outcome of youths in low income neighbourhoods in inner city Boston. They
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look at the influence of peer behaviour and the characteristics of older members 
of the neighbourhood on several outcome variables including teen pregnancy, 
drug abuse, church attendance, involvement in crime and drop out rates. After 
allowing for the endogeneity of their neighbourhood aggregates, as they are 
constructed from sample data, they find that there are significant neighbourhood 
effects, even after a large array of family background characteristics are taken 
into account. Interestingly, Case and Katz find that child behaviour is strongly 
influenced by similar behaviour of the neighbourhood adult population. High 
rates of neighbourhood crime bias children towards criminality, high 
neighbourhood church attendance biases children in other, more saintly, 
directions.
4 The AYS and Australian Neighbourhoods
The analysis in Section 5 of this chapter uses data from the AYS which covers 
the period from 1989 to 1994. The first wave, sampled in 1989, consists of 5,350 
sixteen to nineteen year-olds. In each subsequent year, roughly 1,500 sixteen 
year-olds are interviewed for the first time, and all other panel members are re­
interviewed where possible. Our sample includes teenagers who were in the final 
year of high school, or were in the same cohort but left school at an earlier stage. 
In this sample, the probability of leaving school early is 30 percent, which is 
consistent with aggregate retention rates over this period. Table 2 decomposes 
this sample by age and year.
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Table 2: Summary Of Sample By Age And Year
Year\Age 16 years 17 years 18 years Total
1989 121 563 - 684
1990 75 574 226 875
1991 60 557 199 816
1992 88 447 232 768
1993 61 429 165 655
1994 54 434 157 645
Extensive individual and family background information is collected in the AYS, 
including details of educational outcomes and labour market experience for both 
the respondent and the members of their household. Summary statistics for the 
sample of individuals who are still in school and for those who have left school 
are provided in Table 3. A more detailed description of the data is provided in 
Appendix A.
In general, males are less likely to complete school than females, as are teenagers 
who attend government schools. These differences are consistent with aggregate 
retention rate statistics. Teenagers who have left school have more siblings on 
average, which may reflect the increased financial constraints faced by families 
with more children. Teenagers who were bom overseas, on the other hand, are 
more likely to complete school. Teenagers who were living with both parents 
when they were 14 are more likely to complete school than teenagers living with 
only one parent.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics By Education Decision
Averages by group, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate
In School Left School
Personal background
Male 0.46 0.58
Age 17.08 (0.55) 17.20 (0.57)
Number of siblings 1.96(1.45) 2.17(1.60)
Foreign bom 0.13 (0.34) 0.08 (0.27)
English not first language
English good 0.11 (0.31) 0.08 (0.27)
English poor 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.08)
School
Catholic 0.26 (0.44) 0.15(0.36)
Other non-government 0.11 (0.32) 0.05 (0.21)
Parents’ characteristics
Father’s occupational status @14 32.04 (24.22) 24.28 (21.79)
Mother’s occupational status @14 20.89 (21.59) 16.42(19.79)
Father not employed @14 0.05 0.06
Mother not employed @14 0.35 0.40
Father not present @14 0.12 0.24
Mother not present @14 0.02 0.13
Father has:
Degree 0.20 0.09
Trade qualifications 0.17 0.18
Other post-secondary 0.11 0.09
Mother has:
Degree 0.15 0.07
Trade qualifications 0.04 0.05
Other post-secondary 0.16 0.13
continued next page
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Table 3: Summary Statistics By Education Decision (continued)
In School Left School
Section of state
Other capital city 0.17 0.18
Rural area 0.03 0.03
Country town 0.07 0.10
State
Victoria 0.24 0.26
South Australia 0.10 0.10
Western Australia 0.11 0.11
Queensland 0.18 0.13
Tasmania 0.02 0.02
ACT 0.04 0.03
Neighbourhood
Average personal income 5654.37 (1069.49) 5477.36 (931.20)
Proportion with graduate 0.14(0.08) 0.12(0.07)
qualifications
Proportion with trade qualifications 0.14(0.03) 0 .14(0.03)
Unemployment rate 0.11 (0.05) 0 .12(0.05)
Note: @14 indicates that the variable is the parent’s characteristic when the respondent was 14 years-old
Unfortunately, parents’ income is not well measured in the AYS. Child reported 
income figures are available, but the response rate is relatively low and the 
quality of the data is questionable. There is, however, detailed information about 
the occupational status of parents and their education levels, both of which are 
likely to be good proxies for income, especially permanent income. These 
variables are also likely to provide information about the parents’ attitudes to 
education. Teenagers are more likely to complete high school if their parents 
have graduate qualifications and are employed in jobs with higher occupational 
status, which is measured as an index ranging from 0 to 100.
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Most importantly for our purposes, the AYS provides detailed geographic 
information. As well as providing information about which state the respondent 
lives in and the section of state the respondent mainly lived in before they were 
14 years old, the AYS allows individuals to be located by their geographic 
neighbourhood in most years. In 1989 and 1990 the information is recorded by 
1986-defined collection districts (CD), which are small neighbourhoods 
containing, on average, 465 individuals. The postcode where the interview took 
place is available for re-interviewees in 1991 and for all people interviewed from 
1992 to 1994. Postcodes are larger than CDs, but there is a mapping from 1986- 
defined CDs to 1991-defined postcodes.
The average postcode has 5,558 residents over the age of 15 years. The largest 
postcode has a population of 62,885; the smallest has less than a hundred 
residents. The distribution is highly skewed with 90 percent of postcodes having 
fewer than 15,131 residents. We have information on a range of neighbourhood 
characteristics at the postcode level from the 1991 Australian Census. The most 
important neighbourhood characteristics to include are those which can be 
justified by economic theory.
The theory of social networks suggests that variables which capture labour 
market status and the types of employment of neighbourhood residents would be 
important. Theories of role model effects would suggest that the most important 
variables for inclusion are those which capture the educational attainment and the 
subsequent earnings of neighbourhood residents. Based on these considerations, 
and taking into account the variables used to capture neighbourhood effects in 
earlier studies, the neighbourhood characteristics we have included are: the 
average level of personal income, the proportion of the neighbourhood with 
graduate and vocational qualifications, and the neighbourhood unemployment 
rate.
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Neighbourhood characteristics differ across the two groups in ways which are 
consistent with differences in average family background characteristics: 
teenagers who come from neighbourhoods with higher average personal income 
or with a higher proportion of adults with graduate qualifications are more likely 
to complete high school.
The following analysis is restricted to major urban areas for two reasons.7 The 
first is that the ABS introduces sampling error into small postcodes to ensure 
confidentiality. By excluding non-major urban areas, most postcodes which are 
affected by this will be excluded. The second reason is that the concept of the 
neighbourhood underlying the economic models above is related to physical 
proximity. Consequently, low density population areas, such as rural areas, do 
not conform easily to the concepts underlying our analysis.
The childhood postcode is defined as the postcode where the individual was 
interviewed when they were 16 years-old, as this is the earliest recorded 
neighbourhood information. The postcode information for 16 year-olds is 
missing in 1991, and these individuals are allocated their 17 year-old postcode 
from the subsequent interview. This is also done for the 17 year-olds in 1989 to 
increase the available sample.
Childhood postcodes are only defined if the children are living with one or both 
of their parents. This is standard practice in the literature, but may cause biases if 
the decision to move out from the family home is a function of the endogenous 
variable. For example, if children who leave school at 16 years-old are also more 
likely to move out then we under sample this group of children. It should be 
noted here, that respondents who reported that they had spent most of their life
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until they were 14 years-old overseas or were married are also excluded from the 
analysis. This does not significantly affect any of the formal analysis.
5 An Empirical Model and Results
The purpose of our analysis is to estimate the effects of neighbourhood 
characteristics on education decisions. In particular, we look at whether or not 
Australian teenagers decide to complete high school. In Section 5.1 we develop 
the empirical model within the framework presented by Manski (1993,1995) to 
formalise the different mechanisms through which neighbourhood effects could 
operate. In Section 5.2 we present the results of estimating this model ignoring 
neighbourhood effects. In Sections 5.3 and 5.4 we add neighbourhood variables 
and discuss their contribution to our understanding of teenage education 
decisions. In Section 5.5 we discuss potential objections to our interpretation 
that these results demonstrate the existence of neighbourhood effects.
5.1 A Common Framework
The model we estimate was originally discussed by Manski (1993, 1995) and can 
be summarised as follows:
y t* = a  + Zj p  + E (z  | x J y  + SEty* \ x i) + ei (1)
where:
• y i * is the underlying propensity to leave school before the final year of high 
school for individual /;
7 Major urban areas are defined as cities with greater than 100,000 in population.
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• z t are the personal and family background characteristics of individual i;
• x t is the post code level neighbourhood of individual i;
• E (z  | jc;-)are the average characteristics of the individuals in 
neighbourhood x t ;
• E(y*  | x t ) is the probability of being an early school leaver in neighbourhood 
jcz- ; and
• £z is the error term which contains all the unobserved factors which affect 
individual z’s propensity to leave school before the final year.
In the context of the discussion above, E (z\ jcz ) captures the exogenous 
neighbourhood effects, and E(y*  | x t ) captures endogenous neighbourhood 
effects.
5.2 Individual Effects
We start our analysis by estimating the model assuming that neighbourhood 
effects are not important, that is assuming that y  = 8  = 0 in Equation 1. As
discussed earlier, this specification has been considered in earlier literature and 
has been quite successful in explaining teenage education decisions (Miller and 
Volker, 1987). Because we do not observe the propensity to leave school early 
but the final decision, which is a binary variable, we estimate a probit model. 
The results are presented in Table 4.
39
Table 4: Estimation Results -  Individual Effects
Number Of Observations: 4,401
3Pr/5x T-stat
Personal Background
Male* 0.080 5.59
Age 0.093 6.48
Number of siblings 0.009 1.77
English not first language
English good* -0.080 -3.12
English poor* -0.137 -2.09
Bom overseas* -0.077 -3.15
School
Catholic* -0.125 -7.32
Other non-govemment* -0.170 -7.10
Parents’ Characteristics
Father’s occupational status @14 -0.002 -3.51
Mother’s occupational status @14 0.000 -0.26
Father not employed @14* -0.017 -0.50
Mother not employed @14* 0.004 0.20
Father not present @14* 0.059 2.26
Mother not present @14* 0.443 10.84
Father has:
Degree* -0.055 -2.17
Trade qualifications* 0.020 0.95
Other post-secondary* -0.039 -1.55
Mother has:
Degree* -0.091 -3.56
Trade qualifications* 0.019 0.52
Other post-secondary* -0.025 -1.19
continued next page
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Table 4: Estimation Results -  Individual Effects (continued) 
Number Of Observations: 4,401
3Pr/9x T-stat
Section of State
Other capital city* 0.014 0.70
Rural area* 0.045 1.03
Country town* 0.026 0.99
State
Victoria* -0.025 -1.33
South Australia* -0.048 -1.90
Western Australia* -0.008 -0.32
Queensland* -0.072 -3.35
Tasmania* 0.005 0.09
ACT* -0.119 -3.32
Log Likelihood -2256.8
Pseudo R2 0.159
Test overall significance 854.28 ~X2(34)
Note: Time dummies have been included, but have not been reported;
Dummy variables are denoted by an asterisk.
Because the probit model is non-linear, the estimated coefficients will provide 
information about the direction of the effect an independent variable has on the 
probability of leaving school early, but the magnitude of the effect depends on 
where the probability is evaluated. One way of presenting the estimates so that 
they are comparable is in marginal effects form. The marginal effect can be 
interpreted as the impact a one unit change in the explanatory variable will have 
on the probability of leaving school early, given that the probability is initially 
evaluated at the sample means. For dummy variables, marked with an asterisk, 
the reported marginal effect will be the change in the probability of being an 
early school leaver if the individual has that characteristic rather than the 
reference characteristic given by the omitted group. The results in Table 4 are 
expressed in marginal effects form.
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Note that most of the variables have the expected effect. Males are 8 percentage 
points more likely to leave school early than females, and older cohort members 
are more likely to leave school early than younger ones, perhaps reflecting the 
effects of repeating earlier school years. Teenagers with more brothers and 
sisters are more likely to leave school early and this may reflect financial 
constraints.
Teenagers for whom English is not their first language are significantly more 
likely to complete high school, as are teenagers who were bom overseas. These 
effects are independently significant. Consequently, teenagers who were bom 
overseas and did not learn English as their first language are 15.7 percentage 
points more likely to complete high school if they judge themselves to speak 
English well, and are 21.4 percentage points more likely to stay on if they were 
bom overseas and have poor English skills. This may reflect different attitudes 
to education, but may also reflect the relatively poor prospects these teenagers 
may face in the youth labour market. Teenagers who attend a government school 
are 12.5 percentage points more likely to leave school early than their 
counterparts attending a Catholic school and are 17 percentage points more likely 
to leave than teenagers at other non-government schools.
Parents’ characteristics are also important for explaining the decision to leave 
school early. Teenagers with fathers who have higher status jobs are less likely 
to leave high school early. Teenagers from single parent families are 
significantly less likely to complete high school. Parents with degree 
qualifications are much more likely to have children who complete high school: 
degree qualified fathers and mothers decrease the chances of leaving by 5.5 and 
9.1 percentage points respectively.
42
There is some indication that location has an influence on teenage decision 
making, as the section of state and state variables are jointly significant. If, 
however, the neighbourhood has some influence on a teenager’s school leaving 
decision, this will not be captured fully by the variables we have included and 
will instead enter the error term. To see whether these errors vary systematically 
across neighbourhoods, we plot the actual and predicted probabilities of leaving 
school early against the proportion of the neighbourhood with graduate 
qualifications. Because individuals from neighbourhoods where there is a high 
proportion of adults with graduate qualifications are also more likely to come 
from families with graduate qualified parents, the actual and predicted 
probabilities of leaving school early will have a negative relationship with the 
proportion of adults in the neighbourhood with graduate qualifications. 
However, we are interested in whether the difference between these two 
probabilities varies systematically across neighbourhoods ranked by this variable.
For this heuristic measure of spatial correlation to be useful, it is necessary to 
smooth out the individual specific factors using the outcomes of individuals who 
should have similar behaviour. This is particularly important for obtaining an 
underlying actual probability of leaving school early for each individual, as only 
the actual decision is observed. The non-parametric smoothing procedure we use 
is loess (Cleveland, 1993)8
This procedure assumes that individuals can be ranked such that individuals who 
are closer in the ranking are also more similar in terms of the underlying 
behaviour of interest. We have ranked individuals by the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with graduate qualifications, as it corresponds well with our
8 We have used the lowess option in the STATA 5.0 command ksm.
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intuition that teenagers from neighbourhoods with a high proportion of graduate 
qualified adults are also likely to have parents with graduate qualifications and 
are therefore likely to have similar school-leaving behaviour. The basic idea 
behind the loess smoothing procedure is to average the outcomes of a group of 
individuals, centred on each individual in turn, to obtain the expected outcome 
for the centre individual.
There are two ways in which the loess procedure smoothes out the individual 
specific factors using the outcomes on individuals who are ‘close’ in the ranking. 
The first is that a tricube weighting scheme is applied to ‘close’ individuals.9 The 
tricube weighting function allocates the highest weight to the outcome of the 
individual in the centre of the chosen group, for whom the smoothed outcome is 
being calculated. The weights allocated to individuals on either side decline the 
further they are away in the ranking and are zero for individuals who are not 
defined to be ‘close’. Smoother results are obtained when the number of 
individuals defined as ‘close’ increases or alternatively, the defined bandwidth is 
wider.
The second step of the loess procedure is to perform a weighted least squares 
regression of outcomes on the ranking variable for samples centred on each 
individual in turn. The final smoothed outcome will be the predicted value of the 
outcome variable for each centre individual. The actual smoothed probability of 
leaving school early for each individual will effectively be a weighted sample 
proportion. The smoothed actual and predicted probabilities of leaving school 
early are graphed against the proportion of the neighbourhood with graduate 
qualifications in Figure 7.
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Figure 7 shows that a systematic difference between the smoothed actual and 
predicted probabilities o f leaving school early does exist: the individual effects 
model is under-predicting the probability o f being an early school leaver in less 
educated neighbourhoods and over-predicting this probability for more educated 
neighbourhoods.
Figure 7: Smoothed Probability Of Leaving School Early
Individual Effects Only
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9 For a full description of the tricube weighting function, see the Methods and 
Formulas section of the ksm command in the STATA reference manual.
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5.3 Reduced Form
If we take expectations of Equation 1, conditional on the individual’s 
neighbourhood we obtain E(y* \ x i ) as a linear function of E (z  | jc/ ). 
Substituting this out we obtain Equation 2:
y.  = + (2)
1 ( I -S)  (1-8)
Given personal characteristics and family background variables, we can test for 
the presence of neighbourhood effects by testing the significance of average 
neighbourhood characteristics in a standard probit framework. We will not be 
able to identify the coefficients y  and 8, and therefore, we cannot distinguish 
between endogenous and exogenous neighbourhood effects in this reduced form 
specification. The results from estimating Equation 2 are presented in the first 
two columns of Table 5.
In general, the size and significance of the marginal effects of personal 
characteristics and family background variables do not change noticeably. The 
variables which are most affected by the presence of the neighbourhood variables 
are, not surprisingly, the section-of-state and state variables. The neighbourhood 
variables indicate that an individual is more likely to leave school early if the 
proportion of people in the neighbourhood with vocational qualifications is 
higher, and to a lesser extent, if the neighbourhood unemployment rate is higher.
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Table 5: Estimation Results
Number Of Observations: 4,401
Reduced form Structural form
Neighbourhood
3Pr/3x T-stat 3Pr/3x T-stat
Average personal income 0.000 0.39 0.000 -0.43
Proportion with 
graduate qualifications
0.001 0.31 0.015 2.28
proportion with trade qualifications 0.014 3.02 0.016 3.41
Unemployment rate 0.005 1.52 0.001 0.23
Endogenous effect 
Personal Background
— — 0.021 2.36
Male* 0.081 5.65 0.080 5.60
Age 0.092 6.43 0.092 6.40
Number of siblings 
English not first language
0.009 1.85 0.008 1.73
English good* -0.072 -2.76 -0.072 -2.75
English poor* -0.129 -1.94 -0.126 -1.89
Bom overseas* 
School
-0.076 -3.12 -0.075 -3.08
Catholic* -0.120 -6.96 -0.119 -6.94
Other non-govemment* 
Parents’ Characteristics
-0.161 -6.48 -0.160 -6.46
Father’s occupational status @14 -0.002 -3.48 -0.002 -3.47
Mother’s occupational status @14 0.000 -0.29 0.000 -0.27
Father not employed @14* -0.016 -0.45 -0.012 -0.36
Mother not employed @14* 0.004 0.18 0.003 0.14
Father not present @14* 0.060 2.30 0.061 2.32
Mother not present @14* 
Father has:
0.445 10.82 0.444 10.79
Degree* -0.052 -2.04 -0.052 -2.01
Trade qualifications* 0.016 0.79 0.017 0.84
Other post-secondary* 
Mother has:
-0.045 -1.78 -0.046 -1.83
Degree* -0.083 -3.22 -0.087 -3.39
Trade qualifications* 0.017 0.49 0.018 0.49
Other post-secondary* -0.025 -1.17 -0.026 -1.22
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Table 5: Estimation Results (continued)
Number Of Observations: 4,401
Reduced form Structural form
3Pr/3x T-stat 3Pr/3x T-stat
Section of State
Other capital city* -0.005 -0.22 -0.001 -0.07
Rural area* 0.025 0.57 0.028 0.63
Country town* 0.008 0.29 0.010 0.39
State
Victoria 0.001 0.05 -0.004 -0.17
South Australia -0.037 -1.32 -0.053 -1.86
Western Australia -0.008 -0.29 -0.010 -0.33
Queensland -0.045 -1.79 -0.048 -1.89
Tasmania 0.043 0.79 0.015 0.27
ACT -0.087 -2.19 -0.095 -2.40
Log Likelihood -2249.2 -2246.41
Pseudo R2 0.162 0.163
Test overall significance 869.44 ~X2(38) 874.99 ~%2(39)
Note: Time dummies have been included in estimation but are not reported;
Dummy variables are indicated by an asterisk.
Figure 8 compares the smoothed actual probability of leaving school early with 
the smoothed probability of leaving school early predicted by the reduced form 
estimation. Including neighbourhood effects has reduced the systematic error 
between the predicted and actual probabilities of leaving school early, although 
the reduced form model is still under-predicting the probability of leaving school 
early for the less educated neighbourhoods. Thus, there appears to be some 
support for the Crane hypothesis of epidemic effects in low status 
neighbourhoods.
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Figure 8: Smoothed Probability Of Leaving School Early
Reduced Form
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There are several possible explanations for the importance o f the proportion of 
the neighbourhood with vocational qualifications. Our preferred explanation is 
that it captures the extent and usefulness o f the job-information network available 
to a teenager contemplating leaving school early. To the extent that vocationally 
trained adults are aware of jobs which offer opportunities to early school leavers, 
teenagers with access to this network will have higher expected benefits of 
leaving school early than teenagers in neighbourhoods without a high proportion 
o f vocationally trained adults.
Another related possibility is that the proportion of vocationally trained adults
represents the level o f local labour demand, and therefore the probability o f an
early school leaver securing a job. For this effect to be operating, it would be
necessary to argue that the proportion of vocationally trained adults is a better
proxy for the local demand for unskilled labour than the local unemployment
rate. This is not an unreasonable hypothesis, however, the distinction between
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these two channels cannot be resolved in the current setting, especially given the 
problems of multicollinearity which are likely to be present (see below).
The final possibility is that there is a role model effect, similar to the model 
presented by Struefert (1991). In this model the probability of leaving school 
early increases as the number of high earning, highly educated role models in the 
neighbourhood decreases. This model is based on the underlying assumption 
that the returns to completing high school and undertaking further education are 
higher than they are for leaving school before the completion of Year 12. This is 
true in Australia (Gregory and Vella, 1996). However, Dockery and Norris 
(1996) present evidence that suggests the returns to completing an apprenticeship 
are also high in Australia. If a teenager’s information set includes a large number 
of adults receiving relatively high returns to their vocational training and if there 
are relatively few adults to demonstrate the returns to graduate education, this 
will naturally bias them towards leaving school early to find an apprenticeship. 
Roughly 40 per cent of early school leavers in the AYS give starting an 
apprenticeship as the main reason for leaving school.
5.4 Structural Form
In order to separately estimate exogenous and endogenous neighbourhood 
effects, it is necessary to ensure that these effects are identified in the empirical 
model and that the endogenous neighbourhood effect variable can be suitably 
measured. The formal identification of the two effects requires that some 
identifying assumptions about the parameters in Equation 1 are made. In 
particular, it is possible to separately identify all the underlying parameters if at 
least one exclusion restriction is imposed on the y  vector. The fact that the 
coefficient on the endogenous neighbourhood effect, S, can be recovered if this 
restriction is imposed can be seen by considering Equation 2. The exclusion
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restriction, combined with the estimate of /?, allows 8  to be recovered from the 
composite coefficient on the neighbourhood variable.
Technically, 8  is over-identified in our empirical model, as there is more than one 
exclusion restriction implicit in our choice of included neighbourhood 
characteristics. In this case, 8  can be estimated as long as a suitable measure of 
the endogenous neighbourhood effect can be found. If we had sufficient 
observations in each neighbourhood, we could estimate Equation 1 using sample 
estimates of E (y* | x t ). Due to the small number of observations per 
neighbourhood however, we must use information from individuals in ‘similar’
A
neighbourhoods to calculate a sample estimate, E(y* \ x t). The loess smoothing 
technique discussed earlier can also be used for this purpose. Because
A
E(y*  | x i ) is calculated from the sample, it is potentially correlated with the
error for each individual in that neighbourhood.10 This is a side effect of the very 
feedback structure that we are trying to capture.
A
We try to solve this problem by finding suitable instruments for E(y* \ x t ). A
good instrument should be correlated with the average probability of early school 
leaving in the neighbourhood, but should not affect the individual’s decision to 
leave school early. We choose the average number of siblings in the 
neighbourhood as an instrument, because it will be correlated with the average 
probability of peers leaving school early, but will not have an effect on the 
individual’s decision beyond this. Again, the small number of individuals in
10 This is independent of the fact that we have smoothed over neighbourhoods, 
although smoothing lowers the correlation between the endogenous variable and the 
error term.
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each neighbourhood requires that the loess technique be used to obtain a 
smoothed sample average of the number of siblings in the neighbourhood.
A
The results of estimating Equation 1, instrumenting E(y*  | x/ ) with the
smoothed average number of siblings are presented in the final two columns of 
Table 5. The estimated marginal effects of the variables capturing personal 
characteristics and family background do not change noticeably. The proportion 
of the neighbourhood with trade qualifications has remained positive and 
significant and the marginal effect is comparable to that estimated in the reduced 
form specification. The variable included to capture the endogenous effects,
A
E(y*  | Jt, ) is positive and significant.
However, the estimated marginal effects and significance of the other 
neighbourhood composition variables change markedly. The local 
unemployment rate changes from being marginally significant to being 
insignificant and the marginal effect of the proportion of the neighbourhood with 
graduate qualifications, which had a perverse sign in the reduced form 
regression, has become larger and significant. To some extent this is expected if 
the reduced form parameters were capturing both neighbourhood effects.
When estimating the structural form, excluding the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with graduate qualifications and the local unemployment rate, the 
endogenous effect variable is estimated to have a marginal effect of 0.4 of a 
percentage point with a t-statistic of 1.23. The proportion of the neighbourhood 
with vocational qualifications has a marginal effect of 0.8 percentage points and 
remains significant. This confirms the intuition that the significance of the 
proportion of graduate qualifications in the neighbourhood is spurious, but also 
makes it difficult to assess the importance of endogenous neighbourhood effects.
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Another way of checking whether endogenous effects matter, is to look at the 
difference between the smoothed actual probabilities o f leaving school and the 
smoothed probabilities predicted from the structural form model. Figure 9 
provides further support for the Crane hypothesis o f epidemic effects in low 
status neighbourhoods because the inherently non-linear nature o f the 
endogenous neighbourhood variable has improved the ability o f the model to 
predict the probability o f teenagers leaving school early in less educated 
neighbourhoods. Although this specification has reduced the difference between 
actual and predicted smoothed probabilities at the low end o f the education 
distribution, these differences have increased slightly at the upper end o f the 
distribution relative to the reduced form specification.
Figure 9: Smoothed Probability Of Leaving School Early
Structural Form
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In summary, it appears that neighbourhood effects do influence a teenager’s 
decision of whether or not to complete high school. Neighbourhood composition
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affects this decision through the proportion of the neighbourhood with vocational 
qualifications. There is also some evidence for the presence of endogenous 
neighbourhood effects. Although multicollinearity problems make it difficult to 
separate the two effects, the structural form model appears to be better at 
explaining actual school leaving behaviour over the whole distribution of 
neighbourhoods than the reduced form model. It is also apparent that these 
neighbourhood effects are dominated by personal characteristics and the 
immediate family. Before concluding, however, we briefly consider possible 
objections to our interpretation of the results as demonstrating the existence of 
neighbourhood effects.
5.5 Have we Really Found Neighbourhood Effects?
One common objection to the empirical analysis of neighbourhood effects is that 
the neighbourhood composition variables may just be picking up omitted 
individual level variables such as parents’ attitudes. We have two responses to 
this objection. The first is that omitted background variables are more likely to 
be correlated with the large number of included background variables than with 
neighbourhood variables.
The second response is that the mechanisms by which such effects are supposed 
to occur are difficult to specify. Our interpretation can only be affected by an 
omitted variable which is positively correlated with the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with vocational training, as a negatively correlated variable 
would induce negative bias which serves to strengthen our case. It is difficult to 
imagine an omitted individual level variable which increases the probability of a 
teenager leaving school early and is more highly correlated with the proportion of 
vocationally trained adults in the neighbourhood than with any individual level 
variables.
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To the extent that the neighbourhood characteristics that have been included are 
correlated with excluded neighbourhood characteristics, the conclusion that 
neighbourhood effects are present is not affected. The presence of such a 
correlation, however, might affect the consistency of the results with the 
mechanisms through which neighbourhood characteristics might influence 
individual behaviour proposed in Section 5.3. However, as already mentioned, 
the analysis presented in this chapter can only ever establish the existence of 
neighbourhood effects. Further research is required to find evidence of specific 
mechanisms.
Another concern that has been expressed about interpreting the results in Table 5 
as neighbourhood effects is the possibility of endogenous sorting. This will arise 
if there are omitted variables, such as school quality, which directly affect the 
probability of leaving school early, but also have an indirect effect through 
location decisions made by families on the basis of school quality, which change 
the composition of the neighbourhood. Thus, the omitted variable will be 
correlated with the neighbourhood composition variables which we have treated 
as exogenous. Again, we have two responses.
The first is that we would expect an omitted variable which causes families to 
sort to be more correlated with the endogenous neighbourhood effect (Evans, 
Oates and Schwab, 1992). We have instrumented for this variable, albeit for 
different reasons. Second, to the extent that the unobserved variable affecting the 
location decision of families is more highly correlated with the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with graduate qualifications than with the proportion of the 
neighbourhood with vocational training, we would expect the positive bias to be 
greater for this variable. This effect is not apparent in the results presented in 
Table 5.
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6 Conclusion
This paper examines the factors which affect a teenager’s decision to leave 
school early. In particular, we are interested in whether higher rates of early 
school leaving in some neighbourhoods is the result of families with 
characteristics which discourage school completion tending to live together, or 
whether the neighbourhood has an independent effect. We find that, although 
personal characteristics and family background variables explain much of the 
distribution of early school leaving behaviour across neighbourhoods, these 
variables are not enough.
We find evidence of exogenous neighbourhood effects. Specifically, we find that 
a larger proportion of vocationally trained adults in the neighbourhood increases 
the probability of a teenager leaving school early, even when the qualifications of 
each parent have been controlled for. We suggest that the most plausible 
explanation for the presence of this effect is that this variable is a proxy for the 
extent and usefulness of local job-information networks which may affect the 
balance of costs and benefits to these teenagers of staying on at school. We also 
find some evidence for the presence of endogenous neighbourhood effects which 
arise when the schooling decisions of other teenagers in the neighbourhood affect 
an individual’s decision.
Distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous neighbourhood effects is 
interesting because the policy implications of these two types of effects are quite 
different. Theoretical results suggest that endogenous feedback mechanisms, 
such as endogenous neighbourhood effects, can lead to multiple equilibria even 
for initially identical neighbourhoods. One-off expenditures that reduce the rate 
of early school leaving may have long-run benefits if the endogenous feedback 
mechanism pushes the neighbourhood to a new equilibrium. In contrast, policies
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that attempt to affect school decisions by changing neighbourhood composition 
may have to be ongoing if endogenous sorting in future periods pushes the 
equilibrium neighbourhood configuration back to its old equilibrium.
It is also important to bear in mind that while the analysis in this paper argues 
that neighbourhood effects influence teenage education decisions, we have only 
suggested possible mechanisms through which exogenous neighbourhood effects 
operate. Further research is necessary.
If the job-information network story is correct, direct search methods, such as 
using family and friends for information or approaching employers directly, 
should be more commonly used in neighbourhoods where the proportion of 
vocationally trained adults is higher. Chapter 4 of this thesis examines the factors 
which affect the job-search decisions of unemployed Australian teenagers, and 
finds that the local unemployment rate rather than the proportion of vocationally 
trained adults is important. While this does not directly support the job- 
information network explanation put forward above, it also does not provide 
evidence against it, to the extent that teenagers leaving school early move 
directly into jobs. Information about search methods is only available in the 
AYS for unemployed job-seekers. Another potentially fruitful direction for 
further research is to incorporate different types of education into the Struefert 
model to distinguish between vocational training and more academic post-school 
qualifications.
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A p p e n d ix  A: D a t a  f r o m  t h e  AYS a n d  1991 A u s t r a l ia n  C e n s u s
1 The Australian Youth Survey (AYS)
The AYS is used in Chapters 2 to 4 of this thesis. The original sample contained 
5,350 16 to 19 year-olds in 1989. In each subsequent year, this sample was 
reinterviewed where possible, and a new cohort of 16 year-olds was added. The 
final wave of the survey was interviewed in 1994. Table 6 summarises the main 
activities of respondents of different ages.
Table 6: Main Activity By Age At The Time Of Interview, 1989-1994
Per Cent Of Total Age Group In Parenthesis 
Main Activity at the time of interview
Age School Employed Unemployed Other Study Other
16 6 705 (84.3) 812(10.2) 303 (3.8) 60 (0.8) 78(1.0)
17 4 644 (61.9) 1 894 (25.3) 598 (8.0) 206 (2.7) 155 (2.1)
18 1 253 (17.4) 3 915(54.3) 1 058 (14.7) 747(10.4) 233 (3.2)
19 144 (2.2) 4 348 (66.1) 1 057(16.1) 777(11.8) 253 (3.8)
20-24 23 (0.2) 9 788 (73.5) 1 745(13.1) 1 047 (7.9) 705 (5.3)
At the first interview individuals are asked about a large list of background 
characteristics. These include personal characteristics such as gender, place of 
birth and information about the respondent's parents. Respondents are asked 
whether each of their parents were present in the household when they were 14. 
If a parent was present, further questions are asked about whether the parent was 
employed, the nature of their employment and their education level.
At the first interview, individuals are also asked about their current 
circumstances. At subsequent interviews information about current
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circumstances is updated and questions about the time since the previous
interview are also asked.
The following variables take the value one when the characteristic is present and
zero otherwise:
• personal characteristics: male, married, bom overseas;
• parent’s characteristics: parent not present in the household when the 
respondent was 14, parent not employed when the respondent was 14 (given 
that they were present in the household);
• parent’s education: has a degree, has a trade qualifications, has other post 
school qualifications (omitted category: parent has completed high school or 
less);
• section of state: other city, rural area, country town (omitted category: capital 
city);
• state: Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland, Tasmania, 
ACT (omitted category: New South Wales; Northern Territory dropped due to 
too few observations); and
• school/work experience: left school in Year 10 or earlier, receives 
unemployment benefits or the Job Search Allowance (used in Chapter 4).
The following variables are discrete variables:
• age (in years), number of siblings;
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• parent’s occupational status is measured as the socioeconomic status of the 
respondent’s parent when the respondent was 14. If the parent was not present 
in the household or was not employed the index is set to zero; and
• years since leaving school and current unemployment duration (in weeks) 
(used in Chapter 4).
The language proficiency variables are defined as:
• English good takes the value one if the respondent does not have English as a 
first language, but regards their proficiency as ‘very good’ or ‘good’; and
• English poor takes the value one if the respondent does not have English as a 
first language and regards their proficiency as ‘fair’, ‘poor’ or ‘very poor’.
The omitted category contains respondents who speak English as their first
language.
The school variables are defined as:
• Catholic takes the value one if the respondent is currently studying at a 
Catholic high school, or whose last school before they left was a Catholic 
high school;
• Other non-government takes the value one if the respondent is currently 
studying at a non-government, non-Catholic high school, or whose last school 
before they left was an ‘other non-government’ school.
The omitted category contains respondents whose current or last school was a
government high school.
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The AYS provides detailed geographic information that allows individuals to be 
located by their geographic neighbourhood in most years. In 1989 and 1990 the 
information is recorded by 1986-defined collection districts (CD), which are 
small neighbourhoods containing, on average, 465 individuals. The postcode 
where the interview took place is available for re-interviewees in 1991 and all 
people interviewed from 1992 to 1994. Postcodes are larger than CDs, but there 
is a mapping from 1986-defined CDs to 1991 defined postcodes.
2 The Australian Census - 1991
Information about the neighbourhood where an individual lives can be obtained 
from the 1991 Australian Census. Information about the average characteristics 
of an individual’s neighbourhood is used in Chapters 2 and 4.
The neighbourhood variables are defined as:
• Average personal income is the average personal income of the respondent’s 
post code measured in 1976 Australian dollars11;
• Unemployment rate is the unemployment rate of the respondent’s post code;
• Proportion with graduate qualifications is the proportion of the respondent’s 
post code who recorded having a higher degree, a degree, a graduate diploma, 
or an undergraduate diploma; and
11 To convert to 1991 Australian dollars, this number should be multiplied by 3.333.
61
• Proportion with trade qualifications is the proportion of the respondent’s post 
code who recorded having skilled vocational training or basic vocational 
training.
The omitted education category is the proportion of the respondent’s post code 
with high school education or less.
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C h a pt e r  3
F in a n c ia l  A ssista nc e  a n d  th e  S c h o o l  L e a v in g  D e c isio n  
1 Introduction
In the 1986-87 Budget, the Australian government introduced a new student 
income support initiative to address the twin problems of rising youth 
unemployment and the low level of high school completion rates. The scheme, 
known as AUSTUDY, is essentially a means-tested income support scheme for 
full-time students in higher education and for secondary school students in the 
final two years of school. It replaced a number of earlier income support 
schemes for full-time students and was accompanied by changes to income 
support arrangements for unemployed teenagers. The policy changes resulted in 
a dramatic increase in the availability and amount of income support for full-time 
students, particularly those in the final two years of secondary school. At the 
same time, there was also a substantial reduction in the amount and availability 
of income support for unemployed teenagers.
This chapter uses data on individuals who were making school leaving decisions 
before and after the change in government policy to see whether the aim of 
increasing the number of teenagers choosing to stay at school through these 
initiatives was achieved. To do this, we develop an economic model to explain 
what factors will affect the probability of observing any given individual either in 
employment, in unemployment or at school.
Previous empirical work has estimated the effect of AUSTUDY within a ‘natural 
experiment’ framework, using the means-tested nature of AUSTUDY to identify 
a control group of individuals whose behaviour was not affected by its
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introduction. This analysis finds that eligibility for AUSTUDY does increase the 
probability of an individual completing high school. However, it does not take 
into account the possibility that the control group was affected by simultaneous 
changes that were made to the administration of unemployment benefits.
In this chapter we consider the effects of the two policy changes, personal 
characteristics and family background on the observed outcomes of teenagers 
who were either in the final year of high school, or would have been if they had 
stayed on. Taking the incentive effects of changing the level and availability of 
unemployment benefits into account requires unemployment and employment to 
be considered as separate outcomes. The most appropriate framework for 
analysing this question, therefore, is the multinomial outcome framework.
The most straight-forward way of estimating a three outcome model is to use a 
multinomial logit specification. The results from this estimation confirm the 
importance of personal characteristics and family background in determining the 
outcomes of teenagers. Changes in policy also appear to have an important role 
in increasing the number of teenagers completing high school. Eligibility for 
unemployment benefits and AUSTUDY appears to increase the probability of 
teenagers completing school by between 8 and 10 percentage points. 
Interestingly, eligibility for unemployment benefits and AUSTUDY is estimated 
to decrease the probability that teenagers will be employed and slightly increases 
the probability that they will be unemployed. These results suggest that 
teenagers choosing not to complete school are taking a gamble on the labour 
market, and that when the disincentives to being unemployed increase, it is the 
teenagers who have a better chance of finding work who are choosing to 
complete high school.
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While a multinomial logit model is straight forward to estimate, this comes at the 
expense of restrictive assumptions about the structure of the variance-covariance 
matrix. In order to allow free estimation of variance-covariance parameters, it is 
necessary to use an alternative specification such as the multinomial probit 
model. We find, however, that although the estimated multinomial probit model 
is formally identified, the identification of the variance-covariance parameters is 
fragile, that is, vastly different estimates of the variance-covariance parameters 
are consistent with the same likelihood value. The source of this problem is that 
when the explanatory variables only capture individual characteristics and no 
outcome specific characteristics, the coefficient estimates can change to 
accommodate different variance-covariance parameters (Keane, 1992). This 
makes the multinomial probit model an expensive method, in terms of time and 
effort, for very little practical reward, in empirical work where the data only have 
information about the individuals, and not the outcomes.
The rest of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses the details of 
the changes to education and labour market policy that have occurred in Australia 
since the 1970s, and discusses the ‘natural experiment’ analysis of Dearden and 
Heath (1996). In Section 3 we develop a simple multinomial outcome model 
which explicitly models the changes to incentives which were intended to occur 
as a result of the policy change. The data are discussed in Section 4 and 
Section 5 presents the results of estimating multinomial outcome models. 
Section 5.1 focuses on the multinomial logit model and Section 5.2 discusses the 
multinomial probit model. Final conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2 Teenage Labour Market And Education Policy
From 1974 until the mid-1980s, a major focus of Australia’s education policy 
was to ensure equal access to tertiary education. This was signaled in 1974 when
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fees for tertiary education were abolished. At the same time, means-tested 
income for full-time students was provided by the Tertiary Education Allowance 
Scheme (TEAS) and Secondary Allowance Scheme (SAS).
SAS was paid to parents and the real value of the maximum payment was very 
low. This did not vary greatly over the 12 years the scheme was in operation 
(Dearden and Heath, 1996). The number of secondary students receiving SAS 
was also quite low. In 1977, coverage was only 2 per cent of the relevant student 
cohort. The proportion of students receiving SAS remained below 5 per cent until 
1983 and peaked at 15 per cent in 1986. TEAS was paid to eligible full-time 
higher-education students directly and was more generous than SAS, but the 
level of both allowances was substantially lower than the non-means-tested 
benefit paid to unemployed teenagers.
By the mid-1980s, it was apparent that there were several problems with the 
focus of education policy in general and with several institutional aspects of SAS 
in particular. Despite the abolition of tertiary education fees, there had not been a 
significant change in the demographic make-up of higher-education participants. 
Students from financially constrained and disadvantaged families continued to be 
the ones who did not complete secondary school and thus were precluded from 
benefiting from the provision of free tertiary education. In an extensive survey of 
low-income families, Braithewaite (1987) looked at the effectiveness of SAS. 
He found that the number of eligible families taking advantage of SAS payments 
was surprisingly low and that the relatively high level of unemployment benefits 
acted as a disincentive to completing secondary school.
These issues were clearly in the minds of policy makers when the introduction of 
AUSTUDY was announced in the 1986-87 Budget. The Minister for
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Employment and Industrial Relations, introduced the policy initiative in the 
following way:
"The significant increases in allowances being implemented by the Government provide 
a much stronger incentive for young people to study and secure qualifications which 
will help them find and keep employment. The scheme with its much improved 
allowances for students will remove the disincentive to study which arose from the fact 
that the unemployment benefit outstripped the basic rates of education allowances for 
young people."
The introduction of AUSTUDY involved substantial real increases in the level of 
income support provided to students, particularly secondary-school students, and 
the benefit is generally received by the student, not their parents. This brought 
payments made to eligible 16 and 17 year-olds into line with the Job Search 
Allowance (JSA), a new form of unemployment benefit payments payable to 
unemployed youth (Dearden and Heath, 1996). The JSA was no longer 
universally paid to all unemployed 16 and 17 year-olds but, like AUSTUDY, was 
now means-tested on parents’ income. Those eligible to receive JSA also had to 
wait 13 weeks after leaving school before they could receive any payment. From 
September 1990, the level of unemployment benefit paid to 18 to 19 year-olds 
living at home was also lowered to bring the maximum benefits into line with 
AUSTUDY rates.
In addition, AUSTUDY had a more generous means-test than SAS, and was 
advertised widely to raise awareness as a part of the ‘Priority One’ education 
policy initiative. The combined effect was that the proportion of students 
receiving AUSTUDY increased to well over 30 per cent. The AYS provides 
some extra information about whether the introduction of AUSTUDY has 
influenced the decisions of teenagers.
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Of respondents attending school in 1990 and 1991, 43 per cent said that they had 
decided to complete Year 12 before they entered high school at the age of 12 or 
13 years. A further 28 percent said that they had made the decision to continue 
in Year 10, this year or last year. This suggests that there are a significant 
number of teenagers making their education decisions relatively late in their time 
at high school and therefore, that there is some potential for AUSTUDY to 
influence their education decisions. In 1990, 10 to 15 per cent of teenagers 
receiving AUSTUDY said that they would not stay at school if they were not 
eligible.
A further sign of the shifting focus of education policy, was the reintroduction of 
tertiary fees via a Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS), from which 
part of the cost of tertiary study is recouped in the form of a delayed payment 
collected through the taxation system when the student enters the labour market. 
This allowed some of the funding that would otherwise have gone to tertiary 
education to be redirected towards supporting students from low-income 
families. The introduction of HECS was also motivated by a desire to expand the 
capacity of the tertiary sector (Chapman, 1997).
The main features of AUSTUDY are that it is means-tested on parents’ income 
and that the amount payable depends on the child’s adjusted family income 
(AFI). This AFI takes into account the number of dependent children under the 
age of 16 in the family. The amount that is payable and the rate of abatement are 
also affected by the number of other ‘eligible siblings’ -  namely, brothers and 
sisters aged 16 or over in full-time education. If the student receives 
AUSTUDY, their parents are no longer permitted to receive family allowance for 
that child or other social security payments associated with supporting the child. 
There is also a limit on the amount of income students can earn from part-time 
work and if this is exceeded, the student loses $1 per annum of support for every
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$2 per annum earned over the limit. A more detailed description of the
administrative details of the means test are provided in Dearden and 
Heath (1996).
The changes in government policy that were implemented in 1987 were 
significant and had explicit aims. Despite this, there has been very little 
empirical assessment of whether the changes which were made achieved their 
goal of increasing the proportion of teenagers completing high school. Dearden 
and Heath (1996) investigate this question in two ways. The first method is a 
two stage estimation procedure. In the first stage, information about whether 
teenagers in school after 1987 were receiving AUSTUDY or not is used to 
estimate the probability of being eligible for AUSTUDY using probit estimation. 
Using the results from the first stage estimation, the probability of being eligible 
is predicted for individuals in the pre-1987 period and for those who had left 
school in the post-1987 period.
The second stage regression estimates the probability of completing high school, 
using the predicted probability of being eligible for AUSTUDY as an 
explanatory variable. It is important to ensure that the predicted eligibility 
variable is identified, that is that there is at least one variable in the eligibility 
equation which is not likely to affect school continuation decisions 
independently. Eligibility for AUSTUDY is based on a means-test and on the 
number of eligible siblings. Most factors which could be used to control for the 
effects of the means-test, for example, family size or parent's education, on 
eligibility are likely to have an independent effect on the schooling decision 
(Miller and Volker, 1987; Dearden, 1995). Dearden and Heath (1996) use the 
number of siblings in the household over 15 years-old as an instrument, as it will 
be highly correlated with the number of eligible teenagers and is unlikely to have 
an independent effect once the number of siblings is controlled for.
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The number of children in the household aged 15 years and over is significant in 
the first stage regression and increases the probability of being eligible by around 
2.5 percentage points for each extra sibling over 15 years-old. The probability of 
being eligible for AUSTUDY has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability of continuing on to do Year 11 and Year 12. The estimate of the 
marginal effect suggests that a one percentage point increase in the probability of 
being eligible increases the probability of continuing high school by around 2 
percentage points for an 'average' individual in the sample.
The two stage estimation results are extended to a 'natural experiment' framework 
by identifying a control group of individuals whose school leaving behaviour is 
not likely to be affected by the introduction of AUSTUDY. The obvious control 
group are teenagers who will not be eligible for AUSTUDY because of the 
means-test. Dearden and Heath (1996) define the control group as the 50 percent 
of individuals who have the lowest predicted probability of being eligible for 
AUSTUDY. Given that around 30 per cent of teenagers in school receive 
AUSTUDY, this cut-off point is somewhat conservative. The estimated effects 
of eligibility on the school decision will also be conservative as the treatment 
group will contain teenagers who are essentially unaffected by the introduction of 
AUSTUDY.
The factors which affect the school continuation decision are estimated for the 
control group and this provides a policy-free baseline estimate. The policy-free 
behaviour of all individuals in the treatment group can be predicted from these 
estimates. The effect of policy can then be estimated by calculating the extent to 
which the differences between actual and policy-free behaviour of the treatment 
group differ in the pre-1987 and the post-1987 periods. The procedure is 
essentially a difference-in-differences approach to a problem expressed in a 
natural experiment framework.
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Using this method, the introduction of AUSTUDY is estimated to have increased 
the probability of continuing high school by around 4 percentage points for the 
treatment group. This is an average marginal effect calculated for the treatment 
group as a whole. The estimated marginal effect increases as the group for which 
it is calculated is restricted to individuals who are predicted to be 'more eligible'.
3 Teenage Labour Market And Education Outcomes
The main failure of Dearden and Heath (1996) is that it does not consider the 
impact of changes in the unemployment benefit system which occurred 
simultaneously with the introduction of AUSTUDY. To do this, it is necessary 
to increase the number of possible outcomes to include employment and 
unemployment. Random utility models provide the most natural framework for 
analysing such a multinomial outcome model.
Assume that the value to individual j  of being in one of the three outcomes can 
be written as a linear combination of observable characteristics and a random 
shock:
Vg = X'Jpi + et for is {employed (E), unemployed (U), in school (S)} (3)
To help with notation, let Sj be an indicator variable which takes the value one 
when individual j  is observed at school, and zero otherwise. Similarly, let Ej 
and Uj indicate whether individual j  is employed or unemployed. Given that the 
outcomes are mutually exclusive, these indicator variables will sum to unity.
We can write the probability that individual j  is observed at school as:
Pr(s, =l) = Pr({Fs >VEJ\n{vsj > v j
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— Pr({xj p s + £Sj > Xj PF + eEj }o \ x y p s + £Fj > X j p u + £Ul j)
— Pr({x^,^s Xj'PE>£Ej f^}n{Xy fis X j p u >eUj £Sj})
= Pr( K  >'*F.,\n  K  > }) (4)
where aEj=XJ'PS- X / P E 
auj= x ; p s - x ; p u
W Ej ~  £ Ej £ Sj
W Uj ~  £ Uj £ Sj
It is possible to follow a similar process to write down the probability of being in 
either of the other two states in terms of the limit variables, aEj and aVJ, and the
error terms, wEj and wVJ.
Pr(£, = l)= Pr(K, > VSJ }n [vEj > VUj j)
= Pr({- a Ej > Ej K  -  ° E j  >  W Uj ~  W E, }) (5)
Pr(f/, = l)= Pr({^ > P,}n{P„; > VE]\)
= Pr({- 0 U, >  ~ W Uj K  -  a Uj > W E, -  W Uj }) (6)
The three dimensional outcome problem can be represented in two dimensional 
space (Figure 10). In this figure the axes are the error terms, wEj and wnj, which
represent the unmeasured factors affecting the individual's outcome. Given their
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definitions, a high draw of wEj, for example, suggests that the unmeasured
factors influencing individual j  increase the probability o f their being observed in 
employment, all else equal. The three broken lines in Figure 10 represent the 
locus o f points along which individual j  will be indifferent between two o f the 
three alternatives. On either side o f these lines, individual j  is more likely to be 
observed in one or other state, as indicated.
Figure 10: Representation Of A Three Outcome Model
OUTCOM E=U
OUTCOM E=S OUTCOM E=E
Assuming a joint probability density function for the error terms wEj and wVJ,
f(w ), it is possible to determine the probability o f observing an individual in any 
of the three states, given values o f aEj and aVj. In particular, we can write the
probability that a teenager j  completes school as:
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Pr(sy= liX >;y8;s)=  11dF(w) (7)
where:
• p  are the parameter vectors Ps,PE,Pu\
• Eis  the underlying variance-covariance matrix of the errors, es, eE, £i;; and
• F(w) is the cumulative distribution function off(w).
Similar expressions for the probability of being observed in either unemployment 
or employment can be derived from the appropriate normalisation.
Before dealing with assumptions about probability distributions and the details of 
estimation, it is useful to discuss how we would expect the introduction of 
AUSTUDY and changes to the administration of unemployment benefits to 
affect an individual's observed outcome. There are three regimes to consider. The 
first is the pre-1987 regime in which no-one is eligible for AUSTUDY and 
everyone is eligible for unemployment benefits. For convenience, this regime 
will be referred to as PRE87. The second regime includes all individuals who 
were eligible for both AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits after 1987. The 
third regime includes all individuals who are eligible for neither after 1987. 
These two regimes will be referred to as ELIGIBLE and INELIGIBLE 
respectively.
The change in incentives for an individual moving from PRE87 to ELIGIBLE, 
that is someone for whom AUSTUDY becomes available, is equivalent to an 
equal increase in aEj and aVJ. This is represented in Figure 11. Assuming that
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the joint probability distribution of wEj and wVJ does not change, the net result is
that the probability o f observing an individual in school increases, and the 
probabilities o f observing an individual in employment or unemployment 
decrease.
Figure 11: Change In Outcomes For People Eligible Post-1987
OUTCOM E=U
OUTCOME-EOUTCOM E=S
An individual moving from PRE87 to INELIGIBLE, that is someone for whom 
unemployment benefits become unavailable, can be characterised as 
experiencing an increase in the level o f aU}. This is represented in Figure 12.
The net result o f this change is that the probability o f an individual being 
observed in unemployment decreases, and the probabilities o f observing them 
either in employment or school increase.
Given that the level o f unemployment benefits fell after 1987, this effect will be 
present to a lesser degree for individuals moving from PRE87 to ELIGIBLE. The
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probability o f  being observed in school will still increase unambiguously and the 
probability o f  being observed in unemployment will fall. However, the effect on 
the probability o f  observing the individual in employment will be ambiguous. If 
the effect o f  the falling level o f unemployment benefits dominates, the 
probability o f  observing an individual who becomes ELIGIBLE in employment 
could rise.
Figure 12: Change In Outcomes For Ineligible People Post-1987
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The analysis o f  Dearden and Heath (1996) can be defended by arguing that there 
are very few individuals who are INELIGIBLE due to the means-test, who do not 
already decide to complete school. For these individuals, the values o f aEj and
am are so high that there is very little probability o f observing them in either
unemployment or employment and the effect of increasing these values through 
the policy initiatives is small. Another way of thinking about this in terms o f the 
structure above, is that for most individuals who are INELIGIBLE, the shocks
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which would be required to observe that individual in employment or 
unemployment are very large and occur with very low probability.
4 Data Sources and Definitions
The data used in this paper are essentially the same as the data used by Dearden 
and Heath (1996). The post-1987 data are from the AYS which is described in 
more detail in Appendix A. The pre-1987 sample consists of individuals who 
were interviewed in the Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS). This survey was 
run from 1985 to 1989 and tracks a nationally representative sample of 
individuals who were 16 to 25 years-old when the sample was established in 
1985. For the purposes of this paper we restrict our sample to teenagers who 
were in Year 12 or would have been in Year 12 had they stayed at school. 
Because the ALS did not interview new cohorts of 16 year olds each year, the 
data required to obtain a representative sample are not available by 1987. To 
extend the pre-1987 data set, we use information about what respondents were 
doing in 1984 to obtain an extra year of data. The information and question 
structure of the ALS is essentially the same as for the AYS.
A summary of the activities of the individuals in our sample, by year, is provided 
in Table 7. The changes in the composition of the sample generally reflect 
changes in composition at the aggregate level.
The focus of the following analysis is on how eligibility for AUSTUDY and 
unemployment benefits affects outcomes. We aim to assess the impact of 
eligibility by estimating the marginal effects of being in one of the three regimes 
identified in Section 3 on the probability of being observed in different outcomes, 
after controlling for personal and family background characteristics. Policy is 
captured in the following analysis by two indicator variables. The first takes the
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value zero in the pre-1987 period and one if the individual is ELIGIBLE, that is 
eligible for both AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits after 1987. The second 
indicator variable captures individuals who are INELIGIBLE by taking the value 
zero in the pre-1987 period and one if the individual is not eligible in the second 
period.
Table 7: Teenage Labour Market And Education Outcomes
Proportions in parentheses
Year School Employment Unemployment Total
1984 322 (45.5) 302 (42.7) 83(11.7) 707
1985 432 (48.9) 342 (38.7) 109 (12.3) 883
1986 334 (48.6) 296 (43.0) 58 (8.4) 688
1989 680 (51.1) 502 (37.6) 151 (11.3) 1333
1990 820 (66.9) 318(26.0) 87 (7.1) 1225
1991 841 (71.7) 251 (21.4) 81 (6.9) 1173
1992 930 (82.2) 145 (12.8) 56 (5.0) 1131
1993 889 (85.3) 118(11.3) 35 (3.4) 1042
1994 809 (83.4) 114(11.8) 47 (4.9) 970
Before 1987, AUSTUDY was not available and eligibility for unemployment 
benefits was not affected by family background, as there was no means-test on 
parents’ income. From this point of view, eligibility for all the individuals in the 
pre-1987 sample was the same. The proportion of unemployed teenagers in the 
pre-1987 sample who actually received unemployment benefits was 61.4, 74.3 
and 86.2 percent in each year from 1984 to 1986. The fact that not all 
unemployed individuals received benefits may reflect the fact that these 
individuals had enough private income to be ineligible for benefits, but still 
considered themselves to be unemployed. Alternatively, there may be 
incomplete take up of unemployment benefits.
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After 1987, eligibility for AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits (or JSA) was 
affected by means-tests on parents' income. These are similar enough that we 
assume that the receipt of one benefit implies eligibility for the other. Table 8 
provides information about the proportion of individuals in the sample receiving 
AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits, if they were in school or unemployment 
respectively. Roughly one-third of students in Year 12 receive AUSTUDY. On 
average around half of unemployed teenagers who would have been in Year 12 
receive unemployment benefits. This proportion is higher in periods of high 
unemployment, which highlights the importance of controlling for 
macroeconomic conditions either by including aggregate unemployment rates or 
more generally, year indicator variables.
Table 8: Proportion Of Teenagers Receiving Benefits
Year Proportion of School Attenders 
Receiving AUSTUDY
Proportion of Unemployed 
Receiving Benefits
1989 34.0 22.5
1990 32.2 48.3
1991 33.5 61.7
1992 34.1 71.4
1993 35.3 65.7
1994 32.6 48.9
An important assumption underlying the definition of whether an individual is 
ELIGIBLE or INELIGIBLE is that individuals who are eligible actually receive 
transfer payments. The pre-1987 evidence suggested that while take-up rates of 
unemployment benefits were high, they were not complete. In 1990 respondents 
to the AYS were asked whether they had applied for AUSTUDY, and the reasons 
for not applying if they had not. Roughly 75 per cent of respondents had not 
applied, and of these, two thirds did not apply because they or their parents 
earned too much for them to be eligible. Twenty percent of 16 year-olds
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responded that they did not know why they had not applied, hadn't got around to 
it or didn’t know what AUSTUDY was. For 17 year-olds and older age groups, 
the proportion with this response fell to 6 per cent. This suggests that the 
assumption of complete take up of AUSTUDY by eligible teenagers is not 
unrealistic.
Although the assumption that individuals receiving benefits are eligible for both 
AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits is useful for individuals who are 
observed in school or unemployment, no information about eligibility is directly 
available for individuals observed in employment after 1987. As an 
approximation, we predict the probability of being ELIGIBLE for employed 
teenagers from a probit model of eligibility estimated using the observed benefit 
receipt of all the unemployed and individuals in school in the post-1987 sample. 
Employed individuals whose probability of being eligible is greater than 50 
percent are deemed to be ELIGIBLE.
The control variables which are included are a standard set of individual and 
family background characteristics. A summary of the mean characteristics for 
teenagers in each of the three outcomes is presented in Table 9. Interestingly, one 
of the most distinct differences between employed and unemployed teenagers is 
that employed teenagers are more likely to have working parents with higher 
status jobs on average. A more detailed description of the data used is given in 
Appendix A.
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Table 9: Summary Statistics by Observed Outcome
Averages by group, standard errors in parentheses where appropriate
Employment Unemployment School
Personal background
Male 0.56 0.55 0.48
Age 17.29 (0.70) 17.40 (0.70) 17.15(0.62)
Foreign Bom 0.08 0.10 0.14
ESL: English spoken well 0.05 0.07 0.09
ESL: English spoken poorly 0.01 0.02 0.02
Attend(s/ed) a government school 0.83 0.83 0.70
Number o f siblings 2.39(1.56) 2.53 (1.85) 2.16(1.53)
Parents’ characteristics
Father’s occupational status @14 27.32 (21.68) 21.77(2.39) 32.21 (23.59)
Mother’s occupational status @14 15.53 (19.45) 13.05(19.19) 19.86(21.79)
Father not employed @14 0.04 0.09 0.04
Mother not employed @14 0.45 0.49 0.39
Father not present @14 0.14 0.21 0.12
Mother not present @14 0.03 0.06 0.02
Father has:
Degree 0.07 0.10 0.17
Trade qualifications 0.20 0.13 0.17
Other post school qualifications 0.07 0.06 0.10
Secondary education 0.43 0.40 0.36
M other has:
Degree 0.06 0.05 0.14
Trade qualifications 0.06 0.04 0.05
Other post school qualifications 0.12 0.11 0.15
Secondary education 0.64 0.64 0.56
Note: @14 indicates that the variable is the parent’s characteristic when the respondent was 14 years-old
5 Estimation Issues and Results
The purpose of this section is to estimate the model outlined in Section 3 of this 
chapter. All that is required to implement this model is for an assumption to be 
made about the joint probability distribution for the underlying errors and
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consequently the joint probability distribution of the errors wEJ and wLJj. Having 
made this assumption, the likelihood function can be written as:
/0?,2 ) = n P r ( s ,  = 1 | H ej =11 Pr(Uj (8)
j =1
where N  is the total number of individuals in the sample.
Section 5.1 discusses estimation of the multinomial logit model. From a 
practical point of view, this model is the most straight forward to estimate and 
provides an excellent starting point from which to explore less restricted models. 
Section 5.2 discusses estimation of the multinomial probit model which permits 
the estimation of more free parameters at the cost of being more time and 
computer intensive.
5.1 Multinomial Logit Estimation
The multinomial logit model is the most straight forward multinomial outcome 
model to estimate. This model has the advantage that the cumulative distribution 
function used to evaluate the probabilities used in the likelihood function can be 
expressed in closed form and is therefore straightforward to compute. Another 
computational advantage of the multinomial logit model is that global 
convergence is guaranteed.
The multinomial logit specification defines the probability of individual j  being 
observed in school as:
Pr(s,=l)=
Xj Ps
Xjfii (9)
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The probability of being observed in each of the other two outcomes is defined 
similarly and the sum of the three probabilities will be one, as required. However, 
the coefficients will not be uniquely identified without a further restriction. The 
standard restriction for multinomial logit models is to assume that the vector of 
coefficients for one alternative, known as the base category, is normalised to 
zero. The normalised coefficients are then interpreted as the effect of a given 
characteristic on the probability of being observed in a given outcome, relative to 
its effect on the probability of being observed in the base category. For example, 
if the base category is schooling, a positive coefficient on age for employment 
indicates that older teenagers in the sample are more likely to be observed in 
employment than in school, all else being equal.
However, computational ease comes at the cost of implied restrictions on the 
variance-covariance matrix, which may not be satisfactory from the point of view 
of the economics. In particular, the multinomial logit specification assumes that 
the variance-covariance matrix of the underlying errors is an identity matrix, thus 
implicitly assuming that all the possible outcomes are perfectly substitutable for 
each other. This assumption, also known as the Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA), is difficult to justify a priori, in the current circumstances. 
For example, it is plausible that shocks increasing the likelihood that an 
individual leaves school for employment could be positively correlated with 
shocks which increase the likelihood of observing an individual in 
unemployment.
Despite the restrictive assumptions, multinomial logit estimation provides a good 
first pass at the problem. At the very least, the multinomial logit provides good 
starting values for more computationally intensive multinomial probit model, 
discussed in Section 5.2 and provides a feel for the data.
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Because multinomial choice models are non-linear functions of their coefficients, 
the estimated coefficients provide information about the direction of the effect, 
but not about its size. The size will depend on the values taken by all the 
independent variables. For this reason, the results of estimating the multinomial 
logit model presented in Table 10 are expressed in terms of the marginal effect a 
given variable has on the probability of being observed in a particular outcome, 
given that all other variables are set to their mean value. In terms of Equation 9, 
this can be written as:
3Pr(s,=l)
dx =pr(^ =iL z (a-aH ^L (10)
The coefficients on dummy variables can be interpreted as the change in the 
probability of observing a given outcome if the value of the dummy variable is 
changed from zero to one. Dummy variables are indicated by an asterisk. For 
example, in Table 10, being male increases the probability that the individual 
will be observed in employment by 4.8 percentage points. For continuous 
variables such as age, the coefficient is interpreted as the increase in the 
probability of observing the outcome if the explanatory variable increases by one 
unit. Therefore, an individual who is one year older than average will be 7.7 
percentage points more likely to be observed in employment.
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Table 10: Estimation Results
Number of observations: 9,152
Employment Unemployment School
Eligibility
3Pr/9x t-stat 3Pr/3x t-stat 3Pr/3x t-stat
ELIGIBLE (post-1987)* -0.314 -15.59 -0.017 -1.55 0.331 14.60
INELIGIBLE (post-1987)* 
Personal background
-0.150 -8.44 -0.041 -3.80 0.191 9.30
Male* 0.048 5.27 0.010 2.09 -0.059 -5.74
Age 0.077 10.26 0.033 8.70 -0.110 -13.08
Foreign Bom* -0.054 -3.02 -0.016 -1.69 0.070 3.59
ESL: English spoken well* -0.122 -5.45 -0.022 -1.93 0.144 5.96
ESL: English spoken poorly* -0.205 -3.65 -0.000 -0.01 0.205 3.57
Attend(s/ed) a government 
school*
0.121 10.48 0.024 3.70 -0.146 -11.41
Number o f siblings 
Parents’ characteristics
0.011 3.59 0.004 2.53 -0.014 -4.34
Father’s occupational status @14 -0.001 -3.78 -0.001 -5.21 0.002 6.08
Mother’s occupational status @14 -0.000 -1.19 -0.000 -1.18 0.001 1.68
Father not employed @14* -0.046 -1.76 0.015 1.34 0.031 1.11
Mother not employed @14* -0.007 -0.49 -0.004 -0.46 0.011 0.67
Father not present @14* -0.010 -0.44 -0.007 -0.60 0.017 0.66
Mother not present @14* 
Father has:
0.051 1.50 0.041 2.62 -0.092 -2.44
Degree* -0.116 -4.46 0.010 0.71 0.107 3.73
Trade qualifications* -0.013 -0.60 -0.024 -2.08 0.036 1.54
Other post school qualifications* -0.070 -2.83 -0.021 -1.53 0.092 3.30
Secondary education* 
M other has:
-0.016 -0.81 -0.008 -0.81 0.024 1.10
Degree* -0.086 -3.16 -0.023 -1.52 0.109 3.63
Trade qualifications* 0.033 1.19 -0.004 -0.24 -0.029 -0.93
Other post school qualifications* -0.024 -1.02 -0.004 -0.034 0.028 1.07
Secondary education* 0.002 0.09 0.007 0.76 -0.009 -0.43
Note: Section of state and state of residence and time dummies have been included, but have not been reported;
Dummy variables are indicated by an asterisk.
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The marginal effects of the eligibility indicators are large and significant. These 
coefficients provide information about how the probability of being observed in a 
given outcome would be affected by being either ELIGIBLE or INELIGIBLE, 
rather than in the pre-1987 sample. As such, they can be interpreted as the effect 
of introducing AUSTUDY, in the case of ELIGIBLE, and the effect of removing 
unemployment benefits, in the case of INELIGIBLE. In most cases the direction 
of the effects correspond to the changes represented in Figures 11 and 12.
Individuals in the post-1987 sample are more likely to complete high school and 
are less likely to be unemployed than those in the earlier sample. Teenagers who 
are ELIGIBLE are less likely to be employed than PRE87 teenagers, which 
suggests that the effect of introducing AUSTUDY is stronger than the effect of 
decreasing the level of unemployment benefits which are available. However, 
contrary to the prediction of the model outlined in Section 3, INELIGIBLE 
individuals are less likely to be observed in employment than PRE87 individuals.
One explanation for this is that the leaving school is seen as a gamble on finding 
work, and the lack of access to unemployment benefits if the gamble does not 
pay off inclines individuals who would otherwise have had a good chance of 
being employed towards completing high school. Another possibility is that 
these indicator variables are picking up trend changes in participation and 
unemployment rates. However, this explanation can be discounted as these 
effects are captured by the inclusion of time dummies.
The impact of both changes in policy on behaviour can be assessed by comparing 
the ELIGIBLE and INELIGIBLE individuals, without reference to the pre-1987 
sample. This can be calculated as the difference in the marginal effects of being 
ELIGIBLE and INELIGIBLE as presented in Table 10. This calculation suggests 
that being ELIGIBLE increases the probability of completing high school by 14.0
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percentage points and of being unemployed by 2.4 percentage points, and 
reduces the probability of being observed in employment by around 16.4 
percentage points.
Intuition and the results presented earlier from Dearden and Heath (1996) suggest 
that the estimated marginal effects of eligibility on the probabilities of being 
observed in either employment or school are larger than would be expected. One 
possible explanation for the magnitude of the calculated marginal effects is that 
they are evaluated at the average characteristics of the entire sample. If we are 
interested in understanding how a given group would have responded to the 
availability of benefits, it is not clear that the average characteristics of the whole 
sample is the correct place to evaluate the marginal effect.
The questions we are interested in addressing are:
• How would the predicted probabilities of ELIGIBLE teenagers change if they 
did not have access to AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits?
• How would the predicted probabilities of INELIGIBLE teenagers have been 
affected if these benefits had been made available?
To answer these questions, we calculate the probability of correctly predicting 
the actual outcome of each individual in the post-1987 sample, first assuming 
that the individual is ELIGIBLE and then assuming that they are INELIGIBLE. 
Differencing these predicted probabilities provides information about the 
marginal effect of being eligible for both AUSTUDY and unemployment 
benefits, rather than neither, for each individual.
To summarise these effects, we average the probabilities predicted under both
assumptions and their differences for different groups. First we split the post-
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1987 sample by observed outcome, because we are interested in how the 
availability of benefits would have affected the probability of observing actual 
outcomes. Each of these three groups is split further by whether the individual 
was actually ELIGIBLE or INELIGIBLE. Consequently, there are six groups of 
individuals for which the average probability of correctly predicting observed 
outcomes is calculated under these two assumptions (Table 11). For each group, 
one of the average predicted probabilities will be the probability that they are 
observed in their actual situation, and the other will be a counterfactual. The 
actual scenario has been made bold.
Table 11: Average Probability Of Choosing Observed Outcome
For individuals in the post-1987 sample
Assuming that all individuals are:
Observed Group ELIGIBLE INELIGIBLE Difference
Employed
ELIGIBLE 0.210
(0.45)
0.394 -0.184
INELIGIBLE 0.182 0.344
(0.75)
-0.162
Unemployed
ELIGIBLE 0.140
(0.80)
0.091 0.049
INELIGIBLE 0.128 0.085
(0.66)
0.043
In School
ELIGIBLE 0.803
(0.76)
0.706 0.097
INELIGIBLE 0.839 0.750
(0.65)
0.079
Note: Bold entries indicate the actual predicted probabilities rather than probabilities evaluated under
the counterfactual scenario;
Numbers in parentheses are the proportions o f the relevant groups with predicted probabilities
o f being higher than the random probability.
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In general, the higher the probability of correctly predicting the actual outcome, 
the better is the predictive power of the model. However, the predicted 
probability of observing an outcome will also be higher, the higher the random 
probability of observing that outcome. Therefore, each predicted probability 
should be compared with the random probability, which is given by the 
proportion of the sample in each outcome. To provide some metric of the quality 
of the predictions, the proportion of individuals with predicted probabilities 
above the random probability has been included for each actual scenario in 
parentheses. In general, the model appears to be adding predictive power.
Table 11 confirms the general result that being ELIGIBLE, rather than 
INELIGIBLE, increases the probability of observing teenagers in unemployment 
and school, and decreases the probability of observing them in employment. If 
AUSTUDY had been taken away from teenagers who were receiving 
AUSTUDY and completing school, these calculations suggest that they would 
have been 9.7 percentage points less likely to complete school. In the reverse 
situation, if teenagers who were completing school but were not eligible for 
AUSTUDY were to receive it, their predicted probability of completing school 
would increase by 7.9 percentage points. This model, therefore, suggests that the 
effect of both the policy changes is roughly twice as large as was predicted by 
Dearden and Heath (1996), although it should be noted that their estimates were 
conservative.
The effect of being ELIGIBLE appears to have had the least effect on the 
behaviour of unemployed teenagers: the probability of correctly predicting that 
unemployed teenagers are unemployed increases by between 4 and 5 percentage 
points. This suggests that there are relatively few teenagers in the unemployment 
pool who are affected by the means-test. This adds weight to the results of
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Dearden and Heath (1996) which are essentially estimated with this assumption 
imposed.
Eligibility for AUSTUDY and unemployment benefits appears to have the 
largest impact on the predicted behaviour of employed individuals: it decreases 
the probability of observing an individual in employment by around 17 
percentage points. Changes in government policy appear to have had the largest 
impact on the employment/school margin rather than on unemployment 
outcomes.
The rest of the results in Table 10 show that the personal background and family 
characteristics that have been included are also important for explaining the 
outcomes of Australian teenagers, consistently with earlier literature and other 
analysis in this thesis. Males are 4.8 percentage points more likely to be 
employed and 5.9 percentage points less likely to be in school than females. 
Older members of a cohort are more likely to have left school. Teenagers who 
would have been in Year 12 and are one year older than the sample average, are 
7.7 percentage points more likely to be in employment and 3.3 percentage points 
more likely to be unemployed.
Individuals who were bom overseas are more likely to complete Year 12 and are 
significantly less likely to be employed than members of their cohort who were 
bom in Australia. In addition, teenagers whose native language is not English are 
also significantly more likely to stay and school and are less likely to be 
employed. The fact that these effects are stronger for poor English speakers 
suggests that these teenagers face poor labour market prospects and use school as 
a means of improving their skills.
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Teenagers who attended government schools are 12.1 percentage points more 
likely to be employed and 2.4 percentage points more likely to be unemployed 
than teenagers from the same cohort who are enrolled in Catholic or other non­
government schools. As before, teenagers with more siblings are less likely to 
complete school.
Parents' characteristics are also important determinants of teenagers' education 
and labour market outcomes. In general, teenagers whose parents have higher 
status occupations and are better educated are more likely to complete high 
school and are less likely to be either employed or unemployed. Interestingly, 
parents' education appears to affect the probability of observing the individual in 
school or in employment, whereas occupational status also affects the probability 
of observing a teenager in unemployment. This suggests that there is some 
financial element in the probability of observing that someone is unemployed, as 
this is captured in the occupational status index, but is imperfectly approximated 
by educational attainment.
5.2 Multinomial Probit Estimation
An alternative to the multinomial logit specification is the multinomial probit 
model. By assuming that the underlying errors are joint normally distributed, and 
consequently that the error terms wEj and wVj are joint normally distributed, it is
possible to allow free estimation of some variance-covariance parameters. 
Although there are three parameters in the variance covariance matrix of wEJ and
wVJ, only two of these parameters are free to be estimated. The loss of one free
parameter arises because the estimated coefficient parameters can only be 
estimated relative to the parameters in the variance-covariance matrix. 
Identifying the coefficient parameters requires that the variance-covariance
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matrix be normalised, which reduces the number of free variance-covariance 
parameters by one.
The trade-off for being able to freely estimate variance-covariance parameters is 
that the cumulative distribution function of a joint normal does not have a closed 
form solution. The three outcome model considered here requires that the 
cumulative distribution function of a bivariate normal distribution be evaluated. 
In general, the evaluation of cumulative distribution functions of multivariate 
normal variables will require simulation techniques.12 In the case of a bivariate 
normal, however, the cumulative distribution function can be evaluated by 
numerical integration.13 Estimation of the multinomial probit model requires 
significantly more computational effort that the multinomial logit model. The 
rest of this section discusses the results of estimating the multinomial probit 
model using numerical integration techniques, and examines whether the extra 
effort is rewarded by economic insights which could not be made by estimating 
the multinomial logit model.
In general, parameter estimates for the multinomial probit model failed to 
converge. In order to understand the reasons for this, the model was estimated 
with a relatively high tolerance for the convergence criterion of three decimal 
places.14 The estimated marginal effects for all the control variables are very
12 Originally, we intended to estimate the multinomial probit model using the Geweke- 
Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) algorithm to simulate the probabilities in the likelihood 
function. Details of this simulation method are presented in Appendix B. However, 
problems of obtaining convergence for the multinomial probit, discussed below, 
were more severe for this method.
13 In what follows, the cdfbvn command in GAUSS is used to evaluate the cumulative 
density of a bivariate normal distribution for given parameter vectors.
14 The maximum likelihood estimation performed here was done using the GAUSS 
routine optmum.
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close to those presented in Table 10. The estimated marginal effects of being 
either ELIGIBLE or INELIGIBLE, rather than in the pre-1987 sample, on the 
probability of being observed either in school or in employment are also similar 
in magnitude to those estimated by multinomial logit (Table 12). The marginal 
effect of being ELIGIBLE on the probability of being observed in unemployment 
is closer to zero, but was statistically insignificant in the multinomial logit 
results.
Table 12: Marginal Effects Of Being ELIGIBLE and INELIGIBLE 
Estimated with a multinomial probit model
Employment Unemployment School
Numerical Integration ELIGIBLE 
(tolerance = 3)
-0.331 -0.006 0.337
LL=-6480.39 INELIGIBLE -0.154 -0.035 0.189
Numerical Integration ELIGIBLE 
(tolerance = 5)
-0.339 -0.003 0.342
LL=-6479.09 INELIGIBLE -0.158 . -0.032 0.190
Note: Tolerance is given in terms o f the number of decimal places, and LL is the log likelihood function.
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure has been set up to estimate two 
free elements of the lower Choleski decomposition of the variance-covariance 
matrix, rather than the free parameters in the variance-covariance matrix 
themselves. Neither of these parameters are statistically significant. The 
corresponding variance-covariance matrix of the error terms wEj and wVj is
presented in Equation 11. The final term in this equation expresses the variances 
and covariance of wEj and wVj in terms of the variances and covariances of the
underlying errors.
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(ii)
The variance of wL/J is large relative to the variance of wEJ which has been
normalised to one for the purposes of identification and the covariance between 
wEj and wVj is negative. In order to attribute signs and relative magnitudes of
these estimated parameters to underlying variances and covariances, it would be 
necessary to make three further identifying restrictions. Without doing this 
explicitly, it is possible to infer that the relationships between the elements of the 
variance covariance matrix are consistent with being relatively large and with 
aEU being relatively large and negative. The magnitude of a] cannot explain the 
signs and relative magnitudes in Equation 11, because it is present in all three 
terms. Also, it can be argued that the signs and magnitudes of a ES and aus 
cannot be used to explain the differences in the estimated parameters because 
they affect the estimated parameters in the same way, which is not consistent 
with the fact that they have opposite signs.
This suggests that it is relatively difficult to explain why a teenager is observed 
in unemployment with the available information. This is consistent with the fact 
that there are relatively few unemployed teenagers in the sample, which generally 
makes it more difficult to find strong correlations between observed behaviour 
and personal characteristics. A large negative correlation between the shocks 
affecting the probability of being observed in employment and unemployment is 
also consistent with intuition. It is straight forward to find unobserved 
characteristics such as the presence of local information networks, which are 
discussed at length in the following chapter, which would increase the 
probability of observing a teenager in employment and decrease the probability 
of observing a teenager in unemployment simultaneously.
We attempted to estimate these parameters more accurately by decreasing the 
tolerance of the convergence criterion to five decimal places. However, after 
20,000 iterations, the estimates had not converged, there had been very little 
improvement in the log likelihood value and the estimated marginal effects had 
not changed significantly (Table 12).15 However, the estimated elements of the p  
matrix and of the Choleski decomposition did change considerably (Equation 
12). The associated variance-covariance matrix of the parameter vector is not 
invertible.
var cov = 1 -1290
1290 197789100
(12)
Another way of demonstrating these results is to compare the distribution of the 
probabilities of correctly predicting observed outcomes, estimated by 
multinomial logit, and multinomial probit at the two different tolerance levels 
(Figure 13). These histograms are strikingly similar despite apparently large 
differences in the magnitude of the variance-covariance parameters.
These results are indicative of identification problems, although the model 
estimated above is formally identified. Keane (1992) noted that even in formally 
identified multinomial probit models, identification would be an issue if the 
explanatory variables only contain information about the individual and not 
information specific to the different outcomes. An alternative statement of this 
requirement is that there needs to be at least one exclusion restriction in the 
coefficient vector for each alternative.
15 Estimating 20,000 iterations took around two weeks, to give some indication of the 
time required to estimate a multinomial probit model with three outcomes and 9,152 
observations using numerical integration methods.
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Figure 13: Distribution Of The Probabilities Of Correctly Predicting
Outcomes
■  Multinomial Logit
Multinomial Probit 
(tolerance=3)
Multinomial Probit 
(tolerance=5)
0.075 0.175 0.275 0.375 0.475 0.575 0.675 0.775 0.875 0.975
The source o f this identification problem is that, in the absence o f exclusion 
restrictions, changes in the estimated variance-covariance parameters can be 
accommodated by changes in the estimated coefficient parameters. This 
behaviour is apparent in the two sets o f estimates generated by numerical 
integration methods, as the estimated coefficient vector varies markedly as the 
variance-covariance parameters vary, even though the marginal effects do not 
vary significantly.16 For the question being addressed here, it is not possible to 
know what the characteristics o f the unchosen alternatives are, making it difficult 
to fulfil this requirement. For example, it is not possible to know how much an 
individual would be earning if  they are not observed to be working. The
16 A more detailed discussion of this effect is provided in Keane (1992).
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conclusion of this section, therefore, is that for this particular empirical question, 
there is very little added value, in terms of our understanding of the behaviour of 
individuals, from estimating a multinomial probit model.
6 Conclusions
The aim of this analysis was to understand the impact that changes in 
government policy can have on the behaviour of teenagers who are making 
decisions about whether or not to complete high school. In 1987 the Australian 
government introduced a means-tested payment for teenagers in their final two 
years of high school and introduced a means-test for unemployment benefits for 
teenagers. The combined effect of these changes was intended to increase the 
proportion of teenagers completing high school and to decrease the number of 
unemployed teenagers by changing the financial incentives that they faced.
This question has been addressed in earlier work by Dearden and Heath (1996), 
although they did not consider the effect of changes to the administration of 
unemployment benefits. The analysis here extends the analysis of Dearden and 
Heath (1996) by allowing teenagers to be observed in one of three outcomes: 
employment, unemployment or school. In the first stage of this analysis we use a 
multinomial logit model to estimate the effects of policy changes on the 
probability of being observed in school, employment or unemployment.
The results from estimating this model indicate that the policy changes in 1987 
did affect the probability of observing teenagers in different outcomes. Being 
eligible for unemployment benefits and AUSTUDY, rather than being ineligible 
for either, is estimated to increase the probability of completing high school by 
between 8 and 10 percentage points. The estimated effect of the policy change is 
roughly double the effect estimated by Dearden and Heath (1996). Interestingly,
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being eligible rather than ineligible also increases the probability of being 
unemployed by between 4 and 5 percentage points and decreases the probability 
of being employed by between 16 and 19 percentage points.
The increase in the proportion of teenagers completing high school was achieved 
by decreasing the probability of being employed rather decreasing the probability 
of being unemployed, as would be expected from a model such as the one 
outlined in Section 3. One explanation for this result is that teenagers who 
decide not to complete high school are taking a gamble on the labour market, and 
it is the teenagers who would have had the best chances of obtaining work who 
are most likely to complete high school in response to increased incentives to 
staying in school and the increased costs of unemployment.
The last section of this paper considered estimating the effects of policy changes 
using a multinomial probit model to allow for the free estimation of variance- 
covariance parameters which is not permitted in the multinomial logit model. 
The estimated marginal effects and the probability of correctly predicting the 
observed outcome are not significantly changed by allowing for the extra 
parameters to be estimated. This arises because, although the model is formally 
identified, identification will be fragile in the absence of exclusion restrictions in 
the estimated coefficient matrix. In the context of multinomial probit models, 
exclusion restrictions require the data to contain information about the different 
alternatives. Given the nature of the problem, namely that the available data only 
contain information on individuals, there is no benefit in estimating a 
multinomial probit model.
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A p p e n d ix  B : S im u l a t e d  M a x im u m  L ik e l ih o o d  E s t im a t io n
The following description of the simulated maximum likelihood approach to 
estimating a multinomial probit is based on Borsch-Supan and Hajivassiliou 
(1992). The aim is to evaluate the probability of a certain outcome being 
observed that is continuous in the parameters, so that standard maximum 
likelihood algorithms can be applied. The basic procedure is as follows:
• rewrite the problem in terms of univariate errors using a Choleski 
decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix;
• draw a set of univariate errors with the appropriate distributions and 
constraints applied for each individual;
• evaluate the probability of observing the outcome given these errors and the 
parameter vector, and average across draws;
• apply standard maximum likelihood optimisation algorithms to determine a 
new set of parameters that increase the likelihood.
In what follows, the example of an individual who is observed in school, as 
developed in Section 3 will be continued. The simulation of the probability of 
being observed in unemployment or employment is a straight forward 
transformation of this procedure given that the error terms which need to be 
simulated can be expressed as linear combinations of the error terms simulated 
for the case where an individual is observed in school.
The first step towards simulating the probability of observing that an individual 
is in school is to re-write the problem in terms of univariate standard normal
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variables. Assuming
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Consequently, we can re-write the probability of observing that an individual is 
in school in terms of standard normal variables as:
Pr(sy = l)= Pr({a£j > wEj\n{aut > w,4|)
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The first component of this probability is a straight forward evaluation of a 
cumulative standard normal function. The second component, however, depends 
on the data, parameters and a truncated standard normal variable, eoEj. A
variable following this truncated normal distribution can be simulated from a 
variable following a standard uniform distribution using the inverse transform 
theorem. This theorem states that when an inverse cumulative distribution 
function is applied to a uniformly distributed random variable, the resulting 
variable will be distributed with the probability density function associated with 
the cumulative distribution function used.
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The cumulative distribution function of a standard truncated normal variable is:
G(a>) =
where aupper and aiower are the upper and lower bounds of the truncation; and 
g)~N (  0,1).
Therefore, a standard truncated normal random variable, Q), can be derived from 
a standard uniform random variable, 77, as:
O) = G-' (tj) = $■' (??(® aupper -  ® aw  )+®(aw ))
In order to simulate the probability accurately, it is necessary to draw a set of 
r=l,...,R replications for each individual from a standard uniform distribution, 
using a different seed for each individual to ensure that the shocks experienced 
by each individual are different. This set of standard uniform variables, riFr, 
remains the same for each parameter draw to ensure that there is not extra 
variation introduced. Consequently, there will be r=l,...,R evaluations of a 
truncated standard normal variable for each individual j , for each new parameter 
vector:
f r ( n  \
\ f w
nEr 0 Ej 
k} e E y
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Finally, these probabilities are averaged across the R replications, resulting in the 
following simulated likelihood function contribution from individuals observed 
in school:
7(p,-z)=Y[VT(j=s\xJ-,p,i:)
s,=\
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This procedure has been implemented for multinomial probit models in GAUSS 
and is available on request.
Ch a pt e r  4
J o b -S e a r c h  M e t h o d s , N e ig h bo u r h o o d  E ffe c t s  a n d  t h e  Y o u t h
La b o u r  M a r k e t
7 Introduction
Survey data suggest that around one-third of teenagers successfully find work 
through friends and relatives, one-third find work by directly contacting 
employers and the remaining third use indirect methods such as newspapers or 
employment agencies. In contrast, less than 10 per cent of unemployed teenagers 
report that they are using friends and relatives as their main job-search method 
and two thirds report that they are mainly using an indirect method of search. 
This chapter examines what factors affect the way teenagers look for work in 
order to explain why we observe this behaviour.
To this end, a model of job-search behaviour is developed in which there are two 
job-search methods available. The first is a general job-search method whose 
success depends on aggregate labour-market conditions and the search effort 
chosen by the individual. The second is a local job-search method which only 
depends on local labour-market conditions. This characterisation is motivated by 
the possibility, raised in Chapter 2, that information networks provided by friends 
and relatives are local in nature. Modelling the interaction of individuals, their 
neighbourhood and the aggregate labour market also provides an opportunity to 
explore the possibility that local job-information networks help to explain the 
unequal distribution of unemployment across Australian neighbourhoods as 
documented by Gregory and Hunter (1995).
103
Finally, this paper estimates the factors which affect the search methods chosen 
by Australian teenagers. Our sample includes teenagers who were looking for 
work, but were not enrolled in full-time education and who were respondents to 
the AYS. Data on individuals from the AYS allow us to control for individual 
characteristics, past education experience, family background and the 
characteristics of the neighbourhood the teenager is living in.
We find that the receipt of unemployment benefits is the single most important 
variable for explaining the method reported as the main search method. 
Unemployment benefit recipients are almost 20 percentage points more likely to 
report that the government employment agency, the CES, is their main job search 
method and are significantly less likely to report either newspapers or direct 
search methods.17 There is some evidence that individuals who have a longer 
duration of unemployment are more likely to report newspapers as their main 
job-search method. This is consistent with the possibility that unemployed 
teenagers begin their job search by focussing on methods that have proved more 
successful for other teenagers, but switch to alternative search methods if a job 
offer is not secured after some period.
Respondents whose parents are better educated and/or have higher status 
occupations are more likely to search using friends and relatives or directly 
contacting employers in preference to searching in the newspaper or through the 
CES. Respondents who left school in Year 10 or earlier and/or attended a
17 The Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) was the main employment service 
available to the unemployed through the sample period being considered here, and 
was administered by the Federal Government. In 1998, it was replaced by Centrelink 
and a competitive employment services market known as the Jobs Network.
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government school are more likely to report that the CES is their main method of 
search.
Finally, there is evidence that higher neighbourhood unemployment rates 
decrease the probability of using direct search methods and increase the 
probability of using the CES as the main method of search. This relationship can 
be explained if the effectiveness of direct search methods depends on the quality 
local job information networks, measured as the proportion of the neighbourhood 
who are employed. The importance of local job-information networks may help 
explain the increasing concentration of unemployment in some neighbourhoods 
documented by Gregory and Hunter (1995). If a neighbourhood experiences a 
negative employment shock, for example the closure of a local employer, the 
initial increase in unemployment may be amplified by a fall in the search 
effectiveness of the unemployed in the local area due to the decrease in the 
quality of local job-information networks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some summary 
information about the search methods used in the youth labour market in 
Australia and reviews the international evidence on the effectiveness of different 
job-search methods. After discussing why friends and relatives would be a more 
successful method than other available search methods, this section briefly 
reviews the current empirical evidence for which factors affect the way 
individuals choose to search. Section 3 develops an economic model that 
explains an individual's choice of job-search method and discusses the general 
equilibrium implications of modelling search behaviour in this way.
Section 4 provides a detailed description of the data. Section 5 lays out the 
econometric model explaining the job-search method choice of an unemployed 
individual and presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes by
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summarising the results and examining their contribution to our understanding of 
the youth labour market in Australia.
8 Job-Search Behaviour: What Do We Know Already ?
8.1 Which Search Methods are Most Effective?
Table 13 summarises the job-search methods reported by Australian teenagers 
who were respondents to the AYS. Information about which methods of search 
proved successful is derived from the responses of teenagers who were employed 
at the time of the interview and had obtained their job in the year prior to the 
interview. These responses are summarised in column 1. The number of 
respondents who have been employed continuously over the year since their 
previous interview is also included in the second last row of the table.
Roughly one-third of teenagers found their job through friends and relatives, 
one-third through contacting employers directly, and the final third through 
indirect search methods such as newspapers and the CES. This information is 
consistent with the successful methods reported by teenagers for the 12 months 
to July 1998, although the proportion using direct employer contact is slightly 
larger and the reported use of newspapers and the CES is correspondingly 
lower.18
18 ABS Cat. No. 6245.0, Successful and Unsuccessful Job Search Experience. It should 
also be noted that the CES was replaced by Centrelink and a competitive 
employment services market, the Job Network, during the period covered by the 
survey. All services which replace the CES have been classified as the CES here for 
the purposes of comparison with the older survey data.
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Table 13: Job-Search Methods
16 To 19 Year-Olds
Used to obtain current job Currently used by unemployed
Government program 438 (6%) -
CES 671 (10%) 801 (27%)
Newspapers/media 1 209 (18%) 1 219 (40%)
Friends and relatives 2 228 (33%) 171 (6%)
Direct employer contact 1 929 (28%) 686 (23%)
Other 370 (5%) 145 (5%)
Total 6 845 3 022
Same job as last year 4 126 -
Total 10 971 —
Note: 'Other' includes unions, unemployed persons groups, private agencies, advertising and other.
Respondents to the AYS who reported that their main activity was looking for 
work were asked to list all the search methods they were using and, if more than 
one method was reported, to identify the main job-search method.19 For 
comparison, the main job-search methods of these unemployed teenagers are 
summarised in column 2 of Table 13.
The most striking difference between the employed and the unemployed is that 
the unemployed are much less likely to report that friends and relatives are their 
main search method than the employed are to have used this method 
successfully.20 The proportion of unemployed teenagers reporting that their main
19 Thus, teenagers looking for work, who are enrolled in full-time education are not 
included in this sample.
20 Around one-third of the employed respondents moved directly into their current job 
from an earlier job. The differences observed in Table 13 could perhaps be explained 
if the job-search behaviour of on-the-job searchers was significantly different from 
that of individuals who are not already employed. An examination of the data 
suggests that this is not the case.
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search method is either newspapers or the CES is significantly higher than the 
proportion of employed teenagers who gained jobs through this method.
This is consistent with evidence about the success of different job-search 
methods used by 15 to 26 year-olds who were respondents to the first wave of the 
Australian Longitudinal Survey (ALS) in 1985. Miller and Volker(1987) show 
that respondents using the CES or newspapers are less likely to leave 
unemployment than those using friends and relatives or direct employer contact. 
Jobs obtained through the CES are also less successful if success is measured by 
the duration of employment.
Information about the search effort applied to different job-search methods and 
the success of such effort in terms of the number of job offers received is 
available for the US and the UK. Analysis of these data provides further 
evidence that friends and relatives and direct employer contact are the two most 
successful job-search methods.
Holzer (1988) finds that 16 to 23 year-old males from the 1981 Youth Cohort of 
the National Longitudinal Survey for the United States who were unemployed 
the month before the interview date, spend more hours searching through friends 
and relatives and direct employer contact than through state employment 
agencies or newspapers. They also receive more job offers from these direct 
search methods. Holzer also shows that job offers generated through friends and 
relatives have an 81 per cent probability of being accepted, which is much higher 
than the acceptance rate for offers generated by any other method.
Jones (1989) presents similar evidence for the UK using a sample of unemployed 
people collected by the Economist Intelligence Unit in September 1982. He finds 
that there is some decline in the total hours spent on search as the duration of
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unemployment lengthens and that this is particularly noticeable for the number of 
hours spent using friends and relatives.
Jones also estimates the effects of hours spent using different search methods on 
measures of success such as the number of job offers received and the number of 
interviews obtained. He finds that hours spent using friends and relatives has no 
effect on the number of interviews received, but increases the number of offers 
received. While this supports Holzer’s finding that the probability of obtaining an 
acceptable offer using friends and relatives is very high, it makes it difficult to 
interpret the effect of spending more hours searching on the final outcome.
Another of Jones’ results which is difficult to interpret is that the number of 
hours spent using a government employment agency decreases the number of 
interviews and the number of offers. This suggests that the hours spent using 
different types of search may be proxies for omitted personal or background 
characteristics which are important. More time spent using newspapers is found 
to increase the number of interviews, but not the number of offers.
Overall, the evidence suggests that employment agencies and newspapers are 
relatively unsuccessful job-search methods, compared with using friends and 
relatives or direct employer contact. The question then arises: why do 
unemployed teenagers use job-search methods which are apparently less 
successful?
Assuming that these job seekers are acting in their own best interests, there are 
two explanations for this behaviour. One is that job-search methods which 
proved more successful, on average, for employed teenagers are tried first and 
when they do not result in an acceptable job offer, alternative job-search methods 
are pursued. If this is the explanation, we would expect to see that teenagers with
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longer durations of unemployment are less likely to use direct search methods. 
The second possibility is that some individuals are living in environments or 
have characteristics which make it optimal to choose indirect job search methods, 
even though they are less successful on average. Before addressing this question 
more directly, it is useful to consider why direct methods would be more 
successful.
Motivated by the stylised fact that direct methods appear to be more successful 
than indirect methods, Montgomery (1991) develops a model of imperfect 
information to explain why this might be the case. His model assumes that 
employers cannot observe the quality of potential employees and that, without 
further information, employers will offer all potential employees a real wage 
equal to the average productivity of the unemployment pool.
Montgomery also assumes that there is a social structure within which high 
productivity workers are more likely to associate with each other than with 
low-productivity workers. In this environment, one way for firms to increase the 
probability of hiring a high productivity worker is to offer jobs to potential 
employees who are recommended by current high-productivity workers.
The net gain arises because both the employer and the potential employee have 
better information about each other, increasing the probability that there will be a 
successful match. This process has also been argued less formally by Rees (1966) 
who suggests that employed individuals will only refer capable workers to ensure 
that their own reputation is not affected. These incentives will reinforce the 
mechanism described in the Montgomery model.
110
8.2 What Factors Affect the Choice o f Job-Search Method?
Although the Montgomery model explains why friends and relatives will be a 
successful method of job search, it does not suggest that this method will 
increase the chances of finding an acceptable job for all the unemployed. In fact, 
the model relies on the fact that the unemployed are not homogenous in two 
respects. First, for imperfect information to be an issue, potential workers must 
have different productivity levels when they are matched to a given job. The 
second way in which the unemployed are not homogeneous, is that some are 
connected to more useful social networks than others.
McGregor (1983) considers the possibility that the job-information network 
provided by friends and relatives is local in nature. This implies that the 
effectiveness of friends and relatives as a job-search method would be highly 
dependent on local neighbourhood characteristics. In particular, he argues that 
information about jobs is more likely to come from employed people and 
consequently that there will be less useful job information in high unemployment 
neighbourhoods. The expected probability of obtaining a job offer using 
information from friends and relatives in high unemployment areas is also likely 
to be lower as there will be more competition for any available jobs.
McGregor (1983) proceeds to test his hypothesis, that local labour market 
conditions affect job-search behaviour, using a sample of males who were 
unemployed in Glasgow in 1976. He finds that when personal characteristics are 
controlled for, neighbourhood unemployment rates do not influence the 
probability that friends and relatives are used for search. Although this is a 
disappointing result, there are several technical reasons why these estimates 
should be treated with caution. First, the unemployment rates are presented in
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high, medium, and low bands and second, the estimation technique does not take 
proper account of the nature of the data being used.21
Schmitt and Wadsworth (1993) find that the most important determinant of job- 
search method choice is the unemployed person’s previous occupational status, 
using a sample of unemployed male benefit recipients in Great Britain who were 
interviewed in the General Household Survey between 1979 and 1982. The other 
consistently important variables are the duration of unemployment and a dummy 
for the 50 to 65 year-old age group. Unfortunately however, the use of personal 
contacts is not available as a separate category in this study, but is subsumed in 
‘other’ job-search methods.
Crockett (1994) analyses the factors which affect job-search effort, measured as 
the number of search methods reported by respondents to the 1985 wave of the 
ALS. He finds that state unemployment rates and the benefit-to-income ratio 
both have a negative effect of the number of job-search methods reported. Even 
though these factors are significant, the estimated elasticities are small.
Jones (1989) estimates the relationship between search effort, measured as the 
number of hours used on different search methods and individual characteristics. 
He finds that being male increases the number of hours spent searching through 
all methods except newspapers, that older individuals are less likely to spend 
time searching through government employment agencies and individuals with 
technical qualifications spend more time directly approaching employers. A more
21 The dependent variable used by McGregor (1983) takes the value one if the 
individual is using friends and relatives as a search method and zero otherwise. 
McGregor (1983) uses a linear probability model to estimate the proposed 
relationship rather than a method designed to deal with dependent variables of this 
type, such as logit or probit.
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puzzling result is that individuals from high unemployment areas spend less time 
searching through government employment agencies or newspapers. 
Holzer (1988) examines the factors which affect the probability that an individual 
will use different search methods, but the results are only marginally significant 
at best.
9 A New Model of Job-Search Method Choice
In this section, we develop an economic model to formalise the way in which 
characteristics of the local environment can affect the job-search behaviour of 
unemployed individuals. This is done by extending the job-search model 
developed by Pissarides (1990) to allow individuals to have access to two 
different search methods with characteristics reflecting the differences between 
the indirect and direct search methods discussed above.
The first job search method, labelled the general search method, captures search 
methods such as newspapers and employment agencies, which provide general 
job information. The probability that the general job search method will create a 
match between an unemployed worker and an unfilled vacancy is assumed to be 
a function of aggregate labour market conditions and the search effort of the 
individual. Thus, the general search method is equivalent to the form of search 
described in the search intensity model of Pissarides (1990).
The second job search method, labelled the local search method, is designed to 
capture job-search methods, such as information from friends and relatives or 
direct employer contact. The effectiveness of these methods is assumed to be 
influenced by conditions in the local labour market, but not by the amount of 
effort applied by the job seeker. This implicitly assumes that the job-information 
network provided by friends and relatives is confined to the local area, and that
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the employed neighbourhood residents receive job information at a fixed rate, 
which the job seeker cannot influence.
In Section 3.1 we consider the individual's job-search method choice and the 
steady state of the local labour market, taking aggregate labour market conditions 
as given. The first order condition of the individual's problem provides a basis for 
the empirical model estimated in Section 5. In Section 3.2, we introduce the 
labour-demand decision of firms and look at the aggregate labour market in 
steady state, assuming that all neighbourhoods are identical. Finally, in 
Section 3.3, we examine the effects on individual and aggregate outcomes of 
improving the effectiveness of the local search method and of increasing the flow 
of benefits to being unemployed in a single neighbourhood. This allows us to 
compare this model with the framework of Pissarides (1990) and to understand 
the interaction of individuals, neighbourhoods and the aggregate labour market.
9.1 The Local Environment
Introducing a local search method, which is dependent on local labour market 
conditions, requires assumptions to be made about the way the labour force is 
divided into neighbourhoods. We assume that the labour force is evenly 
distributed across n=l,...,N  neighbourhoods and that the labour force in each 
neighbourhood is normalised to one. We assume that the proportion of 
neighbourhood n who are unemployed is denoted un and consequently, that the
proportion of neighbourhood who are employed is 1 -  un.
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The aggregate unemployment rate is defined as:
N
(13)
N
Individuals choose the optimal level of search effort given information about 
their local labour market and the aggregate labour market. This decision will be 
affected by the probability of matching a job, the value of the job, the costs of 
searching for work, and the value of being unemployed.
The probability of finding a job through the local search method for an 
unemployed person in neighbourhood n is assumed to be a decreasing function of 
local unemployment:
where S  is a measure of the efficiency of the local search method. This particular 
functional form has been chosen for algebraic convenience.
The probability of finding a job through the general search method will depend 
on the state of the aggregate labour market and the search effort applied by the 
individual. Following Pissarides (1990), the number of job matches generated 
when the number of unemployed in the aggregate economy is Nu, the average 
search effort of the unemployed is c, and the aggregate number of vacancies is 
Nv can be expressed by the matching function H(cNu,Nv). The parameter c can 
also be thought of as a technology parameter of this matching function that 
captures the average search effectiveness of the unemployed.
/» = / ( « » ) = —
Un
(14)
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The probability of an unemployed person with search effort cn matching a 
vacancy can be expressed as the search effort of the individual relative to the 
average, multiplied by the probability that an unemployed person with average 
search effort makes a match (Equation 15). The second equality in Equation 15 
can be obtained by making the assumption that the matching function exhibits 
constant returns to scale:
• cn is the search effort chosen by an individual in neighbourhood n;
• Q=v/cu is the degree of labour market tightness, or the extent to which 
demand for labour exceeds supply;
• Nv is the stock of vacancies in the economy;
• Ncu is the stock of unemployment measured in search effort units; and
• c is the average level of search effort in the economy, defined as:
(15)
where
N
C =  => Ncu = Y UnCn (16)
Another factor which affects the individual’s decision about how hard they 
should search using the general search method, is the balance between the costs
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and benefits of being unemployed. We assume that the net flow of benefits to 
being unemployed for an individual in neighbourhood n can be represented by a 
function <j(cn;zn), where zn represents the exogenous flow of income and other
benefits received by an unemployed individual in neighbourhood n. To conform 
to our priors that search effort is costly and to ensure that there is an interior 
solution to the individual’s choice problem, the derivatives of this function are 
signed: a c(c„;zn)< 0; a cc(c„ ;zj<  0;and Oz(cn;zn)> 0.
An unemployed individual in neighbourhood n will choose cn to maximise the 
present discounted value of being unemployed, Un. The following equations 
describe the relationship between the present discounted value of being 
unemployed, Un, and the present discounted value of being employed, En, for an 
individual in neighbourhood n:
(1 + r)U„ = cr(c„;z„) + (/„ + p„)E„ + (l -  /„ -  p„)U„ 
(l + r)En=w+sUn + (l-s)E„
where
• r is the discount rate;
• w is the wage rate received by employed individuals;22 and
• s is the exogenous separation rate from employment.
22 At this stage the wage is assumed to be the same across neighbourhoods. This 
assumption is justified below.
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The present discounted value of being in either of the two labour force states can 
be thought of as the flow of benefits from being in that state currently, plus the 
expected value of future labour market experience. This expected value will be 
the probability of remaining in the current state multiplied by the present 
discounted value of remaining, plus the probability of changing state multiplied 
by the present discounted value of being in the alternative state. By substituting 
out En and re-organising Equation 17, the present discounted value of being 
unemployed can be written as:
j ,  _  ( r+  s )<t (c „;z „ ) + ( /  un +cnh 6  )w
r{r + S + f{un)+cnh{6))
An important side condition that is required to ensure that the unemployed are 
willing to look for work in the first place is that the wage is greater than the net 
flow of benefits of being unemployed.
The first order condition for an individual choosing search effort to maximise the 
present discounted value of unemployment will be:
du„ = (r + s)ac(crl;z„)+h(0)w (r+s)g(c„;z„)+(/ un +cnh 0 )w t ^  Q 
dc„ r(r + s + f  u„ +c„h0) r{r + s + f  u„ +c„h 6 f
=> (r + .s + /(w„) + •  <re (c„; z„) + (w -  <T c„;z„ )»h(d) = 0 (19)
where 0, zn, w, r, s and un are taken as given by the individual. The condition 
that crcc(cn;zn)< 0, ensures that the solution to this first order condition will be 
an interior maximum.
This first order condition is the most important relationship for understanding the 
job-search behaviour of individuals. Implicit differentiation of Equation 19
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shows that the level of search effort chosen and hence the probability of reporting 
that the main method of search is a general search method, increases as the local 
unemployment rate rises and falls as the flow of benefits to being unemployed or 
the efficiency of the local search method increases. Other comparative static 
results are straightforward to derive and correspond to the partial equilibrium 
results presented in Pissarides (1990), Table 4.1.
Equation 19 defines the behaviour of individuals in a given neighbourhood and 
will, therefore, be important for interpreting the results presented in Section 5. 
Defining a steady state condition for the local unemployment rate will enable us 
to tie down the local equilibrium. The local labour market will be in steady state 
when the flows into and out of the local unemployment pool are equal. This 
condition can be written as:
= ■ * ( ! “» +c„h 0  K  
= + =0 (20) 
s - S
= > U „ = --------------- t— rs + cnh{9)
where s>8  is required for steady state local unemployment to be non-zero.
Equations 19 and 20 provide us with two equations for the two local endogenous 
variables, cn and un, as functions of aggregate variables and exogenous
parameters. A local equilibrium is guaranteed by the fact that the equilibrium 
unemployment rate condition is a decreasing function of local search effort 
(Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Local Equilibrium
Eq 19
Si
Si*
Eq 20
9.2 The Aggregate Labour Market
To understand equilibrium in the aggregate labour market, it is necessary to 
introduce three further relationships. The first defines the aggregate steady-state 
unemployment rate. The second condition summarises the labour demand of 
firms in the economy. Finally, the third condition describes the wage setting 
behaviour in the economy.
9.2.1 Steady State Unemployment
Aggregate unemployment is in steady state when the flows into and out o f the 
unemployment pool offset each other so that the unemployment rate remains 
constant. This concept is directly analogous to steady-state unemployment in 
local labour markets and can be derived simply by aggregating the local labour 
market flows:
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n= 1
U  =
s - S  
+ ch(d)
(21)
The only difference between this steady state relationship and the standard 
aggregate steady state relationship used in the job-search literature is the 
presence of the local matching efficiency parameter, 5, which lowers the steady 
state unemployment rate.
9.2.2 Labour Demand
Following Pissarides (1990), labour demand is characterised in this framework 
by a firm’s decision of whether or not to open a vacancy. We assume for 
simplicity that the production function displays constant returns to scale and that 
the only input is labour. This implies that the marginal product of labour is 
constant and is represented by A.
Analogously to the worker’s problem, the firm’s behaviour is determined by the 
present discounted value of having a filled job, J, and the present discounted 
value of holding a vacancy open, V (Equation 22). As before, the present 
discounted value of these assets will be equal to the flow of income in the current 
period plus the expected value of the next period. This expected value will be a 
weighted average of the two asset values, where the weights depend on the 
probability of a job match being destroyed for assessing the value of a filled job, 
and the probability of a job match being made in the case of assessing the value 
of holding open a vacancy.
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(l + r ) /  = , 4 - w + s F  + ( l - 4 /
(1 +  r)F  =  - y 0 +
(  N
£ ( /  “» +c»A 0 k
n=l______________ £(/«* +  Cnh 0 }*n1_2L=1-------------------------------
= ~7o +
V  0
Nv
r sJ  + i - -
l v
J+
Nv
V (22)
where A is the constant marginal product of labour; 
w is the wage paid to each worker; and 
ft is the fixed cost per period of having a vacancy open.
Assuming that there is free entry of firms, the present discounted value of 
holding a vacancy open must be equal to zero. From the vacancy equation this 
implies that:
J  = 7o
\ V  0
(23)
By substituting this into the equation describing the value to the firm of a filled 
job, setting the present discounted value of vacancies to zero and rearranging, we 
obtain the following labour demand function:
cu(r + s)yo0 = (A - w)(£ + cuh 0 ) (24)
If there was no local job matching method, that is 8 = 0, this labour demand 
condition would be the same as the condition derived in Pissarides (1990). It is 
interesting to note that the introduction of local matching means that firms take
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account of the average level of search intensity in the aggregate unemployment 
pool as well as the wage and aggregate labour market tightness, which are the 
only two factors relevant to the firm’s decision in the standard model. To ensure 
incentive compatibility, it is important that wages are set so that the return to the 
firm to filling a job, A-w, exceeds the costs of holding open a vacancy.
9.2.3 Wage Bargaining
The standard assumption about wage bargaining in the job search literature is 
that there is a Nash bargain between firms and workers. The result is that the 
surplus of matching a worker and a vacancy is divided between the two parties 
according to their relative bargaining strengths (Pissarides, 1990; Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1999). Consequently:
w = p(E -U  + J  — V) (25)
where p  is the relative bargaining strength of the workers.
There are two reasons to find an alternative solution to this bargaining process 
for our purposes. The first is that in a framework where individuals are not 
homogeneous, the wage generated by the Nash bargaining solution will vary 
depending on which neighbourhood the unemployed worker comes from. This 
introduces the possibility of strategic behaviour by firms and individuals which 
unnecessarily complicates the structure of the model given our objectives.
The second issue with the standard Nash bargaining solution is that it is a bargain 
over the total surplus generated by the match, despite the fact that the costs of 
search and the costs of holding a vacancy open have already been sunk. This is 
unsatisfactory as only the surplus generated by the match after the sunk costs
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have been spent can be held back and bargained over. Within this framework, the 
surplus is the marginal product of labour, A, and the wage outcome will be:
w = pA (26)
This can also be derived as the outcome of a bargaining process under specific 
conditions.23
9.3 General Equilibrium
In this section we combine the behaviour of individuals and firms, to obtain some 
general equilibrium results. In particular, we consider a situation in which all 
neighbourhoods start with the same flow of benefits to being unemployed, which 
implies that all individuals start choosing the same search effort and that the 
unemployment rate in all neighbourhoods is the same. We compare this 
equilibrium with the equilibrium in Pissarides (1990) and examine the effects of 
increasing the efficiency of the local search method and of increasing the flow of 
benefits to being unemployed in one neighbourhood.
Assuming that zn=z, un- u  and cn=c, and substituting out the wage using
Equation 26, we can summarise the equilibrium of this model with three 
equations:
e \
r  + s + — + ch(0) •(Tc(c;z)+(/3A-<j  c ; z  )*h($) = 0 (19)u y
23 The original discussion of how this may be the outcome of a bargaining process is in 
Binmore, Rubenstein and Wolinsky (1986) and Wolinsky (1987). A more recent 
discussion in the context of job-search models can be found in Mortensen and 
Pissarides (1999).
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s - 8 (21)U  = ------------- 7— r
s + ch(0)
cu(r + s)yp  — (l — 0)A(8 + cuh $ ) = 0 (24)
These three equations represent the job-search effort condition, the steady state 
unemployment condition and the aggregate demand for labour condition, and can 
be solved for the three endogenous variables, c, u, and 0. One of the important 
differences between this system of equations and the system of three equations 
derived by Pissarides (1990), is that introducing the local search method has also 
introduced the unemployment rate u into the job-search effort condition and the 
aggregate demand for labour. This means that where the job-search effort 
condition and aggregate labour demand can be used to solve for c and 6 in the 
Pissarides (1990) framework, it is not possible to recursively solve the system of 
equations above in this way.
The three equation system can be reduced to a two equation system using the 
Equation 21 to eliminate u:
The relationships between search effort, c, and labour market tightness, 6\ 
defined by these relationships are established in Propositions 1 and 2.
(s2 + r ( 5  - 8)+ sch(0))(Tc(c;z)+(s-8XfiA — G  c\z )h(d) = 0 (27)
( 5  -  8 \r  + s)y^c6 -  (l -  p)As{8 + ch $ ) = 0 (28)
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Proposition 1
Assuming that zn=z, un=u and cn=c, job-search effort will be an increasing 
function of labour market tightness.
Proof
Implicitly differentiating the job-search effort choice with respect to aggregate 
labour market tightness using Equation 27, gives us the following expression:
3c
dQ
_ - hf($X(s- SX/34-a c;z )+ scac(c;z))
Eg 27 0 c c ( c '< z t sl +r{s-s)+!ch(e))+ Sh(e)ffc(c; z )  ^
Knowing that oc(c\z) and crcc(c;z) are negative and that the condition for an
interior solution to the steady state unemployment equation, s > S , is satisfied, 
allows us to sign the denominator of this expression as being unambiguously 
negative. The numerator can be signed by noting that the last term is a part of 
Equation 27:
sccrc(c;z)+(s-S)(fiA-cr c;z ) = _ (5 + r^ ~ / ^ c^ C>^ >0 (30)
h(0)
Consequently, ^
Proposition 2
>01
Eg 21
The elasticity of aggregate labour market tightness, which is determined by 
firm’s demand for labour, to the average level of search effort is negative one.
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Proof
This proposition can be shown by implicitly differentiating aggregate labour 
market tightness with respect to average search intensity in Equation 28.
<W
dc
= -((■?-S \r  + s)yQe -  (l -  P)Ash(9))
Eq 28 (^  -  <5Xr + s)roc -  (> -  P)Asch'{e)
e t ( s -8 \r  + s)y„6 -  (l -  P)Ash{8) 
c [ s -8 \r  + s)yQ0 -  (l -  p  )Asch\0)9 
6
(31)
| ^  = - i  (32)
The numerator and denominator of the final term in line two cancel when it is 
noted that the function h{0) is homogenous of degree one.1
The search effort of individuals, c, is an increasing function of labour market 
tightness, and the labour demand of firms is a decreasing function of the average 
search effort of individuals, ensuring that an equilibrium exists (Figure 15).
A second important difference between the current model and the 
Pissarides (1990) framework is the relationship between labour market tightness 
and average job-search effort. Pissarides (1990) finds that firms increase the 
number of vacancies in response to an increase in the average level of search 
effort in the economy, whereas Proposition 2 shows that the relationship is 
negative. The difference between the aggregate labour demand functions 
obtained from the two models arises due to a combination of different wage 
setting rules and the introduction of the local search method.
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Figure 15: Aggregate Labour Demand And Search Intensity
Eq 27c
c*
Eq 28
e* e
In the current framework, the average level o f search effort enters the labour 
demand equation due to the presence of the local search method: if  5=0, the 
average search effort would cancel from this equation. As search effort 
increases, firms can achieve the same probability o f matching by opening less 
vacancies. In the Pissarides (1990) framework, the average level o f search effort 
enters the labour demand function through the firm’s share o f the surplus from 
the Nash bargain which depends on the costs o f search. If  search effort increases, 
the costs o f searching increase, the surplus generated by the match falls and the 
firm must open more vacancies to generate the same surplus.
Another way o f understanding the effect o f introducing a local search method is 
to examine an increase in the effectiveness o f the local search method. Using 
Equations 27 and 28, the effect o f increasing the efficiency of the local search 
method is illustrated in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: An Increase In Local Search Method Efficiency
c Eq 27
Eq 28
0* 0
Given the level o f labour market tightness, the average level o f search intensity 
will fall in response to an increase in the efficiency o f the local search method 
(Equation 27). The incentive for an individual to search using the general search 
method falls if  the chances o f obtaining work with no costly effort rises. For a 
given level o f  search effort, the probability o f firms filling vacancies will 
increase (Equation 28) if local matching is more efficient. This results in a shift 
out o f the aggregate labour demand schedule. The combination o f these two 
effects leads to an unambiguous increase in aggregate labour market tightness.
Proposition 3
The average level o f search intensity will increase and the aggregate 
unemployment rate will decrease in response to an increase the efficiency of the 
local search method.
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Proof
The proof requires the three aggregate conditions to be totally differentiated. See 
Appendix C for details. I
Intuitively, an increase in the effectiveness of the local search method will 
decrease the average time taken to fill an open vacancy. Firms will respond to 
this by opening more vacancies. The resulting increase in labour market 
tightness will increase the benefits of putting more effort into search through the 
general search method. Although this is offset to some extent by the decreased 
incentive to search harder because the probability of finding a job through the 
local search method increases, the overall effect is that the average level of 
search effort increases. The combined effect of increased search effort and 
labour market tightness is a fall in the unemployment rate. The overall effect of 
increasing the effectiveness of the local search method is beneficial to the 
efficient operation of the labour market.
Another interesting comparative static exercise to consider is how a change in 
one neighbourhood will affect the aggregate economy, given that all 
neighbourhoods start in an equilibrium in which un= u9 cn=c and zn = z . This 
can be characterised as an increase in the flow of benefits accruing to individuals 
in neighbourhood one, Az{ > 0.
In the previous comparative static exercise it was possible treat the model as a 
description of an aggregate labour market. Tracking the effect of a change in the 
flow of benefits to being unemployed in one neighbourhood requires the 
neighbourhood structure of the economy to be considered explicitly. To reduce 
the dimensionality of the problem, we assume that there are two neighbourhoods. 
The neighbourhood where the change occurs is labelled neighbourhood one and
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the other N-l neighbourhoods are aggregated and labelled neighbourhood two. 
The labour market can then be characterised by six equations:
There are six endogenous variables:
• Wj the unemployment rate in the neighbourhood where the shock occurs;
neighbourhood where the shock occurs;
• u2 the unemployment rate in the unaffected neighbourhoods;
• c2 the search effort applied to the general search method in the other 
neighbourhoods;
• 0 aggregate labour market tightness; and
• cu the level of unemployment measured in search effort units.
(34)
cu(r + s)y->0 -  (l -  fi)A(S + cuh 6 ) = 0 (35)
(36)N N
• Cj the search effort applied to the general search method by individuals in the
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This system of six equations can be reduced to a system of three equations by 
substituting out the local unemployment rates using Equation 34 and substituting 
out the aggregate unemployment rate measured in search effort units using 
Equation 36. The three remaining endogenous variables are cx, c2 and 0 .
Proposition 4
The effect of an increase in the flow of benefits to being unemployed in 
neighbourhood one will decrease the level of search effort in neighbourhood one, 
increase the aggregate level of labour market tightness and increase the search 
effort in the other neighbourhoods. The unemployment rate in neighbourhood 
one will rise and the unemployment rate in all other neighbourhoods will fall.
Proof
The effect of a change in the flow of benefits to being unemployed in 
neighbourhood one can be calculated by totally differentiating the reduced 
system of three equations. Details are provided in Appendix C. I
The direct effect of increasing the flow of benefits to being unemployed on 
residents of neighbourhood one is that the incentives to search for work fall. 
Given that the labour demand condition has not shifted and that the individuals 
from neighbourhood one are competing less for existing vacancies, there is in an 
increase in the incentives for all job seekers to search harder. This indirect effect 
will result in an overall increase in labour market tightness. The direct effect of a 
rise in the flow of benefits to being unemployed, dominates in neighbourhood 
one, so the local unemployment rate will rise there, whereas the unemployment 
rate in neighbourhood two will fall.
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As might be expected, the effect of a change in the behaviour of individuals in 
one neighbourhood on the aggregate labour market depends on the size of the 
neighbourhood relative to the aggregate. As the size of the neighbourhood 
decreases, or alternatively the number of neighbourhoods increases, the effect of 
a change in the flow of benefits to being unemployed in neighbourhood one on 
aggregate variables decreases.
Proposition 5
As the size of a neighbourhood decreases relative to the aggregate, or 
alternatively, N  -» «>, only local variables are affected by a change in the flow of 
benefits to being unemployed in that neighbourhood.
Proof
Details of the proof are provided in Appendix C. I 
10 Data and the Basic Framework
The data used for the following analysis are from the AYS. The sample includes 
all 16 to 19 year-olds who report unemployment as their main activity at the time 
of their interview and who provide information on all the variables used in the 
estimation. The restriction of the sample to teenagers ensures that the age 
composition of the sample does not vary significantly over time. The results 
presented below do not rely on restricting the sample in this way.
The dependent variable used in the following analysis indicates which search 
methods are chosen by individuals in the sample as their main search method. 
Given the information in Table 13, we restrict the choice set to include three 
possible search methods: ‘direct employer contact’ or ‘friends and relatives’
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(taken as one category); visiting the CES; and searching in newspapers. Sample 
sizes do not permit us to consider ‘friends and relatives’ as a separate job-search 
method.
A set of control variables, similar to what has been used to explain other aspects 
of teenage decision making and behaviour in previous chapters, has been used to 
explain main job-search method choice of teenagers. Table 14 summarises the 
mean values of these variables and a more detailed discussion of the data is 
provided in Appendix A. For comparison, the average characteristics of teenagers 
who obtained employment in the survey year and report their successful job 
search method have also been included. Based on our observation that direct 
search methods are more successful than the CES or newspapers, we would 
expect that characteristics which are more prevalent in the employed sample 
would also be associated with an increased probability that an unemployed 
teenager would choose a direct search method.
There is a slightly higher proportion of males in the unemployed sample. The 
employed sample come from families where the parents have higher skill levels 
on average, as indicated by the higher proportion of parents with graduate and 
trade qualifications. Parents of the employed sample also have higher average 
occupational status and a higher probability of being employed. Members of the 
employed sample are also more likely to have been living with both parents when 
they were 14 years-old. Employed teenagers in the sample are less likely to have 
left school in Year 10 or earlier and are less likely to have attended a government 
high school.
134
Table 14: Summary Statistics by Labour Force Status
Averages by group, standard errors in parenthesis where appropriate
_Sample of unemployed* Sample of employed
Personal background
Male 0.52 0.51
Age 17.93 (0.99) 17.90 (0.99)
Married 0.06 0.04
Number of siblings 2.42(1.76) 2.29(1.57)
Parents’ characteristics
Father’s occupational status @14 22.89 (22.84) 28.26(23.08)
Mother’s occupational status @14 14.95 (20.20) 17.95 (20.89)
Father not employed @14 0.08 0.04
Mother not employed @14 0.45 0.38
Father not present @14 0.22 0.15
Mother not present @14 0.05 0.04
Father has:
Degree 0.10 0.12
Trade qualifications 0.13 0.18
Other post school qualifications 0.08 0.09
Secondary education 0.34 0.37
No qualifications 0.35 0.24
M other has:
Degree 0.08 0.09
Trade qualifications 0.04 0.05
Other post school qualifications 0.13 0.14
Secondary education 0.56 0.58
No qualifications 0.19 0.14
School/work experience
Attended government school 0.79 0.74
Left school in year 10 or earlier 0.30 0.26
Years since leaving school 1.57(1.13) 1.56(1.00)
Current unemployment duration** 29.18(31.13) 9.94 (14.45)
Receives unemployment benefits 0.53 0.04
Neighbourhood
Average personal income 17.27 (3.01) 17.88 (3.31)
Unemployment rate 12.85(4.81) 11.75(4.31)
Per cent with vocational qualifications 14.51(2.99) 14.95 (3.11)
Per cent with post graduate qualifications 10.67 (6.40) 11.45 (6.65)
Notes: @14 indicates that the variable takes the characteristic of the parent when the respondent was 14 years-old;
* these are the average characteristics of those unemployed individuals used in the following estimation, 
i.e. 2,284 observations;
** this is the length of the previous unemployment spell for the employed.
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Perhaps the most marked difference between the two samples is the average 
unemployment experience. The current duration of unemployment has been 
included in the analysis to capture the possibility that the effectiveness and 
availability of different search methods may change over the course of a spell of 
unemployment. To ensure that this is not picking up some measure of the time 
spent in the labour force, the number of years since leaving school has also been 
included in the specification. The unemployed sample have experienced an 
average incomplete duration of unemployment of 29 weeks, whereas the 
employed sample experienced an average completed duration of unemployment 
of 10 weeks.
A dummy variable which indicates whether the individual receives 
unemployment benefits or the Job Search Allowance (JSA) is included to control 
for the fact that receipt of this benefit will affect the costs of unemployment. 
Roughly half the unemployed report that they receive unemployment benefits or 
the Job Search Allowance. A very small percentage of the employed report that 
they are also receiving benefits which is possible if they are earning a sufficiently 
small amount.
As already discussed, another potentially important influence on the job search 
behaviour of individuals is their local environment. Neighbourhood 
characteristics have been controlled for using the same set of variables that are 
used in Chapter 2. Of special interest, given the model developed in Section 3, is 
the local unemployment rate which can be thought of as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of local job-information networks. The neighbourhood composition 
variables tell a similar story to the family background characteristics. On average, 
respondents in the employed sample come from neighbourhoods where the 
unemployment rate is lower, and the average skill level, measured as the
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proportion of the adult population with vocational or graduate qualifications, is 
higher.
11 Estimation Framework and Results
The dependent variable for the analysis below indicates which of the three 
possible job-search methods is reported as the main job-search method by the 
unemployed respondent. Because the choices of main job search method are 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive, it is necessary to use an estimation technique 
which imposes this restriction. Following the discussion in Chapter 3, the results 
presented in Table 15 are the marginal effects estimated from a multinomial logit 
model. It should be noted that section of state, state and year indicators were 
included in the estimation, but have not been reported to minimise the volume of 
results. For each choice, the first column presents the marginal effects calculated 
at the sample averages and the second presents the t-statistics.
Gender and age are both important for explaining the observed job-search 
behaviour of unemployed teenagers. Males are 4.9 per cent more likely to choose 
direct methods, and are 6.8 per cent more likely to choose the CES than females. 
Because the predicted probabilities must sum to unity, this implies that females 
are 11.6 percent more likely than males to use newspapers as their main job- 
search choice. Older teenagers are more likely to use direct methods and are less 
likely to use the CES.
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Table 15: Estimation Results
Number Of Observations: 2,284
Direct methods CES Newspapers
Personal background
3Pr/5x t-stat 9Pr/9x t-stat 9Pr/3x t-stat
Male* 0.049 2.37 0.068 3.45 -0.116 -5.28
Age 0.036 2.20 -0.056 -3.74 0.020 1.16
Married* -0.069 -1.49 -0.061 -1.46 0.129 2.81
Number of siblings 
Parents* characteristics
-0.004 -0.74 0.007 1.35 -0.003 -0.44
Father’s occupational status @14 0.001 1.75 -0.001 -1.14 -0.000 -0.53
Mother’s occupational status @14 0.000 0.21 -0.000 -0.44 0.000 0.22
Father not employed @14* 0.106 2.41 -0.012 -0.30 -0.093 -1.88
Mother not employed @14* 0.067 2.06 0.016 0.52 -0.083 -2.43
Father not present @14* 0.007 0.17 0.049 1.23 -0.057 -1.23
Mother not present @14* 
Father has:
0.055 0.89 -0.087 -1.60 0.032 0.50
Degree* -0.022 -0.42 0.087 1.68 -0.065 -1.17
Trade qualifications* -0.008 -0.19 0.066 1.57 -0.058 -1.21
Other post school qualifications* -0.027 -0.55 0.058 1.20 -0.031 -0.59
Secondary education* 
M other has:
-0.016 -0.42 0.075 2.11 -0.059 -1.47
Degree* 0.096 1.81 -0.081 -1.55 -0.015 -0.25
Trade qualifications* 0.054 0.86 -0.128 -2.13 0.074 1.11
Other post school qualifications* 0.080 1.81 -0.151 -3.56 0.071 1.49
Secondary education* 
School/work experience
0.029 0.80 -0.086 -2.80 0.058 1.53
Attended government sch* -0.025 -0.94 0.062 3.19 -0.037 -1.28
Left in year 10 or earlier* 0.006 0.19 0.044 2.48 -0.050 -1.39
Years since leaving school 0.006 0.42 0.024 1.85 -0.030 -1.92
Current unemployment duration -0.000 -1.24 -0.000 -0.96 0.001 1.96
receive unemployment benefits 
Neighbourhood
-0.106 -4.45 0.192 8.41 -0.086 -3.38
Average personal income -0.025 -3.37 0.007 1.03 0.018 2.23
Unemployment rate -0.011 -3.35 0.005 1.54 0.006 1.83
Per cent with voc. qualifications -0.006 -1.24 0.005 1.13 0.001 0.17
Per cent with grad, qualifications 0.005 1.39 -0.001 -0.42 -0.003 -0.92
Note: Section of state and state of residence and time dummies have been included, but have not been reported; 
Dummy variables are indicated by an asterisk.
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Parents’ characteristics have some effect on observed job-search behaviour. 
Unemployed teenagers are more likely to use direct methods and are less likely 
to use the CES as the occupational status of their parents' jobs, especially their 
father’s job, increases. If either parent was not employed when the respondent 
was 14 years old, the respondent is more likely to use direct search methods and 
less likely to use newspapers. The effects of parents’ education are difficult to 
interpret. More educated mothers however, generally have children who are more 
likely to use direct search methods and are less likely to use the CES.
Education and employment histories of the individual are also important. 
Respondents who attended government schools and/or left school in Year 10 or 
earlier are significantly more likely to use the CES as their main job-search 
method. The combined effect of having both these characteristics is to increase 
the probability of choosing the CES by 10.6 percentage points.
Teenagers who have been in the labour force for longer are more likely to be 
searching through the CES and are less likely to be using newspapers. Having 
controlled for the years since leaving school it is interesting that current 
unemployment duration significantly increases the probability that newspapers 
are reported as the main job-search method and decreases the probability of using 
direct search methods. This provides some limited support for the hypothesis that 
the unemployed are less likely to be observed using direct methods because the 
expected benefits of these methods diminish over the duration of unemployment.
Perhaps the most important single variable for explaining the choice of main 
job-search method is the indicator for unemployment benefit receipt. Individuals 
receiving unemployment benefits are almost 20 percentage points more likely to 
use the CES as their main method of job search. One explanation for this is that 
individuals receiving unemployment benefits are required to demonstrate that
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they are looking for work and registering with the CES offers an easy way of 
doing this. However, even if this were the case, it would not necessarily imply 
that the CES would be reported as the main method of search.
Although receiving unemployment benefits would be expected to increase the 
flow of benefits to being unemployed all else being equal, unemployment 
benefits in Australia are subject to a means-test. Therefore, individuals who 
receive benefits are likely to come from more financially constrained 
backgrounds and the net effect of these two financial considerations could easily 
be that benefit recipients have lower flows of income while unemployed on 
average. In light of this, another explanation for the significant effect of benefit 
receipt on the probability of using the CES is that eligible individuals have a 
lower flow of benefits to being unemployed on average. Following the model 
outlined in Section 3, this would lead eligible individuals to search harder, 
increasing the probability that they are observed using indirect methods. 
However, this explanation also implies that the probability of observing that 
newspapers are the main method of job-search should be higher for eligible 
individuals. In fact teenagers receiving unemployment benefits are less likely to 
be observed using newspapers by around 8.6 percentage points.
The two explanations for the significance of the effect of benefit receipt on 
job-search behaviour are not inconsistent, and there is likely to be some truth in 
each. However, the argument for the work-test explanation is perhaps the most 
consistent with the effects of eligibility on the probability of choosing other job- 
search methods.
Two neighbourhood characteristics appear to be important. As hypothesised, a 
higher local unemployment rate decreases the probability that an unemployed 
teenager will choose direct search methods. An increase in the local
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unemployment rate of one per cent will decrease the probability of using direct 
search methods by 1.1 percentage points. The marginal effect of a one percentage 
point increase in the local unemployment rate on the probability of using either 
the CES or newspapers is around 0.5 of a percentage point. Consequently, the 
degree of competition for jobs at a local level and the lack of access to a local 
job-information network, as proxied by the local unemployment rate, can help 
explain why unemployed teenagers are less likely to be observed using direct 
search methods although they have proved to be the most successful methods of 
finding work for employed teenagers.
The other significant neighbourhood characteristic is the average level of 
personal income. Given that we have controlled for an extensive array of 
background characteristics as well as the proportion of the neighbourhood with 
either academic or vocational post-school training, it is puzzling that coming 
from a neighbourhood with higher average personal income seems to reduce the 
use of direct methods. Since high income is likely to be correlated with 
unobserved characteristics measuring success, the average level of personal 
income in the neighbourhood might have been expected to have the opposite 
effect.
12 Conclusions
Australian and international evidence suggests that the most effective job search 
methods are direct methods such as using family and friends for information or 
directly contacting employers. Over 60 per cent of Australian teenagers obtain 
their jobs using these methods, whereas only 30 per cent of unemployed 
Australian teenagers report these direct methods as their main method of job 
search.
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We find that the single most important characteristic for explaining the 
job-search method choices of Australian teenagers is whether they receive 
unemployment benefits. Receiving benefits increases the probability of a 
teenager using the CES as the main job-search method by almost 20 percentage 
points and decreases the probability of using direct methods or newspapers by 
around 10 percentage points each. Due to the means-tested nature of these 
benefits, this variable may be picking up unmeasured family characteristics. 
However, the fact that the CES offers a relatively easy way for benefit recipients 
to demonstrate that they are looking for work is likely to be a more significant 
factor.
Personal characteristics and family background are also important for 
understanding how unemployed teenagers search for work. In general, 
unemployed individuals with more highly skilled or better educated parents are 
more likely to use direct methods than to use the CES. Males are more likely to 
use direct methods or the CES than newspapers as their main job-search activity. 
Older unemployed teenagers are also more likely to use direct methods than the 
CES. Individuals who attended government school or left school in Year 10 or 
earlier have a significantly higher probability of using the CES and a 
significantly lower probability of using newspapers.
One reason why unemployed teenagers may not be using job-search methods 
which appear to be more effective for teenagers who actually found work, is that 
these methods have been tried and their possibilities exhausted. This is supported 
by the finding that unemployed individuals with longer unemployment durations 
were significantly more likely to use newspapers as their main job-search method 
and were less likely to use direct search methods.
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Another interesting finding is that the local environment, especially the state of 
the local labour market, is important for explaining job-search method choice. 
Higher local unemployment rates decrease the probability that an unemployed 
teenager will use direct search methods, and increase the probability that they 
will use the CES. These results are consistent with the economic model 
developed in Section 3, which highlights the importance of local job-information 
networks and local labour market conditions for explaining job-search behaviour.
An interesting implication of these results is that they help to explain the recently 
documented evidence that unemployment has become increasingly concentrated 
in low-socioeconomic status neighbourhoods (Gregory and Hunter, 1995). An 
adverse labour demand shock in one neighbourhood will raise the local 
unemployment rate and lower the probability that individuals in that 
neighbourhood will obtain work through friends and relatives or direct employer 
contact. This increases the incentives for people in these areas to search using 
general search methods such as newspapers or employment agencies, but their 
overall probability of finding work could easily fall despite this. Thus, the effects 
of an exogenous shock can be magnified within neighbourhoods if job- 
information networks are local in nature and provide an effective means of 
finding employment. If this is an important part of the explanation for the 
increasing concentration of unemployment in low-socioeconomic areas, it 
suggests that it is important for government policy to improve the effectiveness 
of general search methods in these areas. Steps in this direction have already been 
taken with recent changes to the operation of employment agencies in Australia.
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A p p e n d ix  C: D e t a il s  o f  P r o o f s
Details of the Proof of Proposition 3
Write the total differential system as:
[ Z .  z *  z „ ]
dc
dO
du
= ZsdS
where:
Z =
z .  =
r + s H---- 1- ch(p)
u
-h(0)u 
u0( r + s y Q-  1 -  [3 Ah' 0 )
( f  G c + A/5 — <7 )h'(0)
- cuh\6) 
cu( r + s y0-  1-/3 Ah' 6 )
8
- ° c  —u
- ( s  + ch 0 ) 
c0( r + s y0-  1 -  p  Ah' 0 )
Zx =
(1 - p ) A
In order to apply Cramer’s Rule it is useful to sign the component determinants:
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Applying Cramer’s Rule and knowing the signs of the component determinants 
allows us to sign the relevant total derivatives.
dc _ \ZS Z0 Zu | ^  ^
d8~ \Z c Ze Zu\
dO _ |Zc z s Z u\ >  q
d8 | Zc Ze Zu\
du _ \ZC Ze Zs |  ^  ^
dS |ZC Z, Z.|
2 Details o f the Proof o f Proposition 4
The system of three differential equations can be characterised as:
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Signing the determinants required to apply Cramer’s rule:
X  X. X = x u[x21x 3, - x 23x 32]+ x 3l[ o - x l3x 22]>o
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The signs of the total differentials of the endogenous variables with respect to a 
change in zx are therefore:
dcx x 2zi x cc2 X ,
dzx x cc\ Xcc2 X*
dci _ x cc\ x zz\ X*
dzx X cc\ x cc2 Xe
dQ x cc\ x cc2 X*
dzx x cc\ x cc2 Xe
Noting that:
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= (r  + ' y^ 1_ ~ ^ /l' g ) (2(Af -  ^ 2^ ) + ^ - l ) c 2)> 0
the sign of the effect of a change in the flow of benefits to the unemployed in 
neighbourhood one on the unemployment rates of neighbourhoods one and two, 
can be evaluated as:
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3 Details of the Proof of Proposition 5
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Ch a pt e r  5
R e se r v a t io n  W a g e s  a n d  th e  D u r a t io n  o f  U n e m p l o y m e n t  
1 Introduction
The average duration of unemployment in Australia has increased significantly 
since the 1960s (Figure 2). Despite its importance for understanding the rise in 
Australia’s aggregate unemployment rate, there has been relatively little 
empirical investigation of its causes. To the extent that the Australian literature 
has addressed this issue, the focus has been on explaining the probability of 
leaving unemployment rather than on the factors which directly affect 
unemployment duration. In particular, the role of minimum wages, either as legal 
minima that influence firm behaviour, or as minimum acceptable wages to job 
seekers, has not been analysed in depth.
This paper investigates the factors affecting the duration of unemployment using 
data on individual Australian job seekers. These data, which come from the 
Survey of Employment and Unemployment Patterns (SEUP), allow us to assess 
the influence of a comprehensive array of personal characteristics. Importantly, 
the data set provides job seekers’ responses concerning their minimum 
acceptable (or reservation) wage. The reservation wage is a central feature of 
basic job-search theory and its availability allows us to specify an empirical 
model closely tied to theory. Although previous Australian studies have 
investigated unemployment duration using data on individuals, the reservation 
wage has only been included in these studies in an ad hoc manner, to the extent 
that it has been considered directly at all.
150
We find that the reservation wage does not appear to affect the duration of 
unemployment in general. The binding constraint for job seekers is more likely to 
be that they receive very few job offers. Descriptive evidence suggests that one 
reason for this may be that minimum wages are pricing some job seekers out of 
the market. However, more research is required to properly understand the role of 
minimum wages. Non-wage aspects of employment, such as the type of 
occupation, also appear to have a role to play in explaining job seeker behaviour. 
There is evidence that the reservation wage affects the duration of unemployment 
of females. However, supporting evidence suggests that this result is likely to be 
influenced by females who are marginally attached to the labour force rather than 
unemployed per se, and for whom family considerations such as child care costs 
are an important factor.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we briefly review 
current evidence regarding which factors affect unemployment duration in 
Australia. This also provides an opportunity to motivate the approach taken in 
this paper. In Section 3 we discuss the data used and consider descriptive 
evidence for the role played in job-search behaviour by the reservation wage. We 
derive an empirical model of unemployment duration from job-search theory in 
Section 4. In Section 5, we present the results and consider whether the 
estimation issues highlighted in Section 4 are of practical concern. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes.
2 The Australian Evidence
As there are relatively few cross-section or longitudinal data sets available, most 
Australian studies of unemployment have been based on macroeconomic data. In 
general, studies which have used data on individuals have estimated models 
which explain the probability of leaving unemployment, either after a given
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duration of unemployment or over a fixed period of time. The probability of 
leaving unemployment, indirectly provides information about the characteristics 
which are likely to affect an individual’s duration of unemployment. To date, 
only Miller and Volker (1987) have directly investigated those factors which 
affect unemployment duration using individual level data.
The most frequently used empirical model for investigating unemployment at the 
individual level explains the probability of leaving unemployment given the 
duration of unemployment already experienced. This framework, also known as 
the hazard model, has been used by Brooks (1986), Miller and Volker (1987) and 
Chapman and Smith (1992) to look at the youth labour market. It has also been 
used by Aungles and Stewart (1986) to look at the behaviour of job seekers 
registered with the Commonwealth Employment Service (CES) in the Brisbane 
metropolitan area and by Stromback, Dockery and Ying (1998) to look at a large 
cross-section of Australian job seekers surveyed in the SEUP.
In general, these studies find that among the general population, older people are 
less likely to leave unemployment than younger people, but when the analysis is 
restricted to the youth labour market, unemployed youth in their early twenties 
are more likely to exit unemployment than unemployed teenagers. Work 
experience and the level of education increase the probability of leaving 
unemployment, as does being married. To the extent that the duration of 
unemployment affects the probability of exiting unemployment, the effect 
appears to be restricted to the very short term. Chapman and Smith (1992) also 
find that a higher reservation wage reported at the beginning of the 
unemployment spell is associated with a lower probability of leaving 
unemployment, although the marginal effect is relatively small.
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This framework uses job-search theory to suggest the variables which should be 
included in an econometric model however, the estimated parameters cannot be 
directly related back to the theory, and in this sense this analysis is essentially 
‘reduced form’. In this respect it is noteworthy that none of the studies referenced 
above simultaneously estimated the probability of leaving unemployment after a 
given duration of unemployment and reservation wages, as might be suggested 
by theory. It is also likely that the results are affected by the functional forms 
which are assumed for the different components of the hazard model.
The second indirect approach to understanding those factors which affect 
unemployment duration is to model transitions between labour market states 
between two points in time. This method has been used by Brooks and Volker 
(1985), who focus on the youth labour market, and Strombach, Dockery and 
Ying (1998). The effects of different characteristics on the probability of moving 
out of unemployment are consistent with the results obtained by studies 
referenced above.
Brooks and Volker (1985) investigate the probability that an individual will 
either stay in unemployment, exit unemployment for full-time work or exit 
unemployment for part-time work. The reservation wage and duration of 
unemployment are included as explanatory variables. Across different 
specifications, one or other of these variables appeared to be significant, which 
suggests that they are highly correlated. Brooks and Volker also estimate an 
equation for reservation wages as a function of unemployment duration as well 
as other personal and background characteristics. Strombach, Dockery and Ying 
(1998) estimate similar models for the probability of remaining in unemployment
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or leaving unemployment for full-time or part-time work.24 They do not consider 
the reservation wage and find that longer spells of unemployment significantly 
reduce an individual’s chances of getting a job.
Miller and Volker (1987) is the only Australian study of which we are aware that 
estimates an equation for unemployment duration directly. They exclude the 
reservation wage from their analysis, citing evidence that minimum wages, not 
reservation wages, are the real constraint facing job seekers in the youth labour 
market.
As already mentioned, the estimation methods outlined above use job-search 
theory to suggest which variables should be included to explain unemployment 
duration, but it is not possible to relate the estimated parameters back to the 
theory. The analysis which follows extends this literature by deriving an 
empirical model for unemployment duration which is directly related to job- 
search theory. The development of the empirical model in Section 4 ensures that 
the analysis is consistent with the economic model and that complications 
suggested by theory, such as the joint determination of the duration of 
unemployment and the reservation wage, are correctly dealt with.
Although these issues have not been addressed with Australian data, they have 
received some attention in non-Australian literature 25 In part, both the Australian 
and overseas literatures have been constrained by the lack of appropriate data.
24 In contrast to Brooks and Volker (1985), this study considers these transition 
probabilities individually and therefore cannot impose the constraint that the 
probabilities sum to one.
25 An excellent survey of the empirical job-search literature, including structural 
models of unemployment duration and reservation wages, can be found in Devine 
and Kiefer (1991).
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The framework that we have used to analyse the duration of unemployment is 
developed in Section 4 and follows the work of Lancaster (1985), Jones (1988) 
and Gorter and Gorter (1993).
3 The Data Source and Reservation Wages
Before discussing the empirical model, it is useful to get a feel for the data which 
will be used. Section 3.1 describes the Survey of Employment and 
Unemployment Patterns (SEUP) and the definition of our sample. Section 3.2 
considers some descriptive evidence about the minimum acceptable wage rates 
reported in the SEUP.
3.1 The Sample
The SEUP is a longitudinal survey; information is collected from the same 
individuals over a number of years. The panel of individuals was established 
between April and July 1995 and includes people who were aged 15 to 59 at that 
time and who were living in private dwellings in both urban and rural areas. 
A time line of the important events in the compilation of the SEUP data is 
presented in Table 16.
At the first interview, three sub-groups were defined: Jobseekers; a Population 
Reference Group; and persons known to have been labour-market programme 
participants. Jobseekers are defined as those who were unemployed, marginally 
attached to the labour force (that is discouraged job seekers) or under-employed 
in May 1995. They are the focus of this paper. The Jobseeker panel provides a far 
greater number of observations on episodes of unemployment than the 
Population Reference Group, and has a greater proportion of long-term 
unemployed.
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At each interview, individuals are asked to divide their time over the relevant 
survey period (column 3 of Table 16) into periods of work, looking for work, or 
absence from the labour market. Clearly, these categories are not mutually 
exclusive as it is possible to be both working and looking for work. In this paper 
we focus on people who were looking for work and who were not employed at 
the end of the period covered in the third interview, that is in September 1996. 
This definition corresponds more closely to the more familiar concept of 
unemployment, than the Jobseeker definition used in the SEUP, although, given 
the different survey questions in the SEUP and the Labour Force survey, it 
satisfies less stringent activity and availability criteria.
Table 16: Timing Of Events In The Compilation Of The SEUP
Interview Date Period covered Details
First April 1995 to 5 September 1994 to Panel established
July 1995 28 February 1995 Sub-groups
defined
Second September 1995 to 
November 1995
1 March 1995 to 
3 September 1995
Third September 1996 to 
November 1996
4 September 1995 to 
1 September 1996
From this sample, we retain for analysis all individuals with valid answers to all 
the questions used in our econometric estimation in Section 6. This resulted in a 
sample of 1,063 unemployed job seekers.26 Of these 1,063 individuals, around 
32 per cent reported that they had been retrenched or that their employer had 
gone out of business, 23 per cent reported that they had previously been 
employed in temporary or seasonal jobs, 10.5 per cent reported that they had left
26 Another 337 unemployed job seekers answered all questions but didn’t know their 
hourly reservation wage. The definition of reservation wages used in our analysis is 
discussed in Section 3.2.
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unsatisfactory work arrangements, pay or hours and 17 per cent reported that 
they had left for child care, health and other reasons. The remaining 17.5 per cent 
either had never worked or had not had a job since 1985.27
Of those unemployed job seekers who have had a job at some time in the past, 75 
per cent have been in relatively low-skilled professions: intermediate and 
elementary clerical, sales, service, transport and production workers, and 
labourers and related workers. By contrast, only 47 per cent of employed people 
at that time worked in these occupations.
Analysing the unemployed job seekers by educational attainment, 50 per cent 
have not achieved the highest level of secondary school. Another 19 per cent 
have completed the highest level of secondary school but have no further 
qualifications, with 21 percent completing vocational qualifications and just 10 
per cent a degree or post-graduate diploma. By comparison, the proportion of 
employed respondents who have not completed high school is 34 per cent and the 
proportion with graduate qualifications is 22 per cent, suggesting that the 
unemployment pool is less well educated on average.
Figure 17 plots the distribution of unemployment duration where this is defined 
as the number of days of unemployment up to 1 September 1996.28 29 The
27 The SEUP asks unemployed people whether they have had a job since 1985. There is 
no labour-market information before this date.
28 All distributions have been estimated using kernel density estimation (Silverman, 
1986).
29 International studies have indicated that, at successive interviews, respondents tend 
to change their answers to questions concerning their labour-market status at a 
particular point in time. To try to ensure the reliability of retrospective data, the ABS 
use dependent interviewing whereby the interviewer reminds the respondent of their 
labour-market activity at the end of the previous period. To further facilitate accuracy
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distribution is positively skewed with 44 per cent o f the sample having an 
unemployment duration longer than 12 months, and 4 per cent having a duration 
in excess o f five years. The average unemployment duration is 520 days.
Figure 17: Distribution of Unemployment Duration
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years >5
years
3.2 Reservation Wages
Reservation wages are collected by asking job seekers how many hours per week 
they would like to work and, based on those hours, what is the minimum weekly 
take-home pay (or reservation wage) that they would be prepared to accept if 
they were offered a job. Respondents indicated ranges within which their desired 
hours and reservation wage fell; there were 7 bands for desired hours and 30
in recalling the dates of events, each respondent is supplied with a calendar to record 
their labour-market activity; use of the calendar, however, is not compulsory.
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bands for wages. For each respondent, the hourly reservation wage is calculated 
by dividing the midpoint of the indicated band for the reservation wage by the 
midpoint of the band for desired hours.
To gain some understanding of the pattern of hourly reservation wages, Table 17 
gives the medians and means of the ratio of hourly reservation wages to previous 
hourly pay in most recent employment for different groups of people who were 
unemployed at September 1996. The first thing which is notable about this table 
is that the means are much greater than one. It is hard to understand why people 
would only accept a job if it paid more than their previous job, especially if they 
did not leave their last job voluntarily. The median values reported in Table 17 
are, however, much closer to one.30
One possible explanation for the high mean ratios is that previous pay has not 
been indexed. We also report the median and average unemployment duration for 
each group to gauge the extent to which this is likely to be an issue. As the mean 
and median durations are typically not more than a couple of years and cover the 
relatively low inflation 1990s, this lack of indexation is unlikely to have a large 
effect. Measurement error may also go some way towards explaining these 
unrealistically high mean ratios. The dollar ranges for pay in jobs held prior to 
September 1994 are different to the ranges provided for reservation wages. As 
such, the same response to both questions may result in different hourly rates and 
hence, a ratio that differs from one.
Although the levels of the ratios themselves are puzzling, their relative values 
accord with prior intuition. The young have higher ratios than older age groups 
and those who were previously retrenched have lower ratios than those who left
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their job due to dissatisfaction with working conditions. This suggests that 
reservation wage data are meaningful.31
Table 17: Ratio O f Reservation Wages To Previous Earnings
Sample Includes All Unemployed Individuals Who Report A Previous Wage
Reservation wage/previous Unemployment duration 
pay (in days)
Median Mean Median Mean
Total sample 1.00 1.35 260 470
Males 1.00 1.28 261 474
Females 1.05 1.50 254 463
Age
15 to 19 1.09 1.45 149 233
20 to 34 1.00 1.27 253 411
35 to 49 1.00 1.48 303 525
49 to 59 1.00 1.26 699 855
Reason for leaving 
last job
Retrenched or employer 
went out of business
0.95 1.13 303 565
Previous job temporary 
or seasonal
1.08 1.37 153 276
Unsatisfactory work 
arrangements/pay/hours
1.03 1.51 168 391
30 This is consistent with a highly skewed distribution of these ratios.
31 The reasons for leaving one's previous job are also important if they are included in a 
regression of the ratio of reservation wages to previous earnings on the personal 
characteristics and previous job attributes used in Section 6. Individuals who left 
their previous job because it was unsatisfactory or because it was temporary have 
significantly higher ratios, whereas individuals who were retrenched or their 
employers went out of business have significantly lower ratios. Individuals who
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It is also of interest to consider the relationship between reservation wages and 
minimum wages. Figure 18 plots the distribution of hourly reservation wages for 
unemployed job seekers as at 1 September 1996. The minimum wage reference 
point on this graph is an hourly wage calculated from the C14 classification in 
the Metal Industry Award, which was used as a benchmark minimum in the 1996 
Safety Net Review. The gross level of this award is $349 per 38 hour week. 
Assuming that there are no transfer payments and no deductions, and that the 
individual works full-time, this translates to an after-tax hourly minimum wage 
of $7.90, and is therefore comparable to the reservation wages which are also net 
figures.32
The striking feature of the graph is that around one quarter of the sample have 
hourly net reservation wages below the legal minimum of $7.90 per hour. One 
qualification to this is that young workers are likely to face lower minimum 
wages as Australia has a system of age based discounts to the adult award wage. 
This discount declines with age, up to the age of 21 and can be as much as 50 per 
cent for 16 year-olds in some occupations. Around 52 per cent of workers under 
21 are employed on youth wages. Training wages and apprenticeships also 
provide a discount to employers with the understanding that structured training 
will be provided to the employee. Around 13 per cent of young workers are paid 
in this manner.
have higher housing costs or were previously employed as managers or professionals 
in the manufacturing industry also have significantly higher ratios.
32 The SEUP asks for reservation wages in net terms and usual weekly earning in gross 
terms. ABS internal research suggests that respondents answer these questions with 
the correct measures, although using these two different concepts is likely to increase 
respondent error. The idea that respondents mistakenly answer these questions using 
the same concept is at least tentatively supported by the ratios of hourly reservation 
wages to hourly pay reported in Table 17 which tend to be around 1.
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Figure 18: Distribution of Hourly Reservation Wages
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Figure 19 plots the distribution of reservation wages separately for 15 to 19 year- 
olds and for those older than 19 years. The benchmark minimum wage used for 
the youth is $5.30. This is the minimum wage paid to 18 year-old metal workers 
and is close to the Retail Trade Award for 18 year-olds, which covers a large 
number o f teenage workers. Twelve per cent o f teenagers report reservation 
wages below this benchmark and the proportion o f adult workers reporting 
reservation wages below $7.90 falls to 18 per cent.
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Figure 19: Distribution of Hourly Reservation Wages
By age
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This evidence suggests that the minimum wage, rather than the reservation wage, 
may be acting as a constraint on employment, at least for some individuals.33 It 
should also be stressed, however, that the relationship between minimum wages 
and reservation wages is only one element in a relatively complex relationship 
between legal minimum wage rates and employment levels. In particular, Figure 
18 and Figure 19 only present the supply side and have no information about the 
demand response of employers to lower legal minima. Other factors such as 
equity and income distribution, as well as employment consequences, need to be
33 Miller and Volker (1987) argue that it is the minimum wage and not reservation 
wages which is the binding constraint on youth employment. This is based on the 
observation that actual youth wages are on average 25 per cent higher than 
reservation wages and that award wages constitute, on average, around 95 per cent of 
the full-time wages bill.
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considered when assessing its appropriate level of a minimum wage. This is 
beyond the scope of the current chapter.
Although we have used a benchmark minimum, it is important to bear in mind 
that there is a system of award wages, which in general sits on top of the 
minimum wages presented in Figure 18 and Figure 19. In many cases the 
relevant award wage will be the constraint facing job seekers rather than the 
benchmark minimum shown in the graph.
Another factor which is likely to affect the reservation wages reported by the 
unemployed who are expecting to earn low incomes, is the interaction of the tax 
and transfer systems. For example, a couple earning $349 per week from one 
full-time income with two children under 5, one child aged between 5 and 12, 
paying $120 per week in rent could receive as much as $312 in social security 
payments.34 As family income increases, means tested social security payments 
fall and tax payments rise. If the non-working partner starts working 15 hours per 
week at adult benchmark minimum wages, family social security payments will 
fall to $207 and taxes will rise from $46 to $51. Consequently, job seekers in 
families with significant transfer payments may report higher reservation wages 
because they need to be compensated for the loss of welfare payments.
4 A Structural Model of Unemployment Duration
Having described the data source and the key variables, we now turn to 
developing an empirical model from the underlying job-search theory. In 
Section 4.1 we start by looking at the individual job seeker who receives job 
offers which arrive randomly at a predetermined rate, with wage offers being
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drawn randomly from a predetermined wage distribution (the wage-offer 
distribution). From the basic model we derive the distribution of incomplete 
unemployment durations facing an individual when they first become 
unemployed.
In Section 4.2, we discuss the assumptions that are required to incorporate 
individual characteristics which are likely to affect the duration of 
unemployment. We also discuss the individual characteristics that we include in 
the estimation. In Section 4.3, we combine the results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 to 
derive an expression for the expected log of incomplete duration for an 
individual. By assuming that the distribution of individuals who flow into 
unemployment is the same at each point in time, we can then justify estimating 
this expression across individuals as a cross-section regression.
4.1 Deriving the Distribution ofIncomplete Duration for an Individual
Job seekers in the standard job-search framework set a reservation wage which is 
the minimum wage that they would be willing to accept. The reservation wage is 
determined by equating the expected benefits of accepting an offer with the 
expected costs of further search and the opportunity cost of forgoing potentially 
better offers. The reservation wage will be a function of things such as the costs 
of search, the rate at which job offers arrive and the distribution of wage offers. If 
these determinants do not vary with the duration of unemployment, the 
reservation wage and the probability of leaving unemployment will remain 
constant and the model is said to be stationary.
34 Information provided by the Department of Social Security.
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The starting point for our analysis is to consider the hazard rate. This is the 
instantaneous probability of exiting unemployment for an individual, equal to the 
product of the probability that a job offer arrives and the probability that the 
individual will accept the job offer, that is the wage offer lies above the 
individual’s reservation wage. More formally, the hazard rate for individual i can 
be written as:35
0, = 4  ( 1 - ^ ( 6 ) )  (37)
where: 6t is the hazard rate;
Zi is the job-offer arrival rate;
5  is the constant reservation wage; and
Ft(w) is the cumulative distribution of wage offers.
If the hazard rate is constant, the distribution of completed unemployment spells,
T, facing a newly unemployed individual, i, will be exponential:
g i(T) = e,e-e‘T (38)
However, the data we use from the SEUP are from currently unemployed 
individuals. Therefore, we are interested in the distribution of incomplete spells 
of unemployment rather than of completed spells. The probability of observing 
an individual with an incomplete duration of unemployment of length t, is the
35 The notation is intended to be consistent with Lancaster (1985), although the 
derivations are more closely aligned with Jones (1988).
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probability that the individual did not leave unemployment earlier. This 
probability is given by 1 -Gift) for individual i, where Gift) is the cumulative 
distribution function corresponding to the density function gift). The expression 
1 -Gfi) is also known as the survivor function. The distribution of incomplete 
spells for an individual will, therefore, be the normalised survivor function:36
The final expression in Equation 39 can be obtained by integrating Equation 38 
over T to obtain G(t) and substituting this into Equation 39.
4.2 Incorporating Individual Characteristics
In order to transform the theory into an estimable model, it is necessary to add 
more structure. The first step is to make an assumption about the wage-offer 
distribution. One of the most common and tractable assumptions is that wage 
offers are drawn from a Pareto distribution. This means that the probability of a 
given wage offer exceeding the reservation wage can be expressed as:
(39)
o
(40)
(41)
36 This result can be more formally derived using the standard results from renewal 
theory, see Lancaster (1992).
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where: At is the origin of the Pareto distribution, that is some absolute
minimum wage level facing individual i; and
a  is the scale parameter which can also be interpreted as the 
constant elasticity of the hazard with respect to the reservation 
wage (£).
The second step is to assume that the probability of receiving and accepting a job 
not accounted for by the reservation wage, is an exponential function of the 
individual’s characteristics,^:
AjAf* = exp(& + X i j5 + ui) (42)
The explanatory variables, represented by Xt in Equation 42, are included to 
capture those factors which affect the probability of receiving and accepting job 
offers, given the reservation wage. The job-offer arrival rate will be affected by 
the attractiveness of the individual to the employer. Variables which will capture 
this effect include educational attainment, previous occupation and reasons for 
leaving the last job. These variables are also likely to capture the important 
elements of the wage-offer distribution facing an individual. Personal 
characteristics such as gender, age and English language proficiency may also be 
important. These variables may also affect the degree of search intensity, which 
will in turn affect the job-offer arrival rate. Other variables which could be 
important for explaining search intensity include housing costs and eligibility for 
benefits which capture an individual’s financial capacity to continue job search.
In general these variables are self-explanatory and Appendix D provides more 
detailed definitions. Some variables, however, have required more construction 
due to the design and availability of information from the survey. Eligibility for
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unemployment benefits is likely to be an important explanator of labour-market 
outcomes and has occupied a large amount of space in the job-search literature. 
While the SEUP collects unit record data on episodes of income support, 
including the value of unemployment benefits received, these data are not 
publicly available due to confidentiality restrictions. We have derived a proxy 
variable for unemployment benefit eligibility based on answers to questions 
concerning the main sources of income.
If the respondent was unemployed at the time of the third interview and on 
1 September 1996, we classify them as eligible for unemployment benefits if 
social security was their main source of weekly income in the week prior to the 
interview. This accounts for around 80 per cent of the people that we classify as 
unemployment benefit recipients. If they were unemployed on 1 September 1996 
but not in the week before the third interview, they are classified as eligible for 
unemployment benefits if their main source of income in the last financial year 
was social security.
In general, it is important to control for the fact that different people live in 
different places, because local labour-market conditions and wage rates are likely 
to be important. For Australia, it would be obvious to control for the state in 
which the individual lives as well as the section of state which describes whether 
the respondent lives in a rural area, a country town, a capital city, or a non-capital 
city. However, for confidentiality reasons, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 
(ABS) does not release information about the state of residence.
Instead, we control for the state of the local labour market using an index of 
socioeconomic disadvantage compiled by the ABS. This index measures the 
extent to which the local area displays characteristics such as a high proportion of 
low income families, low average education levels and high unemployment
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rates.37 A higher score in the index of socioeconomic disadvantage suggests that 
the area is less disadvantaged. The SEUP provides information about the decile 
of each individual’s local area ranked by the index of socioeconomic 
disadvantage. Gregory and Hunter (1995) have shown that socioeconomic 
disadvantage and unemployment rates are highly correlated across local areas.
4.3 An Empirical Model
The objective of Section 4 is to derive an empirical model which relates the 
duration of unemployment to the reservation wage and to other explanatory 
variables. We can derive an expression for the expected log of incomplete 
unemployment duration for a given individual as follows:
E(log/, 10,) = Jlog(5)/?,(i>fe
0
(43)
o
= -c - lo g (0 ,)
where c is Euler’s constant *0.577.
Therefore,
EQogt, \£„X l) = -{c  + k) + a lo g (£ )  - X^ / S - E f u ,  | £ ,  * , )  (44)
37 The local area used by the ABS for this index is the Collection District (CD) which is 
a small area defined by the ABS for statistical collection purposes.
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In equilibrium, if the flow into unemployment is the same over time, we can treat 
Equation 44 as a regression model where the individuals used for estimation are a 
cross-section of unemployed people with incomplete durations at a particular 
point in time. To the extent that the assumptions made above are acceptable, the 
parameters of this model can be directly related to the underlying theory and this 
model can be regarded as a structural model. If the assumptions which have been 
made are not acceptable, Equation 44 is still a valid reduced-form regression for 
which theory has only provided guidance as to the types of variables to include.
5 Estimation Results
If the conditional expectation of the error term in Equation 44 is zero and the 
stationary job-search framework is appropriate, then OLS estimation is the 
appropriate estimation strategy. However, if omitted variables result in the 
conditional expectation of the error term being non-zero or, if the reservation 
wage is dependent on unemployment duration, it will be necessary to use 
instrumental variable methods to ensure that parameter estimates are not biased 
and inconsistent. In Section 5.1 the results of estimating the unemployment 
duration equation assuming that there are no problems with omitted variables or 
endogeneity are presented. In Section 5.2 we discuss the implementation of 
instrumental variable estimation and present the results of this method. Finally, in 
Section 5.3, we consider estimating Equation 44 for males and females 
separately.
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5.1 OLS Estimation
The results of estimating Equation 44 over the whole sample by OLS are 
presented in the first column of Table 18. The hourly reservation wage is of the 
expected sign, but is statistically insignificant, suggesting that although the 
reservation wage is of critical importance in the theoretical economic model, 
other factors are more important in explaining unemployment duration 
empirically. Gorter and Gorter (1993), using data for the Netherlands, also find 
no effect and attribute this to the fact that the job-offer arrival rate is the binding 
constraint.
It has been noted by several authors that the longer-term unemployed do not 
receive many job offers and that they usually accept those offers that they do 
receive.38 The data in the SEUP suggest that very few job offers are rejected by 
Australian job seekers. In sum, 72 per cent of job offers made between 
September 1994 and September 1996 were accepted, 1.6 per cent were rejected 
for another job offer and 3.9 per cent were rejected because the potential 
employee already had a job. Only 7.5 per cent of job offers were rejected because 
the job was unsuitable.
38 Jones (1989) found that 85 per cent of a sample of unemployed in the UK in 
September 1982 accepted job offers they had received; Holzer (1988) found that 66 
per cent of a sample of unemployed male youth in the USA in 1981 had not received 
any job offers in the previous month; and van den Berg (1990) found that job offers 
arrived very infrequently for a panel of Dutch men, and that 97 per cent of these 
offers were accepted.
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Table 18: Estimation Results
Number of Observations: 1, 063
OLS Estimation IV First Stage IV Second Stage
Hourly reservation wage 
Search Incentives
0.135
(0.131)
-1.922
(1.205)
Log family income -0.084*
(0.044)
0.041**
(0.010)
-
Family size -0.013 0.005 -0.002
(0.031) (0.007) (0.035)
Unemployment benefit 0.701** -0.011 0.679**
eligibility (0.131) (0.031) (0.141)
Log housing costs -0.222** 0.014 -0.194**
Education
(0.061) (0.015) (0.073)
Degree/diploma -0.451** 0.048 -0.352*
(0.160) (0.038) (0.191)
Vocational qualifications -0.096 0.009 -0.077
(0.110) (0.026) (0.123)
Completed high school 0.013 0.035 0.086
(Less than high school) 
Personal characteristics
(0.112) (0.027) (0.131)
Male -0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.090) (0.021) (0.100)
Age 0.020** 0.006** 0.033**
(0.004) (0.001) (0.009)
English first language 0.125 -0.105** -0.093
(0.208) (0.049) (0.258)
English as a second 0.088 -0.027 0.032
language, high proficiency (0.082) (0.020) (0.974)
Married 0.213* -0.014 0.184
Work Experience
(0.112) (0.027) (0.121)
No previous job 0.238 0.118** 0.481
(0.218) (0.052) (0.281)
Previous hourly pay -0.172** 0.049** -0.072
(0.081) (0.019) (0.110)
continued next page
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Table 18: Estimation Results (continued) 
Number of Observations: 1,063
OLS Estimation IV First Stage IV Second Stage
Work Experience
Manufacturing 0.336** -0.036 0.263*
(0.123) (0.029) (0.144)
Manager/professional 0.743** 0 .1 0 0 * 0.950**
(0.217) (0.052) (0.266)
Advanced clerical 0.036 0.116** 0.274
(0.203) (0.048) (0.260)
Trade 0.167 0.030 0.227
(0.145) (0.034) (0.165)
(Low-skilled occupations)
Manager in manufacturing -1.106** 0.063 -0.975*
(0.524) (0.125) (0.590)
Reasons for leaving job
Temporary job -0.559** 0.027 -0.504**
(0 .1 1 2 ) (0.027) (0.129)
111 health 0.238 -0 .0 0 1 0.235
(0.214) (0.051) (0.238)
Unsatisfactory conditions -0.130 0.007 -0.117
(0.149) (0.035) (0.166)
Child care 0.249* -0.003 0.242
(0.150) (0.036) (0.167)
(Lost job/firm bankrupt)
Local environment
Capital city -0.076 0.078** 0.085
(0.097) (0.023) (0.140)
Rural area -0.040 0.062* 0.088
(0.137) (0.033) (0.165)
(Other urban area)
Index of disadvantage 0 . 0 1 2 0.003 0.017
(0.016) (0.004) (0.018)
R2 0.16 0.16 n.a.
Hq: Overall insignificance 7.61*** 7.53*** 6.34***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* denotes significance from zero at the 10 per cent level
** denotes significance from zero at the 5 per cent level
*** denotes p-value of this test is zero to four decimal places
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One possible reason for the low level of job offers, and consequently the 
insignificance of the reservation wage variable, is that reported reservation wages 
are sometimes below Australia’s award system and minimum safety net pay 
levels. For these respondents, changes in reservation wages are not likely to have 
an effect on unemployment duration and this may bias our results away from 
finding a significant role for reservation wages. This explanation can be 
discounted, however, as the reservation wage variable remains insignificant when 
the unemployment duration regression is estimated for a sample restricted to 
respondents with reservation wages above $10.00, which is clearly above the 
minimum.
The next set of control variables presented in Table 18 have been included to 
capture the impact of financial factors on the incentives to search. The log of 
family income has a marginally significant negative effect on the duration of 
unemployment. To the extent that individuals with higher family income have 
lower costs of search, we would expect the sign of this effect to be positive. 
Finding that there is a negative relationship between family income and duration 
suggests that this variable is capturing quality differences in the sample rather 
than different incentives to search for work. The effects of the other three 
variables in this group are consistent with the interpretation that they represent 
financial factors affecting the costs of search.
Individuals from larger families are likely to experience shorter durations of 
unemployment, all else equal, which can either be attributed to the fact that each 
individual has fewer resources available to fund search or because they need to 
search harder to find work to support dependants. Eligibility for unemployment 
benefits significantly increases the duration of unemployment. However, the 
construction of benefit eligibility implies that ineligibility arises either from the 
means test or because individuals are only short-term unemployed, and therefore
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are likely to possess relatively more skills than the long-term unemployed.39 This 
raises some question as to whether the actual effect being captured is one of 
search intensity or of worker quality.
Higher housing costs are associated with significantly lower durations of 
unemployment. This is likely to capture the effect of financial responsibilities on 
the degree of search effort and consequently on the probability of receiving and 
accepting a job offer. The result may also indicate that housing costs are 
correlated with skills and ability, although we believe that we have adequately 
controlled for this more directly through education variables and previous hourly 
pay.
The estimated effects of other variables included to control for the factors which 
affect whether an acceptable job offer arrives, given the reservation wage, accord 
with our economic priors. They are also consistent with previous estimates 
presented by Jones (1988) for the UK and Miller and Volker (1987) for the youth 
labour market in Australia. Note that where there are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive sets of dummy variables, one category has been omitted and the 
coefficients should be interpreted as the effect of having the given characteristic 
relative to having the omitted characteristic. These omitted categories have been 
included in parentheses in Table 18.
Unemployment durations for more educated individuals are relatively low and 
this is reflected in the results. The duration of unemployment for job seekers who 
have a degree or diploma is significantly lower than it is for those who did not
39 Short-term unemployed may not be captured by our eligibility measure if they were 
unemployed in September 1996, but had left unemployment by the third interview,
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complete high school. Vocational qualifications also tend to reduce 
unemployment duration, although this effect is not significant. The results 
suggest that the unemployment duration experienced by those who completed 
high school and did not obtain further qualifications is not noticeably different 
from those who did not complete high school.
Personal characteristics may also affect the probability of receiving a job offer if 
they are used as a screening device by potential employers or if these 
characteristics capture search intensity. Older workers clearly experience longer 
durations of unemployment, whereas other characteristics such as gender, 
English language proficiency and marital status appear to have little independent 
effect on unemployment duration.
Previous work experience is also an indicator of the desirability of job seekers to 
potential employers. Those with no previous work experience do tend to have 
longer unemployment duration, although this is not a statistically significant 
effect. Higher previous hourly pay, which is likely to capture unmeasured 
features of previous work experience or individual ability, significantly decreases 
unemployment duration. Those who previously worked in more highly paid jobs 
are likely to have skills and experience that are relatively attractive to potential 
employers.
Job seekers who previously worked in the manufacturing industry experience 
significantly longer durations of unemployment. This appears to suggest that a 
lack of labour mobility is hampering the employment prospects of those who 
worked in industries subject to significant structural change. A somewhat more
and had not been unemployed long enough in the year to September 1996 to say that 
their main source of income over the year had been social security.
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surprising result is that more skilled occupations, in particular managers and 
professionals, experience longer durations of unemployment than job seekers in 
low-skilled occupations. At first, this would appear to be difficult to reconcile 
with the fact that structural change has favoured skilled labour.
One possibility is that education and previous hourly wages capture the skill 
differentials between job seekers and that the occupation variables are capturing 
adverse selection; unemployed individuals in an occupation with low 
unemployment rates tend to be of poor quality relative to their peers. As such, 
their unemployment is an important signal of their quality. This is in contrast to 
occupations with high unemployment rates where the quality of unemployed 
workers may not be very different to the quality of employed workers.
This result may also indicate a lack of willingness by those who were previously 
managers or professionals to accept work in a different area. This would be the 
case if managers and professionals have more occupation-specific human capital 
and are willing to search longer for jobs which match these skills than other 
unemployed people whose skills are more generic. This suggests the importance 
of non-wage characteristics of job offers.
Another possibility is that managers and professionals from declining industries 
such as manufacturing have skills specific to that industry and have difficulty 
finding another job. We have attempted to control for this by including an 
interaction variable which indicates if the job seeker was previously employed as 
a manager or a professional in the manufacturing industry. This variable is 
significantly negative, suggesting that this explanation does not have support in 
the data.
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People who left their last job because it was temporary or seasonal have 
significantly lower durations of unemployment than those who were retrenched 
or were working for a firm which went bankrupt. Job seekers who left their jobs 
voluntarily because their conditions of work were unsatisfactory also experience 
lower durations of unemployment, although this is not statistically significant. 
This result supports the idea that potential employers use a job-seeker’s reason 
for leaving last job as a screening device (and that leaving because work 
conditions were unsatisfactory is not deemed to be a bad signal).
However, it could also be taken to indicate that the reason for leaving the last job 
also measures the search effectiveness and/or preferences of the individual. This 
is supported by the result that people who left their jobs due to ill health or for 
child care reasons experience much longer durations of unemployment. While 
the results are not shown, it is also interesting to note that ill health and child care 
reasons for leaving employment are more important explanators of 
unemployment duration for the group of people who did not report a reservation 
wage. This may be another indication that for some groups, considerations other 
than the hourly wage are a more important measure of the acceptability of job 
offers.
Finally, the results presented in Table 18 indicate that the local environment does 
not have a strong effect on the unemployment duration of job seekers, although 
this must be qualified to some extent by the lack of information about the state of 
residence.
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5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
The assumption that the conditional expectation of the error term is zero will be 
violated if omitted variables are correlated with other explanatory variables or the 
reservation wage varies over the duration of unemployment. Theory suggests that 
all the variables which affect the job-offer arrival rate and the parameters of the 
wage-offer distribution will also affect the reservation wage. Therefore, in the 
case of omitted variables, there will be a correlation between the error term and 
the reservation wage variable which will exist even if the sample size is very 
large, ensuring that the OLS parameter estimates are inconsistent.
The solution to this problem is to instrument the reservation wage. The choice of 
instrument must be restricted to variables which directly affect the reservation 
wage but which do not affect the job-offer arrival rate or the wage-offer 
distribution. The most likely candidates are therefore variables which affect the 
cost of unemployment such as the level of unemployment benefits. Instrument 
choice is discussed in more detail below.
The second assumption which must hold for OLS estimation to be appropriate is 
that the reservation wage has no duration dependence. If this is not true, it is 
necessary to think about the duration of unemployment and the reservation wage 
as two endogenous variables in a simultaneous system. There are several 
arguments for why reservation wages will decline with duration. These include:
• declining job offers because employers use duration as a screening device or 
because human capital diminishes with time spent out of work;
• limits to search due to fixed working life, fixed level of assets available to 
fund search, limited duration of unemployment benefits; and
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•  learning about the wage-offer distribution.
In terms of the derivation of the duration equation above, the progression from 
Equation 37 to Equation 38 will no longer be valid in general. However, by 
making specific assumptions about the relationship between the reservation wage 
and the duration of unemployment, Lancaster (1985) shows that it is possible to 
derive a tractable expression for the reservation wage equation in a simultaneous 
system, where the duration equation is the same as Equation 44. In particular, by 
assuming that the reservation wage declines exponentially as a function of the 
duration of unemployment and that its minimum level is an exponential function 
of background characteristics, the second equation of the simultaneous system 
will be log linear.
log£ = - /? lo g / + Z 'y  + & + £ (45)
The parameter p  will have a structural interpretation as the exponential rate of 
decline in reservation wages with duration, if the underlying assumptions are 
accepted. Regardless of whether the coefficients can be interpreted as structural 
estimates, the estimation of Equation 44 will still require instrumental variable 
techniques to deal with the endogeneity bias introduced by the log of the 
reservation wage. We have already argued that all the variables in X  
(Equation 44) must also be in Z (Equation 45). Therefore identification of our 
unemployment duration equation requires that there are some variables in Z and 
not in X. These variables are appropriate instruments for the reservation wage in 
estimating Equation 44. Practically, the choice of instruments will be the same as 
for the omitted variable single equation case discussed above.
The best candidates for instruments are variables which affect the costs of 
unemployment, because they have a direct effect on the level of the reservation
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wage but are not generally considered to directly affect the job-offer arrival rate 
or the parameters of the wage-offer distribution. The most obvious candidate for 
an instrument is therefore the level of unemployment benefits. This is the 
instrument used by Jones (1988) and Gorter and Gorter (1993).
As already mentioned, the SEUP does not provide information about the level of 
unemployment benefits, although we have been able to construct a variable 
which measures eligibility. This would be a valid instrument except that it is 
likely to affect the degree of search intensity and hence, the job-offer arrival rate. 
Wadsworth (1991) provides evidence of this indirect effect for the UK. Further 
evidence from UK data suggests that although eligibility increases the number of 
job-search methods used, through information and incentive effects, there is no 
evidence that the level of unemployment benefits has an effect (Schmitt and 
Wadsworth 1993). This suggests that variables which affect the level of benefits, 
rather than eligibility for benefits, are more likely to be valid instruments. Using 
this reasoning, Lancaster (1985) uses the number of dependents as an instrument.
Using information about the number of search methods reported by individuals in 
our sample, it is possible to obtain some evidence about the factors that affect the 
search effort of job-seekers in Australia.40 As for the UK, eligibility for 
unemployment benefits significantly increases the number of job-search methods 
reported. This information, combined with the fact that it is a significant 
explanator of unemployment duration in the results presented above, suggest that 
it cannot be used as an instrument.
40 Results of this estimation are available from the author on request.
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Variables that have been included in this analysis which are likely to capture the 
level of unemployment benefits rather than eligibility per se are the log of family 
income and family size, due to the presence of means testing and taper rates 
which are a function of the number of dependants. Larger family sizes, being 
female and having left previous employment for child care reasons have a 
significantly negative effect on the number of job-search methods reported. This 
is consistent with labour supply decisions and job-search decisions, especially of 
females, being affected by family considerations. This result also indicates that 
family size, despite having no direct effect on the duration of unemployment, 
will not be an appropriate instrument for the reservation wage due to its indirect 
effect on unemployment duration through search effort.
Interestingly, the log of family income, and other financial considerations which 
do not directly affect the level of unemployment benefits paid such as housing 
costs, have no significant effect on the number of reported job-search methods. 
This is consistent with the results presented above, which suggest that the effect 
of family income on duration was not related to search incentive effects. This 
information, combined with the marginal significance of this variable in Table 18 
suggests that the log of family income can be considered as an instrument for the 
reservation wage. Having English as a second language is also associated with 
fewer reported job-search methods.
The second column of Table 18 presents the results of estimating the reduced 
form reservation wage equation. The log of family income has a significantly 
positive effect on the log level of the reported reservation wage. Therefore, one 
of the important characteristics of an instrument, that it is correlated with the 
variable it is being used as an instrument for, has been fulfilled. Interestingly, 
neither eligibility for unemployment benefits or the log of housing costs which
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are important influences on the duration of unemployment, appear to have an 
effect on the level of the reservation wage.
In general, the other variables which are important explanators of the reservation 
wage in this reduced form regression are work experience variables. Older 
individuals and individuals with higher hourly pay in their previous job report 
significantly higher reservation wages. Both these variables are likely to capture 
some measure of previous experience. Also, individuals from more skilled 
professions have higher reservation wages than low-skilled workers. The highest 
premium appears to exist for advanced clerical workers. Perhaps more puzzling 
is that individuals with no previous work experience have higher reservation 
wages. This may indicate that these individuals have had less experience with the 
labour market and therefore do not assess their value to employers correctly. 
Individuals from ‘other urban areas’, that is, outside capital cities, appear to have 
significantly lower reservation wages, as do individuals who have English as 
their first language.
The results of estimating Equation 44 using the log of family income as an 
instrument are presented in the final column of Table 18. The first thing to note is 
that the estimated effect of reservation wages is still insignificant, but has 
changed sign. The effects of the variables which condition for personal 
characteristics, the attractiveness of the individual to potential employers and 
factors which influence search effort are essentially the same.
If there are omitted variables or the reservation wage is duration dependent, the 
instrumental variable estimates will be unbiased, but the OLS estimates of 
Equation 44, excluding the log of family income as an explanator, will be biased. 
Whether this bias is present can be tested formally using a Hausman test. The 
null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that the two sets of estimates are not
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statistically different, that is the OLS estimates do not have a statistically 
significant bias. Under the null hypothesis, neither estimate will be biased 
although the instrumental variable estimates will be inefficient. We test this null 
hypothesis by estimating the log duration equation (Equation 44), replacing the 
log reservation wage with the predicted reservation wage and the prediction error 
from the reduced form reservation wage equation (Equation 46).
log', =A) +M\ log(|,) + (log(£) - log(£)) + x,.' + ui (46)
Testing the equality of the coefficients ^  and ju2 is equivalent to testing the null 
hypothesis that the OLS estimates are not biased. The F-statistic for this test is 
3.56 which has a p-value of 0.059. Thus, there is some evidence to suggest that 
the OLS estimates are upwardly biased and that IV is the appropriate estimation 
method. Given that the coefficient on the reservation wage is less plausible when 
instrumental variable methods are used, and that the overall conclusions of the 
two estimation techniques are essentially the same, we will restrict further 
estimation and discussion to OLS estimates.41
41 Had there been more than one instrument available, it would have been possible to 
test the validity of the extra instruments by assuming the validity of one. This is 
essentially a test of the overidentifying restrictions implied by having more 
instruments than variables to be instrumented.
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5.3 Estimation Results by Gender
Although the dummy variable for gender in Table 18 is not significant, it is 
possible that different characteristics influence the outcomes of males and 
females differently. To examine this issue more closely, we have estimated the 
factors which affect the duration of unemployment males and females separately. 
Given the discussion above, only OLS estimates are reported in Table 19.
There are some notable differences in the results of estimating Equation 44 by 
OLS separately for males and females. Perhaps most interestingly, the 
reservation wage is significant and of the expected sign for females. This 
suggests that the time women spend looking for work could be reduced if they 
were willing to accept a lower hourly wage. However, it does not immediately 
follow from this observation, that the female unemployment rate would fall if 
women could be persuaded to accept a lower hourly wage.
The definition of job-search in the SEUP is less strict than the labour force 
definition of unemployment. Evidence discussed earlier suggested that females 
with larger families and who left their previous employment for child care 
reasons were likely to report a lower number of job-search methods. It is possible 
that there is a significant number of females in the sample who are marginally 
attached to the labour force, but would be willing to enter the labour force and 
work if they were offered sufficient incentives, eg enough pay to cover child care 
costs. Thus, lower wages may not reduce the unemployment rate due to lower 
participation.
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Table 19: Estimation Results By Gender
Males Females
Hourly reservation wage -0.077 0.407**
Search Incentives
(0.174) (0.203)
Unemployment benefit 0.546** 0.921**
eligibility (0.170) (0.216)
Log housing costs -0.326** -0.070
(0.078) (0 .1 0 2 )
Log family income -0.119** -0.051
(0.058) (0.071)
Family size -0.025 0 .0 0 1
Education
(0.038) (0.057)
Degree/diploma -0.360* -0.547**
(0 .2 1 1 ) (0.258)
Vocational qualifications -0.038 -0.197
(0.137) (0.192)
Completed high school -0.065 0.130
(Less than high school) 
Personal characteristics
(0.144) (0.186)
Age 0 .0 2 0 ** 0 .0 2 1 **
(0.005) (0.203)
English first language -0.14 0.295
(0.278) (0.332)
English as a second language, -0.070 0.250*
high proficiency (0 .1 1 2 ) (0.127)
Married 0.386** 0 .1 0 1
Work Experience
(0.148) (0.183)
No previous job 0.256 0.048
(0.279) (0.362)
Previous hourly pay -0.183* -0.191
(0.104) (0.134)
Manufacturing 0.504** 0 . 0 0 2
(0.148) (0.233)
Continued next page
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Table 19: Estimation Results By Gender (continued)
Males Females
Work Experience
Manager/professional 0.674** 0.820**
(0.277) (0.357)
Advanced clerical 0.307 -0.207
(0.285) (0.299)
Trade 0.153 0.526
(0.155) (0.409)
(Low-skilled occupations)
Manager in manufacturing -1.119** -0.804
(0.575) (1.483)
Reasons for leaving job
Temporary job -0.543** -0.684**
(0.135) (0.208)
111 health 0.348 -0.096
(0.261) (0.386)
Unsatisfactory conditions -0.302* 0.167
(0.180) (0.271)
Child care 0.408* 0.056
(0.223) (0.226)
(Lost job/firm bankrupt)
Local environment
Capital city -0 .0 2 1 -0.123
(0 .1 2 1 ) (0.167)
Rural area 0.054 -0.154
(0.166) (0.250)
(Other urban area)
Index of disadvantage 0.018 0.003
(0 .0 2 0 ) (0.027)
Observations 682 381
R2 0.18 0 .2 1
Ho: Overall insignificance 5  4 9 *** 3.65***
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses
* denotes significance from zero at the 1 0  per cent level
** denotes significance from zero at the 5 per cent level
*** denotes p-value of this test is zero to four decimal places
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The log of family income and the log of housing costs do not affect the 
unemployment duration of females, but significantly increase the duration of 
males. This suggests that the log of family income cannot be used as an 
instrument to test whether instrumental variable estimation is appropriate for the 
male sample. For females, however, the log of family income is significant in the 
reduced form reservation wage regression, and the coefficient on the reservation 
wage in the duration equation, estimated using the log of family income as an 
instrument, changes sign and becomes insignificant. The null hypothesis that the 
OLS estimates are not biased is overwhelmingly accepted using a Hausman test 
of the form described in Equation 46. This provides further evidence that the 
OLS estimates presented in Table 18 should be given more weight than the 
estimates obtained using the log of family income as an instrument.
In general, previous work experience and marital status are more important 
factors for determining the unemployment duration of males. This probably 
reflects the fact that women, especially married women with families, are 
generally more likely to leave the labour force than are males. The 
unemployment duration of females, is more dependent on observable measures 
of quality such as educational attainment than on recent labour-market 
experience.
6 Conclusions
The aim of the analysis in this chapter is to understand the factors which affect 
the duration of unemployment within the context of the basic job-search model. 
The analysis differs from much of the previous analysis of this question for the 
Australian labour market because our data provide information on a wide 
cross-section of Australian job seekers and our empirical model is derived 
directly from job-search theory. It is possible to estimate this model because our
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data include information about the reservation wage which, despite being the 
central focus of economic models, is frequently unavailable in survey data. In 
addition, this chapter estimates a model which allows for reservation wages and 
unemployment duration to be jointly determined, which has not been the focus of 
past papers.
The results suggest that although the reservation wage plays a central role in the 
theory, it is not a significant factor in explaining incomplete unemployment 
spells in the aggregate labour market. The key binding constraint on gaining 
employment is the probability of receiving a job offer. One possible explanation 
for the low job-offer arrival rate is that minimum wages are too high. Evidence 
presented in Section 3 shows that a significant proportion of job seekers have 
reservation wages which lie below the minimum wage, although direct 
comparison is complicated by the system of award wages, age discounts and 
potential measurement differences. Further evidence in Section 5, however, 
suggests that minimum wages cannot be the full explanation for why reservation 
wages are not important determinants of the duration of unemployment.
There is evidence that the reservation wage affects the duration of unemployment 
for females. However, this result does not necessarily imply that the female 
unemployment rate would fall if females were willing to accept a lower hourly 
rate. Given other evidence presented in Section 5 that the job-search behaviour of 
females is affected by family considerations, and that the definition of a job­
seeker in this sample includes individuals who are marginally attached to the 
labour force, it is likely that reservation wages affect participation decisions, 
rather than a willingness to accept work once in the labour force.
Job-search theory also suggests that factors which affect the probability of 
receiving a job offer given the reservation wage should be controlled for. We
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found that variables which capture the attractiveness of the job seeker to potential 
employers such as past work experience and educational attainment, and factors 
which influence the search effectiveness of job seekers such as eligibility for 
unemployment benefits, were important for explaining unemployment duration.
What is clear from this analysis is that the basic job-search model which focuses 
on reservation wages is not sufficient for explaining the duration of 
unemployment experienced by different individuals. Future research should aim 
to understand the impact of institutions such as minimum and award wages on 
the demand for labour, how active the unemployed are in applying for jobs and 
the importance of non-wage characteristics on job offers. This will involve 
developing empirical models which jointly consider firms’ decisions to offer 
jobs, and individuals’ decisions to accept or reject them.
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A p p en d ix  D: D a t a  f r o m  t h e  SEUP
The following variables take the value one when the characteristic is present and
zero otherwise. Omitted variables from sets of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive sets of dummy variables are in parenthesis.
• personal characteristics: married, male;
• previous work experience: no previous job, manufacturing, manager, 
advanced clerical, trade, (low skilled), manager-manufacturing;
• education: degree/diploma, vocational qualifications, high school, (less than 
high school);
• section of state: capital city, rural area, (other urban); and
• left previous job due to: temporary or holiday job, ill health, child care,
unsatisfactory work/pay/hours, (lost job or worked for bankrupt firm).
The following variables are multi-valued variables:
• age: is the midpoint of the range for age recorded in the SEUP;
• family size: is recorded at the Wave 2 interview and is only recorded for
families larger than one. Missing values are therefore, replaced with one;
• log unemployment duration: the log of the number of days of job search in 
which there have been no concurrent working episodes. For jobs prior to 
September 1994, the end date of the last full-time job is considered prior to 
the last part-time job;
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• log of current income of the family unit: records the dollar value of the 
midpoint of the range of the family’s current weekly income;
• housing costs: dollar value of the range of the decile in which housing costs 
of the respondent fall. Housing costs include principal repayments on loans as 
well as interest costs and rent for renters;
Language proficiency variables are defined as:
• 'English first language' takes the value one if their first spoken language was 
English and they usually speak English in the home and zero otherwise; and
• 'English language proficiency' takes the value zero if English is the first 
language, takes the value one if English is not the first language but is spoken 
very well, etc. through to 5 if the respondent does not speak English. It is 
recorded at the Wave 1 interview and is self-evaluated.
Other variables which required more construction are defined as:
Index o f socioeconomic disadvantage
The ABS’s index of socioeconomic disadvantage measures the extent to which 
the local area, displays characteristics such as a high proportion of low income 
families, low average education levels, employed labourers and high 
unemployment rates.42 A higher score in the underlying index of socioeconomic 
disadvantage suggests that the area is less disadvantaged. The SEUP provides
42 The local area used by the ABS for this index is the Collection District (CD) which is 
a small area defined by the ABS for statistical collection purposes.
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information about the decile of each individual’s local area ranked by the index 
of socioeconomic disadvantage.
Log o f hourly reservation wages
Desired hours and reservation wages are taken to be the midpoints of the reported 
ranges. For the range 49 hours and over we arbitrarily choose 49 hours. For the 
highest reservation wage we use $1,179.50.
Hours in previous job
We first take the midpoint of the range of hours that the respondent previously 
worked. If the respondent didn’t have a job post September 1994, we take the 
response to the question concerning usual hours in last full-time job. If there is no 
previous full-time job we take the last part-time job. If there was no previous job 
we replace missing values with zero.
Wage in last full-time job
We first take the midpoint of the range of wages that the respondent previously 
worked for. If the respondent didn’t have a job post September 1994, we take the 
response to the question concerning usual weekly income in last full-time job. If 
there is no previous full-time job we take the last part-time job. If there was no 
previous job we replace missing values with zero.
Log hourly pay
This variable is the log of the ratio of the wage in last job to hours in last job. It is 
set to zero if there is no last job recorded.
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Unemployment benefit eligibility
This variable is set to one if the respondent is considered eligible for 
unemployment benefits. If the respondent was unemployed in both the person- 
level data and in our sample which is based on the episodal data, they are said to 
be eligible for unemployment benefits if their main source of weekly income in 
the week prior to the interview was social security. This accounts for around 80 
per cent of the people who end up being classified as unemployment benefit 
recipients. If they were unemployed at the end of Wave 2 but not at the 
interview, they are classified as eligible for unemployment benefits if their main 
source of income in the last financial year was social security. Therefore, those 
who are not classified as eligible will include some individuals who were 
eligible, but whose unemployment spell at the end of Wave 2 was not long 
enough to report unemployment benefits were their main source of income over 
the year and who left unemployment before the interview date.
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